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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay makes a proposal that may not be controversial among those
with a particular interest in international law, but may be less accepted among
those primarily interested in tax law: that international social and institutional
structures shape, and are shaped by, historical and contemporary domestic
policy decisions. As a result, to incorporate these lessons, tax scholarship
should turn to fields such as international relations, organizational theory, and
political philosophy to provide a broader framework for understanding the rapid
changes that are taking place in tax policy and politics in the United States and
around the world.
What is clear to those interested in tax law is that our field presents an
increasingly technocratic thicket of special rules, principles, and standards
intended to accomplish goals of varying comprehensibility and coherence.
Many-perhaps most-who study tax law concern themselves with the policy
goals and outcomes of a given system as described and implemented through
these rules, standards, and principles, including legislative, judicial, and
administrative efforts. Some scholars are explicit about their focus on a
particular bounded society; others may be less explicit, but rely equally on the
idea that tax law and tax policy are by their nature products and functions of
people gathered within, and defined by, sovereign states.
• Allison Christians is an Assistant Professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School; Steven
Dean is an Associate Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School; Diane Ring is a Professor of Law at Boston
College Law School, and Adam Rosenzweig is an Associate Professor of Law at Washington University
School of Law. The authors would like to thank the organizers and participants of the International Law
Association 2007 Annual International Law Weekend, at which the works in this Essay were presented and
discussed, and the International Law Students Association for graciously inviting us to include this discussion
of our work in this conference issue of the Journal.
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Yet it is equally clear that the subjects of taxation-both people and
activities to different degrees-are increasingly free in their movement across
physical boundaries. The four authors presenting this essay count themselves
among a growing number of tax scholars who are becoming increasingly con-
vinced that the international flow of capital, goods, and, to a lesser extent,
people, presents a fundamentally and significantly changing role for legal
systems and institutions that tax scholarship has not confronted as fully as other
fields.' Our aim in this essay, and in collaborating over our working papers at
venues such as the 2007 International Law Weekend (ILW) annual conference
in New York, is to further the emergent dialogue between tax law scholars and
international law scholars about how law and institutions evolve in our
globalized world. Tax scholarship could benefit from the expertise of those
who have focused in depth on how international organizations, transnational
networks, and non-state institutions and actors shape business and investment
activities and their regulation in a world of increasingly diffused interests and
resources. In turn, uncovering the particular ways in which international tax
systems, institutions, and organizations develop uniquely and independently
from those in related fields, such as environmental regulation and international
trade, can contribute to a broader understanding of such organizations and
institutions and how they impact the development of the rule of law in global
society.
To that end, each of us presents below a brief introduction to a line of
inquiry that we suggest could add to the story of how tax law is evolving in the
United States and globally. The common thread of these inquiries is that each
focuses on understanding the structure of what has been described as a "flawed
miracle": the modern international tax regime.2 The existence of such a
regime, assuming it is properly so designated, is a miracle in the sense that,
despite the lack of any explicit multilateral agreement, there appears to be
consensus on at least some fundamental issues of taxation among a fairly large,
and perhaps growing, number of countries.'
1. See, e.g., Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal 'World Tax Organization'
Through National Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 136 (2006); Julie Roin,
Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems, 81 (No. 7) VA. L. REV. 1753
(1995); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 TAx L. REV. 483 (2004); Nancy
H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 LAw & POLY INT'L Bus. 145 (1998);
Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International Taxation, 26 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 1335 (2001); Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443
(2007); Tsilly Dagan, National Interests in the International Tax Game, 18 VA. TAX REV. 363, (1998). This
is, of course, not an exhaustive list.
2. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure ofInternational Taxation: A Proposalfor Simplification,
74 TEx. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996).
3. Reuven Avi-Yonah is the principal proponent of the theory that there is an international tax
regime. Avi-Yonah, supra note 2, at 1303. Others, such as David Rosenbloom, are skeptical that the
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But the miracle is flawed because of the failure of states to agree
sufficiently on an increasingly lengthy list of key areas, which has had far-
reaching and unanticipated effects. In effect, the flaw of the modem miracle is
a series of unrelieved collective action problems among states, each multiplying
the harm of the other, resulting in policies across borders that distort behavior
and decision-making of individuals. Among such problems identified in the
international tax law literature are international tax arbitrage and the increasing-
ly complex matter of tax competition. The cumulative impact of this growing
web of collective action problems is the potential demise of the ability of any
one country, regardless of size, to effectively collect sufficient revenue to
support its public needs. Concurrently, this comes at the very time a growing
inequality of the distribution of social burdens and benefits is being perceived
worldwide.4
The need for revenue to address this global public goods concern,5 and the
increasing unease about the distributional effects of regulation in an economic-
ally integrated world, require that this web of collective action problems be
addressed and, if possible, overcome. Correspondingly, the conception of the
modem state itself has increasingly become co-extensive with the construct of
citizenship, incorporating ideas about political, social, and economic rights and
obligations to connect peoples with particular governments and the world.
Certainly, no single state can continue as a going concern without raising
revenue, and just as certainly it cannot raise revenue without some plausible
connection to persons and property as revenue sources. Further, states cannot
raise revenue effectively or fairly in the modem international economic regime
without interacting with other states and their citizens, as people, goods,
services, and capital increasingly cross global borders. Thus, international tax
law inexorably intertwines with the broader sovereign authority of the state
itself, including its connections with, and to, its citizenry and the other nations
of the world.
Traditional approaches to international tax scholarship have generally
analyzed the law in terms of pursuing the dual policies of worldwide economic
efficiency and the equitable distribution of the international tax burden. One
striking feature of this traditional approach is that it is both unilateral and
Ameri-centric. To the extent other countries are involved, their taxes are often
collection of international agreements and commonality of particular rules, principles, or standards, can truly
be considered a regime at all. See, e.g., H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the
"International Tax System," 53 TAx L. REv. 137 (2000).
4. For example, as measured by an increasing gini co-efficient in an increasing number of
countries. See, UNITED NATIONS UNmIERsrrY, WORLD INCOME INEQUALITY DATABASE, V 2.Ob (2007),
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/DatabaselenGB/database/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
5. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1575, 1578 (2000).
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considered only as a cost to be taken into account in applying the above
policies.
Approaching international taxation as an inherently global socio-legal
phenomenon would require a departure from this approach, one in which the
international tax regime is analyzed as the interaction of people, capital,
business, other institutions and states, rather than purely as a cost of global
capital investment. Such an approach would require both a broadening of the
scope of the literature incorporated in the tax law scholarship and a departure
from the traditional baselines for analysis. For example, the literature could
begin to incorporate the lessons from multiple areas of scholarship, including
international relations theory, sovereignty theory, political philosophy, political
economy, and behavioral game theory, so as to begin to understand the
changing pressures on taxation that are emerging as a result of the increasingly
complex relationship between states, markets, and people in the globalized
world.
Each of us has begun to consider the broad outlines of these inquiries, and
presents a particular focus below. 6
11. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL TAX7
Given the critical role of taxation and revenue for national governments,
combined with the high (and continually growing) volume' of cross border
business, disagreement is inevitable over whose tax rules should apply, what
those rules should be and what role each country should play. How are these
international tax disputes resolved? When and under what circumstances are
countries able to reach agreement on these tax-based conflicts? The inter-
national tax literature has devoted tremendous resources to considering substan-
6. Each of the four co-authors served as a main contributor of one of the four Sections of this
Essay, with helpful comments and suggestions from the others. Professor Ring is the principal author of the
Section titled International Relations Theory and International Tax; Professor Christians is the principal
author of the Section titled The Role of Sovereignty in the Development of Tax Law; Professor Dean is the
principal author of the Section titled Political Economy and International Tax; and Professor Rosenzweig is
the principal author of the Section titled Group Dynamics, Game Theory and International Tax.
7. Professor Ring has discussed these issues in greater depth in prior articles. See, e.g., Diane
Ring, International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, 60 TAx L. REv. 83 (2007) [hereinafter
International Tax Relations]; Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-
Border Tax Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. REV. 79 (2002).
8. The U.S. Treasury Department recently observed that "[tihe United States is increasingly linked
to the world economy through trade and investment. Capital now flows more freely across the globe.
Businesses start up and operate more freely across borders, and business location and investment decisions
are more sensitive to tax and regulatory structures than in the past." U.S. DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY,
TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BusINEss TAXATION AND GLOBAL COMPETnVENESS, BACKGROUND PAPER 1
(2007).
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tive issues in international taxation. Little attention, however, has been directed
to how conflict is handled--essentially the "relations" aspect of international
tax. Where can we look for a deeper understanding of these fundamental
concerns?
Cross-border conflict is not confined to the field of taxation; virtually all
social and commercial behavior can generate international disagreement. The
international relations literature is devoted to examining questions of
relationships, roles, conflicts and solutions on an international scale and across
a wide range of substantive topics.9 As international tax increasingly turns its
attention to the impact of state-to-state dynamics, multiple players, ° and
intersecting issues, the analyses and insights from international relations
research will move to the fore. Although it can be daunting to begin the process
of synthesizing such an expansive field of literature, the effort is invaluable and
ultimately essential."
For example, by drawing upon the work in "regime theory"12 from the
international relations field, we can develop models for evaluating when
countries are likely to reach a resolution on a significant issue of tax law or
procedure (i.e. create a "regime"). Even the narrow dimension of the inter-
national relations theory literature subsumed under the heading of regime
theory is not monolithic but rather incorporates several different strands and
models. Each model is best understood as applicable to different circumstances
(depending on whether power or other factors such as game theory, type of
issue, and related background features are more salient) and not as competing
for complete analytic superiority. Thus, regime theory analysis provides a new
lens through which to understand one of the central features of the international
tax system-the regime for avoidance of double taxation which is significantly
implemented through income tax treaties.
9. See, e.g., JAMES E. DOUGHERTY & ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR., CONTENDING THEORIES OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 28-34 (5th ed. 2001); ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE:
CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1990); BARRY BUZAN, CHARLES JONES &
RICHARD LITTLE, THE LOGIC OF ANARCHY: NEOREALISM TO STRUCTURAL REALISM (1993).
10. For a consideration of nonstate actors on the global stage, see, e.g., DOUGHERTY &
PFALTZGRAFF, JR., supra note 9, at 28-34; Peter Willetts, Transnational Actors and International
Organizations in Global Politics, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 287,288,292-303 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 1997).
11. See International Tax Relations, supra note 7.
12. ANDREAS HASENCLEVER, PETER MAYER& VOLKERRITTBERGER, THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES 8-11 (1997); REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger & Peter Mayer
eds., 1993). This use of the term "regime" from international relations theory is narrower and more precise
than the general usage seen, for example, in characterizing the international tax system as an "international
tax regime." See supra notes 1-2.
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The effort to interpret the past ninety years of double taxation policy and
practice through the framework of regime theory encourages us to:
1) Understand that double taxation policy includes principles (e.g.,
double taxation is harmful), norms (e.g., residence should yield
to source), and rules (e.g., details for coordinating the countries'
tax laws)-each of which plays a different role in the nature and
degree of conflict and agreement among states;1
3
2) Consider the impact of "power" as compared to game theory,
type of issue, and pairing of states in understanding regime
formation;
3) Examine the relationship between a game theory description of
the regime process and the types of states involved;' 4
4) Contemplate the role played by nonstate actors in the regime
process. "
The application of regime theory to the double taxation case study serves as a
window into the possible relationship between international tax and
international relations theory. First, a regime theory approach can be used to
illuminate other issues currently under debate in the international tax arena,
including tax competition, transfer pricing, and arbitrage. Second, with
increased experience we may develop a better sense of what factors are likely
to contribute to regime formation in international tax, and what factors are
mostly likely to be problematic. Third, regime theory directs our attention to
the powerful impact ofnonstate actors including international organizations and
multinational corporations on the development of international tax policy and
practice.
Each of the above points emerging from regime theory work will benefit
from continued research and analysis within international tax. However,
regime theory is not international relations theory's only potential contribution
to international tax. Two other particularly important strands from international
relations theory include: 1) the role of sovereignty in regime formation and
failure, and 2) the impact of a state's domestic tax and political situation on its
international tax policy. Diane Ring and Allison Christians 6 are currently
examining taxation and sovereignty, and Steven Dean and Adam Rosenzweig
13. International Tax Relations, supra 7, at 147.
14. The implications of game theory in international tax are considered below in Part IV by Adam
Rosenzweig.
15. International Tax Relations, supra note 7, at 97, 147-48.
16. See Diane Ring, What's at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation
State, 1-5, 41-44 (2008) (working paper on file with author) andAlison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation,
and Social Contract, 81 MINN. J. INT'L. L. (forthcoming, 2008) (on file with author).
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are pursuing the impact of domestic politics and group dynamics on inter-
national taxation, infra Part IV and Part V-all with the expectation that inter-
national tax will be enriched through this expanded scope of inquiry which
recognizes the powerful link between international tax and international
relations.
Ill. THE ROLE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAx LAW
17
Professor Ring's work on regime theory in international taxation highlights
how important core international law concepts can be for understanding how
tax law is evolving in the United States and elsewhere. When ideas change
about the meaning and significance of concepts such as sovereignty-what it
is, and what it implies for those who make, implement, and try to abide by what
they consider to be law-the implications can be significant even if it is not
clear why or how the conceptions have changed and are changing. Admittedly,
a simple inquiry into the connection between taxation and sovereignty is not
particularly novel-a people's right to establish its own tax system, often
labeled "tax sovereignty," as classically described by Schumpeter, is a well-
accepted construct in tax scholarship. 8 Even so, many of the ideas we tax
scholars seem to hold about sovereignty have been fairly thin, and some of our
key assumptions seem to be undergoing major challenges and changes. It
seems clear that tax scholars could benefit from a more fully developed
scholarship on the nature of sovereignty as a constraint on law from a
theoretical, and philosophical, and instrumentalist perspective.
As is the case in many other regulatory policy areas, globalization has
brought transnational and international issues to the fore in domestic tax policy
debates. At issue is what states can or should do to regulate economic activity
in an age in which sovereign borders mean little for the flow of economic
activity yet potentially constrain the rule of law. To overcome the potential
constraints of national borders on the regulation of international activity,
domestic policymakers are increasingly using transnational networks, such as
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as
places to coordinate and forge consensus on tax practices and related regulatory
issues.19 In confronting the collective action problems posed by the
17. Professor Christians explores these issues in detail in other works. See, e.g., Allison Christians,
Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 25 WIS. INT'L L.J. 325 (2007) [hereinafter Hard Law];
Christians, supra note 16.
18. Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Crisis of the Tax State, translated in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
PAPERS: TRANSLATION PREPARED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 5, 17-19 (Peacock,
Stolper, Turvey & Henderson, eds., 1954).
19. The OECD is a thirty-member international organization that includes most of the world's
largest economies, including the United States, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom, but not including
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international tax regime, these policymakers are rethinking what sovereignty
does, can, and should mean in a globalized world.
A major example of this rethinking has emerged in the OECD's work on
curbing what they describe as harmful tax practices.20 In the relatively short
amount of time since the OECD began this initiative, a significant body of
scholarship has emerged to try to understand and explain what exactly the
OECD's role is, can, or should be in shaping domestic tax law.2' Substantively,
the OECD's work illustrates the difficulty of overcoming global collective
action problems in the absence of a multilateral agreement such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and a forum for resolving disputes
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). The OECD's work has
demonstrated that striving for coherency within any one tax system is becoming
an increasingly futile effort without achieving virtually global adherence to
some fundamentally global agreed-upon tax policy principles. But this
recognition uncovers major challenges for national policymakers, who must
determine both what justifies any given choice of principles and on what basis
one sovereign state can compel any other to adhere to any given choices.
Some form of framework is needed to debate the principles themselves as
well as the theoretical justification for their implementation. One such frame-
work that seems worth exploring is found primarily in political philosophy and
international relations literature: that of defining and understanding the role of
a social contract in constraining the behavior of individual societies for the
benefit of the community of societies as a whole. Through its initiative, the
OECD is implicitly advancing the existence of a global social compact that
constrains states to regulate in a way that prioritizes community-wide fairness
China or India. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Ratification of the
Convention on the OECD and OECD Member Countries, http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_
2649201185_1889402_1_1 11,00.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). The OECD develops tax policy
guidance that both encapsulates and sets international tax standards in what are usually referred to as
"international" issue areas such as transfer pricing in multinational firms and cross-border income tax
coordination. It serves as a forum for consensus-building among interested parties rather than a body for
creating laws with which its members are expected to comply. As such, it operates more like a transnational
network than a supranational organization. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, ANEW WORLD ORDER 11-13, 145
(2004) (describing a transnational network as a horizontal network ofnational officials that builds consensus
among the members but may be "decentralized and dispersed, incapable of exercising centralized coercive
authority," and a supranational organization as a vertical network used by "states to delegate their sovereignty
to an institution above them with real [coercive] power .. " Id. at 13). Nevertheless, many of the OECD's
declarations in tax matters may be accepted by some as largely equivalent to binding law. See Hard Law,
supra note 17.
20. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development http://www.oecd.org/department/
0,3355,en_2649_33745_11 1 1,00.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
21. See Hard Law, supra note 17.
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in tax policy over competition among states.22 This work suggests that inter-
preting the OECD's work on harmful tax competition as a forging, or defining,
of a social contract is one way to frame the issues for debate on both the
substantive merits (which rules, standards, and principles are being chosen) and
instrumental ones (how the goals are being developed, implemented, and
monitored).
This work argues that key players in the OECD are implicitly advancing
a theory that sovereign states, by virtue of their membership in international
society, are obligated to design their tax systems according to a set of funda-
mental principles agreed upon by the OECD. These policymakers are working
together to create consensus positions and disseminating these positions with
justificatory rhetoric regarding whether and how countries must cooperate in
tax policy formulation. Their main principle seems to be that nation states have
a duty to design their tax systems in ways that are responsive to global
community goals, even when these conflict with domestic goals.
This principle, and an evolving theory about sovereignty and a social
compact, emerges from the language developed by international experts and
officials over time to defend tax sovereignty while simultaneously advancing
universality in several key areas of tax policy. The rhetoric of those who shape
international tax policy gives us clues about what the rule makers, and those
who reflect on the rules, think is important and appropriate at any given time.
Using a social contract approach is one way to explore emerging ideas and
perceptions about what states owe each other, and to recognize that these ideas
and perceptions are constantly evolving. Searching for changes in thinking
about what tax sovereignty means within the language currently used by
international experts and policymakers is a starting point for addressing the
larger question of what sovereignty does or should entail for taxation in a
globalized world.
IV. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 23
Making sense of the relationships that form the international tax regime
represents an enormous, perhaps insurmountable,24 challenge. As discussed
22. Christians, supra note 16, at 44.
23. Professor Dean has explored related themes in two prior articles. See Steven Dean, The
Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, (Brook. Law School, Legal Studies, Paper No. 94, 2008)
[hereinafter Incomplete Global Market], available at http://ssm.com/abstract=- 1078732 (last visited Mar. 22,
2008); Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax Havens, Tax
Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911 (2007).
24. It may even be worth asking whether any such system exists. See Rosenbloom, supra note 3,
at 27. "What, exactly, is this 'international tax system' that the Committee invoked? Is it real? Currently
functioning?" Id. at 137. Professor Ring's work, for example, demonstrates that we cannot hope to find
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above, one way to conceptualize those relationships is to picture states as
citizens of a global community committed to observing norms of behavior that
advance the collective interests of that community. The concept of state as
citizen invites a number of compelling questions. One is whether states are
"members of a close-knit group" of the type that can sustain the informal norms
that can create "Order without Law,, 25 so that the community's interests are
served despite the absence of a formal supra-national governance structure.26
A second is a question that international tax scholars have only begun to
confront.27 The notion that individuals often act irrationally and counter to their
own best interests is well entrenched among legal scholars. The question
international tax scholars must grapple with is whether there is any reason to
expect better of our metaphorical citizen-states. Assuming that it is possible for
large groups of individuals to agree on the nature of their collective best
interests, 2' how likely are national governments to translate their rational
desires into coherent laws, treaties and policies? There are good reasons to
doubt the results that even well-intentioned legislators produce. 29 The link
between a nation's collective well-being and the actions of its government is
likely to be even more attenuated when the role of special interests and the
other foibles of the domestic political process are taken into account.
Still, accepting that domestic politics and the inherent limitations of
government play a significant role in determining the shape of the international
tax regime, this is not tantamount to rejecting the possibility that international
tax scholars can understand and even help to improve that regime. In fact, just
the opposite may be true. With the right tools, including the theoretical insights
offered by international law scholars,30 students of the international tax regime
answers unless we go beyond the traditional approach to tax scholarship into literatures that expressly try to
resolve such questions.
25. ROBERTC. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOWNEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTEs 167(1991).
26. Such as that presented by the WTO.
27. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax
Policy?, 60 TAX L. REV 155 (2007) (considering why it might be rational for nations to pursue policies that
advance worldwide welfare).
28. Are we strict utilitarians attempting to achieve the highest possible GDP? Rawlsians intent on
achieving a fair distribution of well-being? Radical environmentalists?
29. "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem" does not offer much reason for optimism on this front. "In
1972, Kenneth Arrow won the Nobel Prize in large part for proving mathematically that no legislative process
can simultaneously satisfy ... five assumptions on legislative fairness ... and remain rational, where
rationality is defined as the capability of aggregating individual preferences into transitive group orderings."
Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1224 (1994).
30. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory ofInternationalLaw,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 514-19 (2005) (creating a comprehensive framework for predicting the likelihood
that nations will commit to and comply with international regimes).
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may be in a position to answer questions that would otherwise defy rational
explanation. For example, domestic political considerations might explain why
existing bilateral tax treaties do a good job of ensuring that taxpayers are not
subject to duplicative taxes, but do little to help extend the administrative reach
of national tax authorities beyond national boundaries (even if both would
increase the treaty partners' economic welfare).31 Expanding the focus of
international tax scholarship to consider these themes, along with the others
described in this essay, would help to provide policymakers with both a more
accurate snapshot of the international tax regime and a greater capacity to shape
its development.
V. GROUP DYNAMICS, GAME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL TAX32
As with those issues discussed above, applying game theory to the
international relations of states and to the tax relations of states specifically, is
not new.33 Further, the recognition in the realm of international relations and
international law that states rarely fit the traditional unitary actor model is not
novel either; public choice theory, among others, provides alternative and, at
times, persuasive arguments to explain the rise of particular state policies. 34 As
the unitary actor model of the state becomes increasingly challenged outside of
international tax scholarship,35 the assumption of the state as a unitary actor in
game theoretical approaches to international tax grows decreasingly persuasive.
Correspondingly, the predictions to be made from a particular model using the
state as a unitary actor may not necessarily conform to reality, even if the game
has a persuasive explanatory effect.
Introducing group dynamics into game theory, or incorporating group and
sub-group dynamics into the models, may provide an avenue with which to
understand this disconnection.36 International law and international relations
theorists have begun to incorporate these multi-layered group dynamics into
their models of how societies, through groups, governments or otherwise, and
31. See Incomplete Global Market, supra note 23 (discussing the differing fortunes of the early
League of Nations anti-double tax and administrative assistance treaties).
32. Professor Rosenzweig has focused on these issues in previous work, See Adam Rosenzweig,
Harnessing the Costs of International Tax Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV. 555 (2007).
33. International Tax Relations, supra note 7, at 136-137.
34. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, 51 BUFF.
L. REv. 679 (2003).
35. See, e.g., Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, The Decline of the Nation State and its
Effects on Constitutional and International Economic Law: A Public Choice Model of International
Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDoZO L. REV. 925 (1996).
36. See Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of
Law, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1281 (2003).
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states interact with each other.37 What is emerging from this work is that
private actors interacting with each other across borders can impact not only
how any one state interacts with other states, but also how such private actors
interact with each other within their own borders.3" As groups of private actors
internalize norms through such interactions across borders, their influence on
the policies of their particular state may change as well. In other words, it is the
increasing globalization of people, goods, and capital itself which may be
changing the terms of the game by transforming both the internal and external
incentives of countries and their citizens.
This is a potentially powerful conclusion for the field of international tax
law. As people, goods, and capital increasingly cross state borders, and as more
states are brought into the international tax discussion, it may be necessary to
more directly confront the possibility that group dynamics are changing the way
to conceptualize a game theoretical model of international tax. Doing so would
not only provide further support to the existing explanatory game theory models
of international tax, but could also significantly increase their predictive power
as well. Taken to its logical, but not necessarily inevitable conclusion, focusing
the international tax laws on these group dynamics could itself change the
group dynamics, potentially leading to a more optimal worldwide tax system.39
This is not to say that game theory is a panacea for international tax
cooperation. The literature is littered with the remains of theories claiming
such authority in the past. It may, however, have more relevance if broader
global socio-legal interactions are incorporated into the models, so as to more
closely tailor their explanatory power with the reality seen in the modern world.
37. See, e.g., Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive International Law,
60 VAND. L. REv. 77 (2007); Charles K. Whitehead, What's Your Sign?-nternational Norms, Signals, and
Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 695 (2006); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective
Action, and the Law, 102 MICH. L. REv. 71 (2003); see also Brent Simpson, Social Values, Subjective
Transformations, and Cooperation in SocialDilemmas, 67 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 385 (2004); Peter Kollock, Social
Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 ANN. REv. SOC. 183 (1998).
38. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 37, at 71 ("This set of dynamics-which I propose to refer to as
the 'logic ofreciprocity'-suggests not only an alternative account of when collective-action problems will
arise, but also an alternative program for solving (or simply avoiding) them through law."); Whitehead, supra
note 37, at 696 ("The unitary model, consequently, understates the impact on compliance of informal
pressures at the small group and individual levels, and of potentially competing interests between domestic
and international state representatives."); Simpson, supra note 37, at 386 ("it follows that a tendency for
actors to transform [Prisoners Dilemma] into [an Assurance Game] would have important implications for
how groups solve social dilemmas.").
39. Geisinger & Stein, supra note 37, at 112 ("When norms are uncertain, the process of
international law making can serve to construct normative beliefs.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
Contemporary tax scholars face a daunting task in redefining the contours
of a rich body of literature created by generations of professors, practitioners,
and policymakers to reflect a swiftly evolving international environment.
Fortunately, the work of international law scholars, among others, offers
insights that make that task much more manageable. The four lines of inquiry
we have outlined here represent just a few ways to approach the complex web
of interrelated issues that make up the global social, economic, and legal
landscape in which taxation plays a role. Each is part of a search for more
comprehensive analytical tools to assess tax policy decisions that are being
made by national, subnational, and transnational bodies. As the line between
national and international blurs in taxation, as it has in other regulatory fields,
tax scholarship can benefit from the analytical work being done by others who
have grappled with the role and reach of international actors, institutions,
organizations, and frameworks. We hope that this essay furthers this kind of
study.
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The choice of forum in international litigation-which country's courts
will hear the dispute--can be outcome determinative. This article discusses
four doctrines by which a party may influence the choice of forum in
international litigation: Forum non conveniens; Parallel Proceedings; Motions
to Stay or Dismiss U.S. Proceedings in Favor of Parallel Foreign Proceedings;
and Antisuit Injunctions. The brief introduction that follows in Section I sets
forth the context in which these doctrines operate.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. International Litigation and Choice of Forum
1. Multiple Fora
In the absence of an exclusive forum selection clause in an international
contract, an international dispute-by its very nature-could likely be
commenced in more than one forum.
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a. For example, if a U.S. corporation manufactures a product that
injures someone in Scotland, that company is likely to be
subject to personal jurisdiction in both the U.S. and Scotland.
b. If a Japanese company enters into a distribution agreement with
a U.S. company, in the event of a dispute, the Japanese
company may well be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
courts of both the U.S. and Japan.
2. Perceived Advantages of a U.S. Forum
In situations where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction both in
the U.S. and another country, a plaintiff--even a non-U.S. plaintiff-may well
choose to bring suit in the U.S.
a. As one English judge, Lord Denning, said: "As a moth is drawn
to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States."'
b. This is because certain features of the U.S. legal system are
perceived to favor plaintiffs, including the following:
i. The availability of contingent-fee lawyers in the U.S.
ii. The availability of punitive or multiple damages awards.
iii. The availability ofjury trials in civil cases.
iv. The availability of broader discovery.
v. The absence of rules making an unsuccessful party liable
for the attorneys' fees and costs of the successful party.
vi. The availability of causes of action that simply do not
exist in other countries, like under RICO, the antitrust
laws or the securities laws.
vii. The possibility of class action suits.
c. As a corollary, a U.S. forum is often perceived to be
unfavorable to defendants. Thus defendants, relying on various
doctrines and strategies, go to great lengths to avoid suits in the
U.S.
d. Some defendants go so far as to stipulate that they will not
contest liability in a foreign forum if the U.S. suit against them
is dismissed.2
Representatives of the deceased French domiciliaries brought suit against
Boeing and TWA in the District Court for the Southern District of New York.
I. Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, at 730.
2. For example, In re Air Crash offLong Island, New York, 65 F. Supp. 2d 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
arose out of the crash of TWA Flight 800 on July 17, 1996 shortly after it took off from New York's John F.
Kennedy Airport for Paris and Rome.
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Boeing and TWA made a motion to dismiss the suit on grounds offorum non
conveniens in favor of a French forum, predicated on a conditional promise,
among other things, not to contest liability for full compensatory damages in the
courts of France and promptly to pay any damages awarded. Presumably,
defendants believed France to be a more favorable forum because it neither
recognizes punitive damages nor permits contingency fee representation.
Notwithstanding defendants' conditional promise, the court denied the
defendants' motion. The court noted in this context:
If Defendants were not willing not to contest liability as to compensatory
damages, this motion would not require serious consideration. It would not be
necessary to consider the public interest factors, because the private interest
factors would themselves weigh heavily against dismissal. Defendants'
willingness not to contest liability makes dismissal a closer issue. Nevertheless,
an exception is not warranted here.'
e. The U.S. is not always the most favorable forum for a plaintiff
and, when faced with an international dispute, it is important to
consider carefully the advantages and disadvantages of choosing
one forum over another. England, for example, is a favorable
forum for defamation actions.
f. Moreover, in the event that a dispute involves a relatively
modest amount, a foreign plaintiff might be better off in its
home courts than have to incur the additional expense inevitably
involved in litigating in another country.
3. Forum Shopping
When a party to an international dispute commences suit in a forum it
believes to be favorable to its case, such party is often accused of forum
shopping. But, as another English judge, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, has pointed
out, "forum shopping is a dirty word; but it is only a pejorative way of saying
that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice ofjurisdiction, he will naturally choose the
one in which he thinks his case can be most favorably presented: this should
be a matter neither for surprise nor for indignation."4
B. Strategies for Selecting or Avoiding a Forum
1. Introduction
Because the choice of forum in international litigation can be outcome
determinative, a party involved in an international dispute needs to be aware of
3. Id. at 218.
4. The Atlantic Star, [ 19741 A.C. 436, at 471.
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various strategies and doctrines which can affect the location of the forum in
which the case is heard. Some of these strategies and doctrines can often be
employed simultaneously.
2. Exclusive Forum Selection Clauses
One strategy is to choose the forum before any dispute arises. This can be
done by including an exclusive forum selection clause in a contract. An
exclusive clause-as its name suggests-means that a suit can be brought only
in the forum designated in the contract. By contrast, a non-exclusive clause
permits, but does not require, a suit to be brought in a particular forum.
Obviously, whether a party can insist that its home forum is designated in an
exclusive forum selection clause turns on its bargaining power during
negotiations or how strongly the other party views the issue.
In fact, one of the reasons that parties to international contracts often agree
to resolve their disputes by arbitration is to have a "neutral forum" for the
dispute, rather than the home court of one or other party.
A forum selection clause, by its very nature, operates only where the dis-
puting parties have a contractual relationship, although the clause, if appro-
priately drafted, can include within its scope any tortious disputes that may
arise out of that relationship--e.g., a claim that the contract was fraudulently
induced.5 Where there is no contractual relationship between the disputing
parties, however, then, ex hypothesi, there will be no forum selection clause
governing where suit must be brought. Thus, where a dispute arises in circum-
stances where either the disputing parties did not include an exclusive forum
selection clause in their contract, or the dispute does not relate to or arise out
of any such contract, then the parties must resort to various other strategies to
influence the location of the forum in which the case is resolved.
3. Races to the Court House and Actions for Negative Declarations
In the absence of an exclusive forum selection clause, one common
strategy for choosing the forum is to be the first to file suit.
a. A prospective defendant does not have wait for the allegedly
injured party-the prospective plaintiff-to commence suit.
The prospective defendant can launch a pre-emptive strike: it
can bring an action in its own favored forum for a negative
declaration-a declaration that it is not liable to the injured
party (now the defendant) for a particular claim. This strategy
works only if the law of the favored forum recognizes actions
5. Appendix A contains some draft forum selection and related clauses.
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for negative declarations. Generally, such actions are
recognized in both common law and civil law countries.
Although, as Lawrence Collins has noted, "[i]n England, there
has been some hostility to actions for negative declarations."
b. For more information, see Andreas Lowenfeld's article, Forum
Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative Declarations, and
Related Tools of International Litigation.7
Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd. is a recent illustration of an
unsuccessful attempt at an action for declaratory relief brought as a pre-emptive
strike. The case arose out of a press release issued by Harrods intended as an
April Fool's joke. The press release related to plans to "float" Harrods. The
joke played on the word "float," suggesting that Harrods intended to build a
floating version of its store. This release was later run by the Wall Street
Journal (WSJ) which commented on the joke in a story entitled "The Enron of
Britain," stating that: "If Harrods, The British retailer, goes public, investors
would be wise to question its every disclosure." Harrods claimed that this
constituted libel and demanded an apology backed by the threat of litigation.
On May 24, 2002, Dow Jones brought suit in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York seeking (i) relief under the Declaratory
Judgment Act (DJA), asking the court to declare that any libel action based on
the WSJ article would be insufficient as a matter of law; and (ii) an anti-suit
injunction enjoining Harrods and Al-Fayed, its owner, from pursuing any
litigation related to the article. On May 29, 2002, Harrods commenced suit in
the High Court of Justice in London seeking damages for libel. The reason for
Dow Jones' preemptive strike is that England is a far more favorable forum for
libel actions than the U.S.
Harrods moved to dismiss, claiming that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under the DJA. Harrods advanced three grounds:
(i) declaratory judgment relief was not the proper mechanism to
resolve tort claims;
(ii) Dow Jones' action was a forum-shopping pre-emptive strike
brought against the "natural plaintiff," and such a suit is outside
of the purposes contemplated for the use of the DJA; and
(iii) there was no "actual controversy" within the terms of the DJA.
6. Lawrence Collins, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 276
(OUP 1994).
7. Andreas Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative Declarations, andRelated
Tools ofInternational Litigation, 91 Am. J. Int. L. 314 (1997).
8. 237 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aft'd, 346 F.3d 357 (2d Cit. 2003).
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In a lengthy and wide-ranging opinion, Judge Marrero granted Harrods'
motion to dismiss. While it is difficult to cover all the issues addressed in the
court's lengthy opinion, three points are worth noting.
First, the district court found there was no "actual controversy" for the
purposes of the DJA. Dow Jones had argued that there was an "actual
controversy" on the ground that any judgment obtained in England would not
be enforceable in the United States because it would violate the First
Amendment. The court rejected this argument, stating that it was based on
"premature concerns about contingencies that may or may not come to pass."9
Even if Dow Jones' theory that ajudgment against it in the London Action
would be unenforceable in most or all American jurisdictions were conceded,
it does not follow that the mere prospect that such a ruling may be rendered at
some indefinite point in the future raises a sufficient actual controversy within
the meaning of the DJA. The Court does not find enough immediacy and
reality in Dow Jones' claim at this early stage of the London Action to warrant
declaratory relief. In essence, Dow Jones' complaint is grounded on a string of
apprehensions and conjectures about future possibilities: that the court in the
London Action will find a basis to assert jurisdiction and will recognize the
pleading of a sufficient claim; that an adverse ruling on the merits may be
rendered against Dow Jones; that the adjudication may award Harrods
compensatory damages or enjoin Dow Jones from publishing the April 5
Article; that Dow Jones may seek to enforce such judgment in the United States
or elsewhere; that if enforcement is sought, the judgment will be recognized
somewhere. At this juncture, however, these protestations and prospects
amount to nothing more than what they still are: premature concerns about
contingencies that may or may not come to pass.' 0
Second, in support of its argument, Dow Jones also cited cases where
federal courts had granted declaratory or injunctive relief enjoining parallel
state court proceedings where fundamental constitutional rights, such as those
under the First Amendment, were at stake. The district court was careful to
distinguish these cases from the case before it, finding that different
considerations applied in international cases. The court stated:
Thus, under Dow Jones' hypothesis, the DJA would confer upon an
American court a preemptive style of global jurisdiction branching worldwide
and able to strike down offending litigation anywhere on Earth. Intriguing as
such universal power might appear to any judge, this Court must take a more
modest view of the limits of itsjurisdiction, and offers a more humble response
to the invitation and temptation to overreach."
9. Id.
10. Dow Jones, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
11. Id. at 41!.
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Third, the district court also considered whether it would exercise its
discretion to issue declaratory relief even if it were to have found an actual
controversy. In addressing this question, the court found significant that Dow
Jones filed its action as a preemptive strike, and stated that this weighed against
the granting of declaratory relief:
Dow Jones' litigation in this Court amounts to strategic forum-shopping
motivated by pursuit of tactical edge over an opponent. In essence, it seeks to
establish venue here and away from anotherjurisdiction where the action could
properly be brought, and to haul foreign parties into this Court for an
application of American law in support of a declaration of non-liability
shielding Dow Jones from damages for prior conduct. That in this race to the
courthouse Dow Jones managed to file its declaratory action first is
immaterial. 2
Being the first to file suit is not dispositive. (Although, as set forth below,
it is a factor considered under U.S. law on a motion to dismiss or stay on
grounds that there is a parallel foreign proceeding.) A defendant may rely on
certain strategies and doctrines in isolation or combination to defeat a plaintiff's
choice of forum, and a plaintiff to defend its choice of forum:
i. Motion To Dismiss on Grounds of Forum non conveniens;
ii. The Commencement of Parallel Proceedings;
iii. Motion To Stay or Dismiss On Grounds of Parallel Foreign
Proceeding; and
iv. Anti-Suit Injunctions.
The following sections consider U.S. law relating to each of these
doctrines.
II. FORUM NON CONVENENS
A. Basic Principles of US. Law
1. Introduction
As the United States Supreme Court stated in the leading case of GulfOil
Corp. v. Gilbert, "[i]n all cases in which the doctrine offorum non conveniens
comes into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is
amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them."' 3
(italics omitted.)
12. Id. at 440.
13. GulfOil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947).
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2. Presumption In Favor Of Plaintiff's Choice Of Forum
The starting point for an analysis of the doctrine offorum non conveniens
is that there is ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiffs choice
of forum that should "rarely be disturbed."'
14
3. Two-Pronged Test
In addressing a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, a
court has to examine:
a. The availability of an alternative forum to adjudicate the
dispute.
b. If an adequate alternative forum exists, the court will then
balance the public and private interests to determine whether the
convenience of the parties and the ends ofjustice would best be
served by dismissing the action in favor of the alternative
forum. '
4. Discretion
Because the test is so fact-intensive, theforum non conveniens analysis is
largely within the discretion of the district court.
a. "[T]he decision lies wholly within the broad discretion of the
district court and should be reversed only if that discretion has
been clearly abused."'"
b. "Discretion is abused in the context of forum non conveniens
when a decision (1) rests either on an error of law or on a
clearly erroneous finding of fact, or (2) cannot be located within
the range of permissible decisions .... or (3) fails to consider all
the relevant factors or unreasonably balances those factors."' 7
14. GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 508.
15. GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 508-509.
16. Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41,46 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481,491 (2d
Cir. 1998) (limited but "meaningfil" appellate review).
17. Pollux Holding, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 2003).
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5. Applicability To Actions To Confirm International Arbitration Awards
The Second Circuit recently held that an action for the recognition and




As noted above, the first prong of the forum non conveniens analysis
requires a determination of whether an alternative forum is available to hear the
dispute.
a. An alternative forum is said to be "available" if the defendant is
amenable to process in another jurisdiction, except in those
"rare circumstances... where the remedy offered by the other
forum is clearly unsatisfactory."' 9
b. To be available, a forum must permit the "litigation of the
subject matter of the dispute."2 Thus, an adequate forum does
not exist if a statute of limitations bars the bringing of the case
in that forum.2 Courts often deal with statute of limitations
issues by making conditional dismissals.22
c. One common argument made by a non-U.S. plaintiff in
opposition to a defendant's motion to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds is that even though the defendant is
amenable to process in a non-U.S. forum, that forum is not
"available" because it is inadequate.
2. Two-Step Inquiry
Accordingly, some courts have further broken down this prong into a two-
step inquiry:
a. the party moving for dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds must be amenable to jurisdiction in another forum, and
b. the other forum must satisfy certain minimal standards of
adequacy.
18. InreMonigasquedeReassurancesS.A.M v. NakNaftogaz of Ukraineetal., 311 F.3d488 (2d
Cir. 2002). For a discussion of this decision, see William W. Park, The International Currency ofArbitral
Awards, (PLI Coursebook 2004).
19. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981).
20. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
21. BCCI v. State Bank of Pakistan, 273 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 2001).
22. ' See Point G below.
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C. Availability ofAlternative Forum
1. Introduction
In order to satisfy this requirement, the foreign court must have
jurisdiction over all the defendants, notjust the "primary" defendants.23 Where
a defendant is considered to be "not essential," however, the fact that he is not
amenable to jurisdiction in the foreign forum will not preclude dismissal on
grounds offorum non conveniens.24
2. Effect of Legislation in Some Latin American Countries
a. Some Latin American countries have passed statutes which
affect theforum non conveniens analysis by U.S. courts.25
b. The Guatemalan statute is illustrative. It provides that once a
Guatemalan national files a suit in the U.S. on a particular
claim, then the courts of Guatemala cease to have subject matter
jurisdiction over that claim. In such a case, the Guatemalan
national can argue that the Guatemalan forum is unavailable for
the purposes of the U.S.forum non conveniens analysis.
c. The purpose of these laws is to prevent U.S. defendants from
obtaining dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens of a
case brought in a U.S. court by a national of those Latin
American countries.
d. U.S. courts have generally rejected arguments based on these
statutes. In Polanco v. H.B. Fuller Co.,26 the court considered
an argument against dismissal onforum non conveniens grounds
advanced by a Guatemalan citizen who had brought suit in the
U.S. In granting the motion to dismiss, the court stated:
Plaintiff argues that Guatemalan law forbids disturbing a
plaintiff's forum choice. Consequently, Guatemalan courts will
not recognize jurisdiction that has been "manipulated" by a
forum non conveniens transfer. However, a quick and decisive
solution to this potential problem was reached in Delgado v.
Shell Oil, 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1375 (S.D.Tex. 1995). After
23. Madanesv. Madanes,981 F.Supp.241,265-66(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding thatdismissalofsuit
would be improper "absent a proffer by all of the Defendants that they would be willing to consent to the
jurisdiction of the Argentine court .. "). See also Odyssey Re (London) Ltd. v. Stirling Cooke Brown
Holdings Ltd., 85 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
24. Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 293 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996).
25. See, e.g., Decreto Numero 34-97 (1997) (Guatemala); Ley de Defensa de Derechos Procesalas
de Nacionales y Residentes (Law in Defense of the Procedural Rights of Nationals and Residents)
(Honduras); Ley 55 (Ecuador).
26. 941 F. Supp. 1512 (D. Minn. 1996).
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finding Guatemala and other fora to be adequate to meritforum
non conveniens dismissal, the court directed that "in the event
that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction" of any plaintiff's case, that
plaintiff may return, and the court will resume jurisdiction.27
e. In Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,28 plaintiff opposed a motion to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds by relying on
Ecuadorian Law 55. Law 55 provides in part: "Should the
lawsuit be filed outside Ecuadorian territory, this will definitely
terminate national competency as well as any jurisdiction of
Ecuadorian judges over the matter."
Plaintiffs argued that Ecuador was not an available
alternative forum on the ground that, under Law 55, Ecuadorian
courts had no jurisdiction.
Judge Rakoff rejected this argument because it "relied on
two doubtful assumptions. '29 The first is that Law 55 is retro-
active (Law 55 was enacted in 1998, and the suit in question
was filed in the U.S. prior to 1998.) The second assumption is
that Law 55 applies even after a case is dismissed on grounds of
forum non conveniens. Judge Rakoff found that "[w]hile the
Ecuadorian courts have yet to resolve these issues .... the
unlikelihood that Ecuadorian courts would ultimately adopt both
these dubious assumptions makes Law 55 an insufficient basis
for concluding that the Ecuadorian forum is unavailable."3
Judge Rakoff qualified the dismissal of the case, however:
Nevertheless, as a safeguard, this Court ... will qualify the dismissals
here to provide that in the event that a court of last review in Ecuador
finally affirms the dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction pursuant to Law
55 of any action raising the claims here at issue pursued in good faith
in Ecuador by any of the plaintiffs here, this Court, upon motion made
within 60 days, will resume jurisdiction over that action.3
The Second Circuit agreed with this reasoning and noted
that, since the district court's decision, the Ecuadorian Constitu-
tional Court had declared Law 55 to be unconstitutional.3 2
27. Id. at 1525.
28. 142 F. Supp.2d 534, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affidas modified, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
29. Id. at 546.
30. Id. at 547.
31. Id. at 547.
32. 303 F.3d at 477.
20081 329
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
D. Adequacy OfAlternative Forum
1. Burden to Show Adequate Forum
It is the moving party's burden to demonstrate the existence of an adequate
alternative forum.33
2. Bases for Claiming Inadequacy
There are three different bases for claiming that a forum is inadequate: (a)
the substantive law of the alternative forum is inadequate; (b) the procedures
of the alternative forum are inadequate; or (c) the political or social circum-
stances in the alternative forum are such as to render it inadequate.
3. Adequacy of Alternative Forum: Substantive Law
a. The fact that the substantive law of the foreign forum differs
from that of the U.S. "should ordinarily not be given conclusive
or even substantial weight"34 , and "[t]he availability of an
adequate alternative forum does not depend on the existence of
an identical cause of action in the other forum."35
b. Although the courts are not always in agreement, most courts
have granted motions to dismiss on grounds of forum non
conveniens notwithstanding the fact that foreign law does not
provide the same remedy as that available under U.S. law, as
long as there is some remedy under foreign law.
c. Set forth below are some arguments considered by the courts in
considering whether a forum is inadequate on the ground its
substantive law differs from the U.S.:
i. RICO Claims. Because plaintiffs can still bring foreign
suits based on the underlying predicate acts, RICO suits
are subject to forum non conveniens dismissal. 6
ii. Antitrust Suits. The Circuits are divided on whether the
doctrine offorum non conveniens is applicable to antitrust
33. BCCI v. State Bank of Pakistan, 273 F.3d 241,248 (2d Cir. 2001).
34. Id. at 247.
35. PT United Can Co. Ltd. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1998).
36. Lockman Found v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 1991); PT
United Can Co., 138 F.3d at 74; Transunion Corp. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 811 F.2d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) ("A review of the legislative history of RICO ... discloses no mandate that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens should not apply .... ). See also In reAir Crash offLong Island, New York, 65 F. Supp. 2d 207
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Alfadda v. Fenn, 159 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Because the traditional Gilbert public
interest factors weigh heavily in favor of France, we do not agree that the United States' interest in applying
'its securities and RICO laws rendered Judge McKenna's decision to dismiss on the grounds of forum non
conveniens an abuse of discretion.").
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cases. The Fifth Circuit has reasoned that absent the
antitrust claim, there may not be an alternate remedy
available to a plaintiff and therefore, these claims should
not be subject to forum non conveniens dismissal."
iii. Securities Law. Courts have held that claims based on
U.S. securities laws are subject to forum non conveniens
dismissal. 8
iv. Copyright Law. Copyright suits have been dismissed on
forum non conveniens grounds, as most countries have
their own copyright laws available as a potential remedy.
For example, the Ninth Circuit held that the Singapore
Copyright Act provided an adequate alternative remedy to
the U.S. Copyright Act, even though its territorial limita-
tions reduced the scope of relief available.39
4. Adequacy of Alternative Forum: Procedural Differences
a. The fact that a foreign forum has different procedures to a U.S.
forum will rarely render it inadequate. If all a plaintiff had to do
was demonstrate that the foreign court had less favorable
procedures than that of a U.S. court, as a practical matter almost
every foreign forum would be found to be inadequate.
b. Set forth below are some of the arguments considered by courts
in assessing whether a foreign forum is inadequate on
procedural grounds:
i. Availability of Jury Trial. The fact that a foreign forum
does not have jury trials does not render it inadequate.4"
37. Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated by 460 U.S. 1007
(1983). But cf Capital Currency Exch., N.V. v. Nat "l Westminster Bank PLC, 155 F.3d 603, 609 (2d Cir.
1998) ("[A]ntitrust suits are subject to dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine."). See also CSR
Ltd. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 484 (D.N.J. 2001).
38. See e.g.,Howev. GoldcorpInv., Ltd., 946 F.2d944,950(1stCir. 1991), cert. denied, 502U.S.
1095 (1992); Alfadda v. Fenn, 966 F. Supp. 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 159 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1998); But
see Derensis v. Coopers & Lybrand, 930 F. Supp. 1003, 1011 (D.N.J. 1996) (Canada was not adequate
alternative forum for securities class action suit based on U.S. securities laws, noting that the U.S. "has a
strong public policy of protecting the integrity of its securities markets").
39. Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech System Pte., Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1995). See also
Deston Songs LLC v. Wingspan Records, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9763 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2001). But see
Jose Armando Bermudez & Co. v. Bermudez Int'l, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12354, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2000)
(declining to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds where plaintiff asserted trademark and copyright
infringement claims).
40. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195,199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 871 (1987); Lockman Found, 930 F.2d at 768.
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ii. Discovery. While most countries do not have the broad
scope of discovery available in the U.S., this will not
render a foreign forum inadequate.4'
iii. Contingent Fee Arrangements. In Murray v. British
Broad Corp.,42 an English national argued that while he
could have brought suit against the BBC in England,
England was not an adequate forum because it does not
permit contingency fee arrangements. Therefore, he did
not have the financial means to litigate in England, and
hence, England was not available to adjudicate the
dispute. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rejected this argument.
The Second Circuit did not deny that the question of
whether a plaintiff had the financial means to bring a suit
in a non-U.S. forum was a factor to be taken into account
after the court had determined that an alternative forum is
available. But the court held that this financial issue could
not be taken into account for the purposes of the threshold
determination of whether an alternative forum was
available in the first place.43
iv. Delay. Generally, a delay of a few years in the foreign
forum is insignificant in the forum non conveniens
calculus."
However, there is a point where the prospective remedy becomes so
remote, that it becomes no remedy at all.45 Where the plaintiff produces
significant evidence documenting the partiality or delay (in years) typically
associated with the adjudication of claims, and these conditions are so severe
41. See, e.g., Doe v. Hyland Therapeutics Div., 807 F. Supp. 1117, 1123-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Pavlov v. Bank ofN.Y Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 426,434-435 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), vacated on other grounds by
25 Fed. Appx. 70, 2002 WL 63576 (2d Cir. Jan. 14, 2002).
42. 81 F.3d 287 (2d Cir. 1996).
43. Id. at 292. See In re Air Crash off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 217 ("the absence of
contingent fee arrangements in a foreign jurisdiction is a permissible factor to weigh in the forum non
conveniens analysis."). See also Byrne v. BBC, 132 F. Supp. 2d 229, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
44. See, e.g.,EastmanKodak Co. v. Kavlin,978 F. Supp. 1078, 1085-86, 1086 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(five year delay for civil actions not given great weight, although Bolivia ultimately found inadequate on other
grounds); Manela v. Garantia Banking Ltd., 940 F. Supp. 584, 591 n. II (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (three year or
longer delay in Brazil did not render forum inadequate).
45. Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220 (3d Cir. 1995) (India held inadequate
where there would be a delay of up to twenty-five years before the litigation could be resolved); Sablic v.
Armada Shipping Aps, 973 F. Supp. 745,748 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (backlog of cases in Croatia possibly resulting
in a lengthy delay cited as one reason for finding it to be an inadequate forum).
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as to call the adequacy of the forum into doubt, then the burden shifts to the
defendant to persuade the district court that the forum is adequate."'
v. Punitive Damages. A Brazilian forum was held to
be adequate even though Brazil did not permit
recovery of punitive damages or damages for pain
and suffering.47
iv. Class Actions. The absence of the class action
procedure "does not ordinarily render a forum
'inadequate' for purposes offorum non conveniens
analysis."4
5. Adequacy of Alternative Forum: Political Issues/Institutional Infirmity
a. While courts have dismissed forum non conveniens motions
based on assertions of political instability or a demonstrated
institutional bias, these conditions must be very severe and well
documented to be taken into account by courts.
b. In the interests of comity, U.S. courts are reluctant to assess the
integrity or quality of foreign judicial systems.
c. Set forth below are some of the arguments considered by courts
in assessing whether a foreign forum is inadequate on grounds
of political instability or institutional bias:
i. Impartiality or Corruption. A generalized concern about
the impartiality of a country's judicial system is not
enough and such claims "[do] not enjoy a particularly
impressive track record."49  Courts are particularly
resistant to these claims when the plaintiff has chosen to
transact business in the foreign forum.5" ("There is a
substantial temerity to the claim that the forum where a
party has chosen to transact business.., is inadequate.")
In Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venez. S.A., 51 the Second
Circuit rejected general concerns that the "Venezuelan
system of justice is ... endemically incompetent, biased,
and corrupt."52 In Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc., 3 the
First Circuit rejected claims that the Turkish justice
system exhibited a "profound bias" against Americans and
46. Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F. 3d 1305, 1313 (11 th Cir. 2001).
47. De Melo v. Lederle Labs., 801 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1986).
48. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
49. Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 1084 (collecting cases).
50. Id. at 1084-85
51. 997 F.2d 974, 981 (2d Cir. 1993).
52. Id.
53. 981 F.2d 1345 (lst Cir. 1992) cert. denied, 508 U.S. 912.
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foreign women.54 In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper
Corp.,5 the court found that "the Peruvian courts furnish
an available and adequate forum for the adjudication of
plaintiffs' claims against Southern Peru and the awarding
of appropriate damages if those claims succeed."56
ii. Fears for Safety. A plaintiff's concern for his or her
individual safety may be given consideration in extreme
situations."
iii Political Unrest. Courts appear to be more sympathetic to
claims of political unrest. In Hatzlachh Supply Inc. v.
TradewindAirways Ltd.,58 a U.S. corporation brought an
action against an English airline for misdelivery of cargo
in Nigeria. The court held that Nigeria was an inadequate
forum, citing strict currency controls that may have
prevented plaintiff from taking out of Nigeria any award
he may have secured, as well as a statute of limitations
that would have provided very little time for plaintiff to
prepare his action. Although the court chose not to decide
the case on this point, the opinion also referred to a travel
advisory warning that portions of the Nigerian
Constitution were suspended, all new legislation was by
decree and violators normally appear before a military
tribunal.59
Similarly, in Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania
de A cero Del Pacifico S.A.,6 the court denied a motion to
dismiss, holding that the defendant failed to establish that
Chile was an adequate forum: "[Plaintiff] has raised
serious questions about the independence of the Chilean
judiciary vis i vis the military junta currently in power."'"
Although there were constitutional provisions in force
54. Id.at 1351.
55. 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
56. But cf Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 1085 (holding that, despite the justifiably strong
inclination against granting these claims, the corruption in the Bolivian system was "compelling" enough to
render that forum inadequate).
57. See, e.g., Rasoulzadeh v. Assoc. Press, 574 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affdmem., 767 F.2d
908 (2d Cir. 1985) (denying forum non conveniens motion where plaintiffs would probably be executed if
they returned to Iran). But see Shields v. MiRyung Constr. Co., 508 F. Supp. 891, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(rejecting plaintiff's assertions that his safety would be endangered in Saudi Arabia as "unsubstantiated
speculation").
58. 659 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
59. See also Sablic, 973 F. Supp. at 748 (holding that, although Croatia was making "great strides
towards recovery," the political and military instability still rendered this country an inadequate forum).
60. 528 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
61. Id. at 1342.
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guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, the junta
had the ability to amend or rescind the constitution. The
plaintiff's concern about getting a fair trial in Chile was
exacerbated because the defendant was a state-owned
corporation.
E. Characteristics ofPlaintiffAffecting Forum Non Conveniens Analysis
1. Introduction
As noted, a central aspect of the forum non conveniens analysis is the
presumption in favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum. The degree of
deference shown to a plaintiff's choice of forum depends in large part on
certain characteristics of the plaintiff.
2. Citizenship and/or Residence of Plaintiff
a. General Principle
It has long been a general principle of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens that a U.S. plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to greater deference
than that of a non-U.S. plaintiff.62 However, being a U.S. citizen is not
dispositive.63 As a corollary, a non-U.S. plaintiff's choice of a forum is entitled
to less deference than that of a U.S. plaintiff.' This is not based on a desire to
disadvantage foreign plaintiffs, but rather on an assessment of the ultimate
convenience of the forum:
When the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this
choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption
is much less reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non
conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's
choice deserves less deference.65
The fact that a plaintiff is foreign, however, is not dispositive. This does
not mean, however, that dismissal is 'automatically barred' when a plaintiff has
chosen his home forum, nor that dismissal is automatically mandated when a
foreign plaintiff is involved. Rather, 'some weight' must be given to the
foreign plaintiff's forum choice, and 'this reduced weight is not an invitation
62. See Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947) (plaintiff's choice of
forum is entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has sued in the plaintiffs home forum).
63. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/VNordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) ("American
citizenship alone is not a barrier to dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens.").
64. Piper, 454 U.S. at 255-256. See also Ralph v. Long, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8197, at *6 (D.
Md. June 14, 2001).
65. Piper, 454 U.S. at 255-56.
Fellas20081
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
to accord a foreign plaintiffs selection of an American forum no deference
since dismissal forforum non conveniens is the exception rather than the rule.'66
b. The Iragorri Case: Examining Motives for Choice of Forum and for
Motion to Dismiss.
In a recent en banc decision, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has addressed the general principle that a U.S. plaintiffs choice of forum is
entitled to greater deference than that of a non-U.S. plaintiff and has instructed
courts to look behind the plaintiff's citizenship and/or residence to other
relevant considerations:
We regard the Supreme Court's instructions that (1) a plaintiff's choice of
her home forum should be given great deference, while (2) a foreign resident's
choice of a U.S. forum should receive less consideration, as representing
consistent applications of a broader principle under which the degree of
deference to be given to a plaintiffs choice of forum moves on a sliding scale
depending on several relevant considerations.67
In Iragorri, the Second Circuit convened en banc in order to address the
issue of the deference to be accorded a plaintiffs choice of forum in the light
of three earlier, recent decisions of the Second Circuit,68 which stand for the
proposition that a U.S. resident's choice of forum is entitled to deference even
if that resident chooses to bring suit in a forum different from that plaintiff's
home forum.
Iragorri arose out of an elevator accident that took place in Cali,
Colombia, in which a naturalized U.S. citizen and Florida domiciliary died.
The plaintiffs, the wife and children of the deceased, who were also Florida
domiciliaries, and the estate of the deceased, brought suit in the District Court
for the District of Connecticut against the manufacturer of the elevators--Otis
Elevator Company, and United Technologies Corporation-both of which had
their principal places of business in Connecticut. The defendants moved to
dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens, arguing that the suit should be
brought in Cali. The district court granted the motion.
The Second Circuit reversed the decision, but, almost simultaneously,
convened en banc to address the question of what degree of deference to accord
a U.S. plaintiffs choice of forum where suit is brought in a U.S. district
different from the one in which the plaintiff resides. In its en banc decision, the
66. CromerFin. Ltd. v. Berger, 158 F. Supp. 2d 347,354 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted). See
also Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001).
67. Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2001).
68. Guidi v. Inter-Cont ' Hotels Corp., 224 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); and DiRienzo v. Philip Services Corp., 232 F.3d 49 (2d Cir.
2000), vacated by 294 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2002),
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Second Circuit held that the district court did not accord the proper degree of
deference to the plaintiffs choice of forum, and vacated the district court's
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
In the course of its en banc decision, the Second Circuit rejected the notion
that there was a hard and fast rule that a U.S. plaintiff's choice of forum should
be accorded deference only where the suit is brought in plaintiff's home district.
Rather, it is necessary to examine why the U.S. plaintiff brought suit outside of
her home forum to determine whether it was done for valid reasons or to obtain
a tactical advantage.
The Second Circuit stated:
The rule is not so abrupt or arbitrary. One of the factors that
necessarily affects a plaintiffs choice of forum is the need to sue in
a place where the defendant is amenable to suit. Consider for
example a hypothetical plaintiff residing in New Jersey, who brought
suit in the Southern District ofNew York, barely an hour's drive from
the plaintiffs residence, because the defendant was amenable to suit
in the Southern District but not in New Jersey. It would make little
sense to withhold deference for the plaintiff s choice merely because
she did not sue in her home district. Where a U.S. resident leaves her
home district to sue the defendant where the defendant has established
itself and is thus amenable to suit, this would not ordinarily indicate
a choice motivated by desire to impose tactical disadvantage on the
defendant. This is all the more true where the defendant's amen-
ability to suit in the plaintiffs home district is unclear. A plaintiff
should not be compelled to mount a suit in a district where she cannot
be sure of perfecting jurisdiction over the defendant, if by moving to
another district, she can be confident of bringing the defendant before
the court. In many circumstances, it will be far more convenient for
a U.S. resident plaintiff to sue in a U.S. court than in a foreign
country, even though it is not the district in which the plaintiff resides.
It is not a correct understanding of the rule to accord deference only
when the suit is brought in the plaintiff's home district.69
Thus, instead of a hard and fast rule, the Second Circuit asserted that
courts should look at the reasons or motivation that led a plaintiff to choose a
particular forum. More particularly, the Second Circuit distinguished a forum
chosen for "legitimate reasons" from one chosen for "tactical advantage."7
The Second Circuit did not give an exhaustive list of what constitute "legitimate
reasons" for the choice of forum or what constitutes a choice for "tactical
69. Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 72-73 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
70. Id. at 73.
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advantage." But it did allude to certain motives that would fall into one or
another category.
Thus, one legitimate reason for the choice of a particular U.S. forum
includes, in the case of a U.S. resident or citizen, the amenability of the
defendant to suit in the chosen forum, as opposed to plaintiffs home forum.
"A plaintiff should not be compelled to mount a suit in a district where she
cannot be sure of perfecting jurisdiction over the defendant, if by moving to
another district, she can be confident of bringing the defendant before the
court."71
Similarly, a plaintiff would have been motivated by the desire to obtain a
"tactical advantage" or has selected a forum for "forum-shopping reasons," 72
when it appears that a U.S. forum was chosen because:
United States courts award higher damages than are common in other
countries"; "local laws... favor plaintiff's case"; of the "habitual
generosity of juries in the United States or in the forum district"; of
the "plaintiff's popularity or the defendant's unpopularity in the
region"; of "the inconvenience and expense to the defendant resulting
from litigation in that forum.73
The Second Circuit also made clear that the court should not simply
scrutinize the motivations for a plaintiff's choice of a particular forum, but it
should also examine a defendant's motivations in making a motion to dismiss
on grounds offorum non conveniens.
Courts should be mindful that,just as plaintiffs sometimes choose a forum
for forum-shopping reasons, defendants also may move for dismissal under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens not because of genuine concern with
convenience, but because of similar forum-shopping reasons. District courts
should therefore arm themselves with an appropriate degree of skepticism in
assessing whether the defendant has demonstrated genuine inconvenience and
a clear preferability of the foreign forum. And the greater the degree to which
the plaintiff has chosen a forum where the defendant's witnesses and evidence
are to be found, the harder it should be for the defendant to demonstrate
inconvenience.74
Moreover, the Second Circuit also made it clear that the appropriate degree
of deference due to a U.S. citizen's choice of forum will also turn on whether
that citizen is also a resident of the United States.
71. Id.
72. Id. at71.
73. Id. at 71-72.
74. Id. at 75.
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When Guidi spoke of the deference due to the choice of forum by U.S.
"citizens," we understand these references to signify citizens who were also
U.S. residents, rather than situations in which an expatriate U.S. citizen residing
permanently in a foreign country brings suit in the United States .... As to
such suits, it would be less reasonable to assume the choice of forum is based
on convenience.75
While the facts of Iragorri-and the specific question to be addressed by
the Second Circuit-relate to the choice by a U.S. resident plaintiff of a forum
other than its home forum, the Second Circuit made clear that principle
articulated in that case was not limited to that fact pattern, but applied more
generally to all plaintiffs, whether domestic or forum:
The Second Circuit stated that: "The more it appears that a domestic
or foreign plaintiff's choice of forum has been dictated by reasons
that the law will recognize as valid, the greater the deference that will
be given to the plaintiff's choice of forum... On the other hand, the
more it appears that the plaintiffs choice of a U.S. forum was
motivated by forum-shopping reasons ... the less deference the
plaintiff's choice commands...""
Thus, in Iragorri, it appears that the Second Circuit has instructed district
courts conducting a forum non conveniens analysis not to attach decisive
significance to the citizenship or residence of the plaintiff, but, rather, to
attempt to ascertain the reasons for why a plaintiff chose one forum rather than
another.
As the Second Circuit stated in Iragorri, "while plaintiff's citizenship and
residence can serve as a proxy for, or indication of, convenience, neither the
plaintiffs citizenship nor residence, nor the degree of deference given to her
choice of forum controls the outcome.""
c. Decisions Applying Iragorri
Recent decisions applying Iragorri have applied to foreign plaintiffs.
These decisions have also made it clear that it is hard to distinguish between
bringing suit for "tactical advantage" and bringing suit for "legitimate
considerations." In In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation," a Canadian
plaintiff brought suit in the U.S. and sought to justify litigating in the U.S. "by
noting that Canada does not permit punitive damages awards in cases like these,
75. Id. at 73 n.5.
76. Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 74.
78. 214 F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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a point... that underscores the fact that plaintiff's suit here is the product of
forum shopping."79 The court held that "[p]laintiff s choice of forum is entitled
to little weight in view of his foreign residence and forum shopping."80
In Wesoke v. Contract Services, Ltd.,"' by contrast, the court held that the
U.S. plaintiff brought suit in the United States for legitimate reasons because
"[P]laintiffs' papers make clear that their main purpose in bringing this action
in the United States was to avoid the substantial (and in all likelihood
prohibitive) expense of litigating in the United Kingdom-expenses generally
associated with litigating a case overseas coupled with the particular
requirement in the United Kingdom that a plaintiff post a substantial bond to
guarantee the payment of attorneys' fees." But bringing suit in one forum to
avoid costs of litigation in another could just as easily be characterized as an
attempt to receive a "tactical advantage" as opposed to a "legitimate
consideration."
In DiRienzo v. Philip Services Corp.,2 the court, relying on Iragorri,
questioned the defendant's motives for moving to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds.
3. Treaties
There are several trade agreements between the U.S. and other countries
that accord nationals of these countries the equivalent access and consideration
that U.S. citizens receive in U.S. courts. When a foreign plaintiff is a national
of a country that is party to such a treaty, that plaintiff's choice of forum is
accorded the same presumption as a U.S. citizen's. 3
In the Iragorri case, the Second Circuit cited to a letter provided to the
Second Circuit by the Department of Justice in response to its inquiry about
how the question to be addressed by the en banc panel "might be affected by
U.S. treaty obligations, including those affording access to U.S. courts." 4 It is
interesting to note that while the Department of Justice acknowledged the
existence of treaties that accorded to foreign nationals access to U.S. courts on
terms no less favorable than those enjoyed by U.S. nationals, it added that "any
right of access afforded to a foreign national plaintiff by treaty will generally
79. Id. at 400.
80. Id.
81. No. 00 Civ. 1188 (CBM), 2002 WL 1560775 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2002).
82. 294 F.3d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 2002).
83. See, e.g., Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venez. S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that, due to treaty between the U.S. and Venezuela, "no discount may be imposed upon the plaintiff's initial
choice of a New York forum"); Irish Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90, 91-92 (2d Cir.
1984); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/VNordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 890 (1980).
84. Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 69 n.2.
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be only a right to the same access that would be accorded to a U.S. national who
is otherwise similarly situated."85
In Iragorri, the Second Circuit stated that "[t]hough the instant case does
not implicate any treaty obligations, the forum non conveniens analysis that we
articulate here is mindful of those considerations."86
In Pollux,7 the Second Circuit considered a treaty between the United
States and Liberia, which provided "freedom of access" to citizens of Liberia.
The court distinguished this treaty from treaties which provide "equal access"
to foreign nationals, and held that plaintiffs' choice of forum should be
accorded "the lesser degree of deference typically afforded foreign plaintiffs."88
4. Suit Involves Plaintiffs Activities Abroad: Corporations v. Individuals
When a U.S. corporation engages extensively in business in a foreign
country and brings suit in a U.S. court based on events occurring abroad, the
strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff's choice of forum is discounted.
a. This is based on the underlying rationale of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens: "A corporate plaintiff's citizenship or
residence may not correlate with its real convenience because of
the nature of the corporate entity, while an individual's
residence more often will correlate with his or her
convenience."89 As the court also noted: "Judicial concern for
allowing citizens ofthe United States access to American courts
has been tempered by the expansion and realities of
international commerce." 9
b. By contrast, the strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff's
choice of forum is affirmed when the plaintiff is a U.S.
individual in a tort action, such as the plaintiffs in Reid- Walen,
a couple injured while vacationing in Jamaica. 9'
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. 329 F.3d at 73.
88. Id.
89. Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1395 n.8 (8th Cir. 1991).
90. Id. at 1395.
91. Id. at 1392. See also Guidi, 224 F.3d at 147, where the court stated: "Plaintiffs ... are ordinary
American citizens for whom litigating in Egypt presents an obvious and significant inconvenience, ... This
is not a case where the plaintiff is a corporation doing business abroad and can expect to litigate in foreign
courts."
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5. Class Actions
If a plaintiff brings suit as a representative of a class, his or her choice of
forum is entitled to less weight.9 2 But this does not mean that the plaintiffs'
choice of forum is entitled to no weight, it depends on plaintiffs' motive for
choosing a U.S. forum.93 ("[P]laintiffs offered a quite valid reason for litigating
in federal court: this county's interest in having United States Courts enforce
United States securities laws.").
F. Balancing Public and Private Interests
1. Introduction
The courts must also balance certain public and private interests to
determine whether to dismiss the suit on grounds of forum non conveniens.
There is a relationship between the degree of deference accorded a plaintiff's
choice of forum and the balancing of the private and public interest factors.
The greater the deference due, the stronger a showing of inconvenience a
defendant must make, and vice versa.94
2. Public Interests
a. The administrative difficulties stemming from court congestion.
i. The Southern District ofNew York is indisputably "one of
the busiest districts in the country." Not surprisingly, the
judges in this district have placed additional weight on this
factor, citing "[tlhe need to guard our docket from
disputes with little connection to this forum." '9
b. The local interest in having controversies decided at home.
c. The interest in having the trial in a forum that is familiar with
the law governing the action.
d. The avoidance ofunnecessary problems in conflict of laws or in
the application of foreign law.
e. The unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with
jury duty.96
92. DiRienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp., 294 F.3d 21, 28 (2d Cir. 2002).
93. Id.
94. Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 74-75.
95. Hyland, 807 F. Supp. at 1128 (citations omitted). But see Cromer, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 355,
where the court stated that: "While the docket of the Southern District [of New York] is an active one, courts
in this district have shown themselves more than able to address the issues that arise in complex actions in
an expeditious and comprehensive manner."
96. But see Moscovits v. Magyar Cukor R., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9252, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. June




a. The relative ease of access to sources of proof and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing witnesses.
i. As modem advances have made international travel and
communication both easier and cheaper, this factor has
taken on a reduced importance.97
b. The availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling witnesses.
i. U.S. courts have recently relied upon 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in
considering motions to dismiss on forum non conveniens
grounds.
ii. Specifically, section 1782, which permits a party to a
foreign litigation to obtain evidence located in the U.S.,
has been relied upon to meet an objection to a motion to
dismiss that U.S. documents or witnesses are beyond the
reach of the foreign court.98
c. The remoteness of forum from the situs of the event, including
possibility of viewing premises, if it would be appropriate to the
action.
d. The ability to implead third parties.
e. The need to translate documents.
i. Translation is considered a serious problem and where all
of the documents and testimony would be in a foreign
language, this factor "militates strongly in favor of the
[foreign forum]."
jurisdiction was based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), which does not allow for a jury
trial.
97. Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc. v. Cargolux Airlines Int'l, S.A., 712 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Oakes, J., concurring) ("[T]he entire doctrine of forum non conveniens should be reexamined in light of the
transportation revolution .. "). Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 930 F. Supp. 36, 44 (D. Conn. 1996). ("To
the extent documents exist in England, advances in transportation and communication accord this issue less
weight.")
98. See PT United Can Co., 138 F.3d at 75 (affirming that the Indonesian court would be an
adequate alternate forum and noting the district court's consideration of "the possibility, under 28 U.S.C. §
1782, of gaining access to witnesses or documents in the United States"); Potomac Capital Inv. Corp. v.
Koninklijke Luchtvaapt Maatschappl N. V., No. 97 Civ. 8141, 1998 WL 92416, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. March 4,
1998) (holding that the Netherlands was an adequate forum and that "[Potomac] can use 28 U.S.C. 1782 to
obtain discovery from... U.S. based non-party witnesses for use at trial in the Netherlands."); Pyrenee, Ltd.
v. Wocom Commodities, Ltd., 984 F. Supp. 1148, 1162 (N.D. 111. 1997) (holding that Hong Kong was a more
convenient forum and the concern that U.S. documents would not be attainable was alleviated by section
1782). But cf Slight v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 979 F. Supp. 433, 440 (S.D. W.Va. 1997)
(observing that while section 1782 would provide access to needed documents, the "frequent shuttling of
documents and attorneys" such requests would entail would be costly).
99. Blanco, 997 F.2dat982. But see Ingram Micro, Inc. v. Airoute Cargo Express, Inc., 2001 U.S.
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f. Issues concerning the enforceability ofjudgment if obtained.
g. All other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive or the opposite.
4. Completion of Pretrial Discovery
a. In Alfadda, 159 F.3d at 48, the plaintiff argued that the fact that
the pretrial discovery had been completed in New York favored
that forum rather than the French forum.
b. The Second Circuit noted in passing that there was some dispute
as to whether completed discovery was a public or private
factor. "
c. The Second Circuit went on to note that
[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the extent of completed discovery is
relevant-whether as a public or private interest-we do not believe
that it tips the balance towards an American forum. The traditional
public and private interest factors weigh heavily in favor of France.
Completing discovery within the Southern District and investing
financial resources in order to facilitate trial in the United States does
not sufficiently tip the scales of the Gilbert balance, especially since
plaintiffs are free to use the existing discovery material to whatever
extent the French tribunal will permit.°10
G. Conditional Dismissals
1. Introduction
Conditioned dismissals protect the plaintiff from being penalized by
choosing to file suit first in the U.S. while also facilitating the dismissal of
suits. If the proponent of dismissal fails to comply with the order, the action
will be reinstated in the U.S. "[F]orum non conveniens dismissals are often
appropriately conditioned to protect the party opposing dismissal."'
0 2
2. Standards for Granting a Conditional Dismissal
In the recent BCCI case, the Second Circuit set forth "the type of finding
that the district court should make regarding the adequacy of an alternative
Dist. LEXIS 2912, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that the need for translation of documents alone is not
a hardship of sufficient magnitude to justify dismissal).
100. Compare Schexnider v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 817 F.2d 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987) (public interest) with Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th
Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066 (1985) (private interest) and Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
935 F.2d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 1991) (discovery "goes to both private concerns... and public ones").
101. Alfadda, 159 F.3d at 48.
102. Blanco, 997 F.2d at 984.
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foreign forum in a case in which foreign law or practice is at issue, and in
which a case is dismissed conditionally."' 0
3
In that case, following a review of competing expert affidavits about
whether Pakistan was an adequate forum, the district court granted a motion to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds on three conditions: (i) plaintiffs
agreement in writing to waive any statute of limitations defense; (ii) the
Pakistani courts not refusing to hear the case onforum non conveniens grounds;
and (iii) plaintiffs agreement in writing to permit defendants to remove any
judgment rendered by a Pakistani court out of Pakistan."" The district court
granted this conditional dismissal based on a "justifiable belief' that Pakistan
was an adequate alternative forum. 5
Under the "justifiable belief' standard a court may dismiss a case on forum
non conveniens grounds "despite its inability to make a definitive finding as to
the adequacy of the foreign forum, if the court can protect the non-moving party
by making the dismissal conditional.""1 6 The Second Circuit made it clear,
however, that the justifiable belief standard imposed certain requirements on
the district court.
0 7
First, the district court is required to engage in a full analysis of those
issues of foreign law and practice relevant to its decision. Second, the district
court is required to closely examine all submissions relating to the adequacy of
the foreign forum. Third, if the court concludes it has a justifiable belief that
the foreign forum is adequate, it should cite to evidence in record supporting
that belief. Fourth, the district court should keep in mind that it is the
defendant's burden to demonstrate the existence of an adequate alternative
forum. Finally, the Second Circuit noted that the degree of certainty a district
court needed to have about the existence of an adequate alternative forum
turned on "how protective of the non-moving party the conditional dismissal
will in fact be." ' 8 The Second Circuit stated, therefore, that if the condition on
which dismissal is granted might not sufficiently protect the plaintiff, then "the
court should either be more sure of its finding as to the uncertain question of
law or practice, and therefore as to the adequacy of the alternative forum, or
frame the condition differently, if that is possible, in order to minimize the
risk."'109
103. BCC!, 273 F.3d at 247.
104. Id. at 244.
105. See id. at 247 (citing cases applying the "justifiable belief' standards).
106. Id.
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The Second Circuit concluded:
we observe that while the conditional dismissal device can help to
protect the non-moving party in circumstances where the district court
remains concerned about the accuracy of its "justifiable belief' as to
a foreign forum's adequacy, the mechanism is not a substitute for the
initial "justifiable belief' of adequacy. Conditions cannot transform
an inadequate forum into an adequate one."'
3. Conditions Typically Imposed
The following are the most commonly granted conditions and have been
almost universally deemed permissible:
a. Statute of Limitations. An adequate forum does not exist if a
statute of limitations bars the bringing of the case in that
forum."' In order to deal with this, courts have conditioned
forum non conveniens dismissals on an agreement by the
defendant to waive any statute of limitations defense that may
exist in the foreign forum. This condition protects a plaintiff
from possibly losing the opportunity to litigate in another forum
because of the time spent pursuing a case in the U.S." 2
b. Jurisdiction. A number of courts have dismissed cases on forum
non conveniens grounds conditioned on the party's consent to
jurisdiction in the foreign forum." 3 The importance of this
factor was demonstrated in a recent Second Circuit decision that
overturned a forum non conveniens dismissal because the
district court failed to have the plaintiff stipulate to jurisdiction
in Ecuador." 4
c. Availability of witnesses or documents. In Piper, the Supreme
Court specifically condoned the possibility of conditioning a
forum non conveniens dismissal on the proponent's agreement
to provide the relevant records.' However, this condition is
not without limits, and courts have been hesitant to grant the full
panoply ofU.S. discovery provisions. While such a broad grant
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. BCCI, 273 F.3d at 246.
112. See, e.g., Transunion, 811 F.2d at 128; In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster in
Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 195,203-04 (2d Cir. 1987); Blanco, 997 F.2d at 984 (collecting cases). See llusorio
v. Ilusorio-Bildner, 103 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
113. See, e.g., R. Maganlal & Co. v. MG. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1991); Mercier,
981 F.2d at 1349. See also Ilusorio v. Ilusorio-Bildner, 103 F. Supp. 2d 672, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
114. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998).
115. Piper, 454 U.S. at 257 n.25.
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is sometimes appropriate it is generally looked upon with
disfavor." 6
d. Delay. In BCCI, the case was to be heard in Pakistan's courts
if it were dismissed. Expert evidence was submitted by the
plaintiff to the effect that a suit might take up to 25 years to be
resolved in the Pakistani court system. Defendant's expert
submitted evidence that plaintiff's claim would be heard by a
special Banking Court in Pakistan, in which the case would
proceed on an expedited basis. On appeal the Second Circuit
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
include a condition to deal with the delay in Pakistan in the
event the district court dismissed the case. Specifically, it
instructed the district court to condition any dismissal on the
Banking Court's acceptance of jurisdiction and to permit the
plaintiff to return to the district court in the event Pakistan's
Banking Court declined to exercise jurisdiction. The Second
Circuit stated:
Accordingly, the district court, if it decides to dismiss, should
condition dismissal on the Banking Court's accepting
jurisdiction over this case. In specifying this condition, we do
not mean to impose any requirement on the Banking Court, a
step that could be beyond our authority. We are simply
requiring the district court to permit BCCI Overseas to restore
this case to the district court's docket in the event that the
Banking Court determines it lacks jurisdiction." 7
e. Enforcement of Judgment. Courts have also conditioned
dismissals on the proponent's agreement to pay any judgment
rendered in the foreign forum.
4. Conditions Typically Rejected
However, not all conditions are permissible and appellate courts will
review and strike down conditions that are overreaching. The following are
examples of conditions that have been rejected as an inappropriate interference
with the foreign forum:
a. Waiver of cost bond. In Mercier, the plaintiffs proposed that
the dismissal be conditioned on defendant's waiving the cost
bond that is normally imposed on foreign litigants in Turkish
116. Hyland, 807 F. Supp. at 1132 (citing concern that the routine granting of this condition would
encourage litigants, without any real chance of success, to file suit in the U.S. simply to gain this advantage).
See, e.g., Union Carbide, 809 F.2d at 205 (collecting cases).
117. BCCI, 273 F.3d at 247.
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courts. "' The court, noting that the bond was not excessive and
the plaintiffs were not indigent, rejected this proposal."1 9
b. Monitor for due process violations. Citing concerns with
perceived shortcomings of the Indian judicial system, the
plaintiffs in Union Carbide requested that the American judge
monitor the proceedings in India so that there were not any due
process violations and, if necessary, remedy any abuses. 20 The
Second Circuit denied this request, noting that once the case is
dismissed the U.S. "ceases to have any jurisdiction over the
matter."121
III. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
A. Commencing Parallel Proceedings
1. Introduction
If party A files suit in one forum (Fl) against party B, party B could
commence suit against party A on the same claim in another forum (F2). In F2,
party B could either seek a negative declaration or assert as affirmative claims
the counterclaims it could assert in F 1.
2. Strategic Considerations
a. There are several reasons why party B might commence parallel
proceedings:
i. In the hope of winning a race to judgment in the more
favorable forum (F2) and securing a judgment that can be
pled as res judicata in the other jurisdiction (F 1).
ii. To put pressure on party A by waging a war on two fronts.
iii. To obtain discovery of material located in F2 that it might
otherwise be unable to obtain.
b. If a party to a U.S. suit is considering commencing a parallel
proceeding in a foreign forum, it should take into account the
reaction of the U.S. judge in the pending U.S. suit.
3. Races To Judgment
a. If party B commences a parallel proceeding in a foreign
jurisdiction with the aim of winning a race to judgment, it is
118. Mercier, 981 F.2d at 1353.
119. Id.
120. Union Carbide, 809 F.2d at 204-05.
121. Id. at 205.
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important for it to seek advice from a local lawyer as to how
long it would take to litigate the case to judgment in the foreign
court.
b. It is also important for party B to ascertain in advance, to the
extent possible, whether a judgment from F2 is likely to be
recognized and granted res judicata effect in F 1.
c. This issue was addressed in Alfadda, Here, the plaintiffs, non-
U.S. citizens residing in Saudi Arabia, brought parallel
proceedings in the courts of U.S. and France in connection with
their investment in defendant Saudi European Investment
Corporation, a Netherlands Antilles corporation.1 22 In the U.S.
suit, the plaintiffs alleged violations of RICO and the U.S.
securities laws.
i. There followed a race to judgment. Defendants prevailed
in the French courts, and moved to dismiss the U.S.
actions on the basis of the preclusive effect of the French
action. There were two issues for the court: 1) whether to
recognize the French judgment; and 2) having decided to
recognize it, to determine the scope of its preclusive
effect.
ii. In determining whether to recognize the French judgment,
the court applied the doctrine of comity as set forth in the
leading case of Hilton v. Guyod23 , which holds that, for
reasons of international comity, a U.S. court will enforce
a foreign judgment "whenever the foreign court had
properjurisdiction and enforcement does not prejudice the
rights of United States citizens or violate domestic public
policy."' 24 The court found that the French judgment
satisfied this test, especially in light of the fact that
plaintiffs themselves initiated proceedings in France.
iii. In determining whether to grant preclusive effect to the
French judgment, the court took into account nine factors.
Four of these factors are relevant to assessing the
preclusive effect of any judgment, whether it be a U.S. or
a foreign judgment; the other five were applied because
they were said to be relevant to recognition of non-U.S.
judgments.
iv. The four factors applicable to both the domestic and
international context are: the issues of both proceedings
must be identical; the relevant issues were actually
litigated and decided in the prior proceeding; there must
122. 966 F. Supp. at 1325-32.
123. 159 U.S. 113(1895).
124. Id. at 1326 (citing Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03).
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have been "full and fair opportunity" for the litigation of
the issues in the prior proceeding; and the issues were
necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the
merits.
v. The five additional factors relevant to issue preclusion in
the international context are: a desire to avoid the dupli-
cation of effort and the waste involved in reconsidering a
matter that has already been litigated; a desire to protect
the successful litigant from harassing or evasive tactics on
the part of his previously unsuccessful opponent; a policy
against making the availability of local enforcement the
decisive element, as a practical matter, in the plaintiff's
choice of forum; an interest in fostering stability and unity
in international litigation; and a belief that the rendering
court was the more appropriate forum.
vi. In Alfadda, the district court reviewed the French judg-
ment and found that it was preclusive of the U.S. pro-
ceeding because the issues considered by the French court
were sufficiently identical to those the plaintiffs would
have had to establish in order to prevail on their claims
and the issues were necessary to support the French
court's judgment. The court also noted "that France, the
rendering jurisdiction, is a more appropriate forum, both
because of convenience, and because France, the home
country to all the defendant banks and much of the alleged
conduct, has a greater interest in the litigation."'25
d. By contrast, in Alesayi Beverage Corp. v. Canada Dry Corp.,126
the court recognized a Saudi Arabian judgment on a breach of
contract claim, but denied its preclusive effect because of
different standards of proof. Specifically, although Alesayi, a
Saudi Arabian company, failed to prevail in the Saudi court, the
U.S. court did not give preclusive effect to this judgment
because, in Saudi Arabia, Alesayi was required to prove its
claim for breach of contract beyond a reasonable doubt. In the
U.S., however, it only had to prove its breach of contract claim
by a preponderance of the evidence.127
125. Alfadda, 966 F. Supp. at 1332.
126. 947 F. Supp. 658, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 122 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1997).
127. See generally Linda S ilberman, Enforcement andRecognition ofForeign Country Judgments,
International Business Litigation and Arbitration (PLI Coursebook 2004).
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4. Parallel Proceedings and Other Strategies
a. The commencement of parallel proceedings works best when
combined with other strategies. For example, if party B (a
defendant in a U.S. action) commences a parallel proceeding
outside the U.S. in an attempt to win a race to judgment, it could
also combine it with the following motions: (i) a motion for an
antisuit injunction in the non-U.S. court seeking to enjoin party
A from pursuing its U.S. lawsuit; (ii) a motion in the U.S. court
to dismiss the U.S. action on grounds offorum non conveniens
(see Section III above); or (iii) a motion in the U.S. court to stay
or dismiss the U.S. action on the ground that there is a parallel
proceeding (see Section IV below).
b. If party B (a defendant in a U.S. action) commences a parallel
proceeding in a non-U.S. forum, party A (the plaintiff in the
U.S. action) could respond by making a motion for an antitrust
injunction in the U.S. court seeking to enjoin party B from
pursuing the action in the non-U.S. forum (see Section V
below).




a. In Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,'28 the Supreme Court held
that "federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases
based on abstention principles only where the relief being
sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary" (emphasis
added).
b. There is some dispute as to whether Quackenbush applies in
cases involving parallel foreign litigation.
i. Some courts which have addressed the issue have held that
Quackenbush is simply inapplicable in cases involving
concurrent international litigation.'29
128. 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996). See also Lewin v. Cooke, 95 F. Supp. 2d 513 (E.D.Va. 2000)
(abstention doctrines are simply not applicable to suits for damages, but apply only to suits in equity).
129. See Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 1999); Goldhammer v.
Dunkin'Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252 (D. Mass. 1999) ("Quackenbush does not crisply govern in
the area of international abstention because the considerations involved in deferring to state court proceedings
are different from those involved in deferring to foreign proceedings.").
Fellas2008]
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ii. Some post-Quackenbush decisions have held that a court
has an inherent power to dismiss an action based on the
pendency of a related proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction
without specifically seeking to distinguish Quacken-
bush. 130
2. Factors Used to Determine Whether to Grant a Stay on International
Abstention Grounds
In determining whether an action should be dismissed or stayed under the
doctrine of "international abstention," courts take into account the following
factors:
a. the similarity of parties and issues involved in the foreign
litigation; the promotion of judicial efficiency; adequacy of
relief available in the alternative forum; issues of fairness to
and convenience of foreign witnesses; the possibility of
prejudice to any of the parties; and the temporal sequence of the
filing of the actions.131
3. Similarity of Parties
It is settled that the parties need not be identical. For example, in
Goldhammer, even though an individual shareholder or plaintiff corporation
was named as a party in U.S. litigation, but not in parallel English litigation, the
court noted that the individual held a two-thirds interest in the corporation and,
therefore, had substantially similar interests to those of the corporation. "While
a shareholder may have claims independent of the corporation, the parties and
claims need not be identical in order for one action to be stayed or dismissed
in deference to an earlier action."'132
130. See, e.g., Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Int'l Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101, 104 n. I (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (noting that "the considerations involved in deferring to state court proceedings are different from those
involved in deferring to foreign proceedings, where concerns of international comity arise and issues of
federalism and federal supremacy are not in play"). But see Exxon Research & Eng "g Co. v. Indus. Risk
Insurers, 775 A.2d 601, 611 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (finding that the same general principles apply
regardless of whether they arise from similar actions brought in state or foreign courts); EFCO Corp. v.
Aluma Sys., USA, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 816, 824 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (staying U.S. action in favor of Canadian
action). But see Abdullah SayidRajab Al-Rifai & Sons W.L.L. v. McDonnell Douglas Foreign Sales Corp.,
988 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (holding that Quackenbush precludes an outright dismissal, but
not a stay, in favor of parallel foreign litigation).
131. Evergreen, 954 F. Supp. at 103; Abdullah, 988 F. Supp. at 1289; Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh v. Kozeny, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1246 (D. Colo. 2000)
132. Goldhammer, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 253. See also Caspian lnv., Ltd. v. Vicom Holdings, Ltd., 770




As withforum non conveniens, courts may grant abstention motions only
on certain conditions. In Evergreen, the stay granted in favor of the Belgian
proceeding was conditioned on
1) An agreement by the party to consent to jurisdiction of Belgian
courts;
2) Agreement by the party to waive any statute of limitations
defense;
3) Agreement by the party to be bound by the judgment of the
Belgian court;
4) And to pay any judgment obtained.'
B. Contrast to Forum Non Conveniens
1. Conceptual Difference
The conceptual difference between the doctrine offorum non conveniens
and that of international abstention is that the former can be invoked even if
there is no parallel foreign proceeding, whereas the latter presupposes a parallel
foreign proceeding: if there is no parallel foreign proceeding, a party can rely
only on the doctrine offorum non conveniens; if there is one, a party can rely
on both doctrines.
2. Practical Difference
While the factors used to assess motions based on each of the doctrines are
not identical, courts generally consider the two doctrines together (with the
exception of one factor discussed below). 134
F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Continental Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408,410
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). 800537 Ont., Inc. v. World Imps. U.S.A. Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 288 (W.D.N.Y. 2001)
(finding that similarity of actions and issues trumps absence of similarity of parties).
133. Evergreen, 954 F. Supp. at 105.
134. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Picaso-Anstalt, 741 F. Supp. 1150, 1154 (D.N.J. 1990) ("The
factors informing the decision on forum non conveniens appear to be fully responsive to those informing a
decision to stay [in favor of a parallel French action], and a detailed presentation on both grounds is simply
unwarranted."); Reavis v. GulfOil Corp., 85 F.R.D. 666, 671 n.3 (D. Del. 1980) (defendant's motions to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, and motion to stay in favor of Venezuelan action, addressed
together under the doctrine of forum non conveniens); General Motors Corp. v. Lopez de Arriortua, 948
F. Supp. 656, 668-69 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (denying both a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens and
motion to stay pending outcome of German proceeding).
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3. Earlier Filed Foreign Proceeding
One factor relevant to a motion for a stay on international abstention
grounds has no explicit role in the forum non conveniens analysis-the
sequence of the filing of the actions. It is worth noting, however, that some
courts have not attached much significance to the argument that the U.S. action
should be stayed because the foreign action was filed earlier. For example, in
American Cyanamid, the court denied the motion to dismiss on grounds of
forum non conveniens, but went on to consider as a separate factor of the
motion to stay the fact that the French action was filed first. It found "little
merit" in this argument. 35 The court stated that where parallel proceedings are
taking place in different countries, "the preferred course of action is to permit
each sovereign to reach judgment and apply the findings of one to the other
under principles of res judicata."'3 6  The American Cyanamid court also
considered the "first to file" argument "as a call for judicial efficiency-
presumably on the ground that the court first obtaining jurisdiction will have
already expended some resources on the case." 137 The court found, on the facts,
that more progress had been made in the second-filed U.S. action than in the
first-filed French action, and therefore rejected this argument. This suggests,
however, that where more progress has been made in the earlier-filed foreign





It is well settled that U.S. courts have the power to issue an antisuit
injunction-that is an injunction enjoining a person subject to theirjurisdiction
from prosecuting a foreign suit. 139 It is important to note that this injunction is
aimed not at the foreign court, but at the party over which the U.S. court has
jurisdiction. Failure to comply with the antisuit injunction, therefore, is
contempt of court.
135. American Cyanamid, 741 F. Supp. at 1159.
136. Id. (citing Sea Containers, Ltd. v. Stena AB, 890 F.2d 1205, 1213-14 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
137. American Cyanamid, 741 F. Supp. at 1159.
138. See also General Motors, 948 F. Supp. at 669 ("While Plaintiffs sought the jurisdiction of the
German civil court by filing their counterclaim there before filing their complaint in this court, that factor
does not compel a stay of this case because the counterclaim is not identical to this suit."). But see Nat 7
Union, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1249 (finding that because the London proceeding was first filed, there were
practical advantages to advancing the litigation in that forum).




Three threshold requirements must be met before a court will consider
issuing an antisuit injunction.
a. Jurisdiction must be established. 4 '
b. The parties must be the same in both matters. 4 '
c. Resolution of the case before the enjoining court must be
dispositive of the action to be enjoined. 42
B. Circuit Split
U.S. courts differ on the appropriate legal standard for issuing an antisuit
injunction once the threshold requirements have been met.
1. Restrictive Standard: Comity
The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Sixth and District of
Columbia Circuits follow a strict test based on the notion of comity.' Courts
following the comity standard have held that as a result of comity concerns,
antisuit injunctions should be "rarely issued" and only in two situations:
a. to protect the U.S. forum's jurisdiction, or
b. to prevent evasion of important public policies.
2. Liberal Standard: Vexatiousness
The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits follow a
more relaxed test based upon several factors, the most important of which is the
vexatiousness or oppressiveness of the non-U.S. litigation.144 Courts that have
adopted the "vexatiousness" standard hold that an antisuit injunction is
appropriate in circumstances when the foreign litigation:
140. See In re Complaint ofRationis Enters., Inc. of Panama v. AEP/Borden Indus., 261 F.3d 264
(2d Cir. 2001).
141. China Trade and Dev. Corp. v. M V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
142. See Id.
143. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992); China Trade, 837 F.2d at
34; CompagnieDes Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. ofN. America, 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1105 (1982), Younis Brothers & Co., Inc. v. Cigna Worldwide Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 2d 743, 745-
46 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
144. See, e.g., Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 626-27; Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d
425 (7th Cir. 1993); Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat '1 Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 198 1),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
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a. would frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction;
b. would be vexatious or oppressive;
c. would threaten the issuing court's jurisdiction; and when
adjudication in separate actions would result in delay,
inconvenience, expense, inconsistency or race to judgment.
3. Totality of Circumstances Standard: First Circuit
In a decision of March 8, 2004, the First Circuit, which up to now had not
ruled on the appropriate standard for anti-suit injunctions, has weighed in with
its views. Rather than join one or the other side of the circuit split, the First
Circuit has staked out a third position. The First Circuit acknowledges that
considerations of international comity should be accorded great weight in
deciding whether to issue an anti-suit injunction. In doing so, it follows the
conservative approach. It departs from that approach, however, by declining
to endorse the view that an anti-suit injunction is justified only in two
circumstances-threat to jurisdiction and public policy. The First Circuit,
instead, offers a new test that looks to the "totality of circumstances."
C. Comity Standard
1. Basic Principles
a. Courts following the comity standard observe the general
principle that one court will not interfere with or try to restrain
proceedings in another court.,4
b. Rather, in cases involving parallel proceedings, the court will
allow the litigation to proceed in both forums until judgment is
obtained in one court which may be pled as resjudicata in the
other court.'46
c. Under the comity standard, duplication of issues, vexatiousness
and harassment do not justify interfering in an action in a
foreign court. "'
2. Requirements for Antisuit Injunction
A court following the comity standard will refrain from issuing an antisuit
injunction unless one of two factors can be shown: (a) the foreign action
145. See, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 926-27.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 928.
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threatens the jurisdiction of the enjoining court, or (b) a party is attempting to
evade an important public policy.
a. Foreign Action Threatens the Jurisdiction of the Enjoining
Court. An antisuit injunction may be appropriate where the
foreign action threatens the jurisdiction ofthe enjoining court.'
• A court may find that a foreign action threatens its jurisdiction
in one of two circumstances.
i) An antisuit injunction may be appropriate when a pro-
ceeding is in rem since resjudicata alone will not protect
the jurisdiction of the first court. Where jurisdiction is
based on the presence of property within the court's
jurisdictional boundaries, a concurrent proceeding in a
foreign court poses a danger that the foreign court will
order the transfer of the property out of the jurisdictional
boundaries of the first court, thus depriving it ofjurisdic-
tion over the matter. 49 or,
ii) In an in personam proceeding where the foreign court is
attempting to carve out exclusive jurisdiction over the
action. 50
b. Evasion of Important Public Policies. An antisuit injunction
may be issued when a party attempts to evade compliance with
a statute of the forum that effectuates important public policies.
An injunction is not appropriate merely to prevent a party from
seeking slight advantages in substantive or procedural law to be
applied in a foreign court.''
3. Actions for Negative Declaration
The fact that the defendant in the U.S. proceeding commenced an action
in a foreign court seeking a negative declaration does not in itself warrant the
issuance of an antisuit injunction.
a. In China Trade, plaintiff China Trade sought to import soy-
beans from the U.S. to China using a vessel provided by
defendant, Ssangyong Shipping Co. The vessel ran aground,
allegedly contaminating the soybeans with water. Plaintiff filed
suit in federal court for damages resulting from failure to deliver
the soybeans. While discovery was still progressing, defendant
Ssangyong filed an action in Korea seeking a declaratory judg-
148. China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35
149. See Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1355
150. China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35.
151. Id. at 37.
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ment that it was not liable for the damaged soybeans. The
plaintiff sought an antisuit injunction in the U.S. preventing the
defendants from pursuing the Korean action.
The Second Circuit denied the motion, stating that parallel proceedings are
generally tolerable. 152. The court noted that vexatiousness and a race to
judgment are inevitable by-products of parallel proceedings and in themselves
are not sufficient justifications for issuing an antisuit injunction. '
The court held, instead, that the most important factors relevant to the
decision whether to grant an antisuit injunction are (i) whether the foreign
action threatens the jurisdiction of the enjoining forum, and (ii) whether strong
public policies of the enjoining forum are threatened by the foreign action. 15
The court held that since neither the defendant nor the Korean court had
attempted to enjoin the New York proceedings, there was no threat to the
jurisdiction of the U.S. court. 15 5 In considering the second factor-evasion of
important public policies-the court observed that an injunction is not
appropriate merely because a party has attempted to seek slight advantages in
the procedural or substantive law by litigating in a foreign court. 156
4. Laker Airways
The leading series of cases on the "comity" standard arise out of the Laker
Airways litigation.
a. Laker Airways brought suit against various airlines in a U.S.
federal court alleging that they had violated the U.S. antitrust
laws by engaging in predatory pricing in order to drive Laker
out of business. British Airways ("B.A.") responded by filing
an action against Laker in the British High Court in which it
sought an anti-suit injunction enjoining Laker from proceeding
with the U.S. suit.
b. In response, Laker sought an injunction from the U.S. court
restraining the defendants from continuing with the suit in
England. The lower court issued the injunction. The Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed,'57 analyzing the
principles relating to antisuit injunctions.
152. China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36.
153. See id
154. Id.
155. Id at 37.
156. Id.
157. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d 909.
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The court stated that "parallel proceedings on the same in personam claim
should ordinarily be allowed to proceed simultaneously, at least until a
judgment is reached in one which can be pled as res judicata in the other. The
mere filing of a suit in one forum does not cut off the preexisting right of an
independent forum to regulate matters subject to its prescriptive jurisdiction.
For this reason, injunctions restraining litigants from proceeding in courts of
independent countries are rarely issued." 158 The D.C. Circuit found, therefore,
that issuing an antisuit injunction to avoid a "vexatious" litigation was
inappropriate for two reasons: (i) issues concerning vexatiousness were more
properly considered in a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds;
and (ii) such issues "do not outweigh the important principles of comity that
compel deference and mutual respect for concurrent foreign proceedings."'
' 59
Although the court found that comity favored respect for a non-U.S.
court's ability to reach a judgment, it also found that a U.S. court had the power
to resist the attempt of a foreign court to interfere with its ability to reach a
judgment. It found on the facts that when the English High Court issued its
antisuit injunction, it was attempting to prevent Laker from litigating altogether
and thus to deprive the U.S. court of jurisdiction:
[T]he British and American actions are not parallel proceedings in the
sense the term is normally used. This is not a situation where two
courts are proceedingto separatejudgments simultaneously under one
cause of action. Rather, the sole purpose of the English proceeding
is to terminate the American action. 6 '
The court also noted that antisuit injunctions are justified when necessary
to prevent the litigants' evasion of the U.S. forum's important public policies.
It cautioned, however, that the standard for granting antisuit injunctions on
public policy grounds are strict.
5. Cases DENYING Antisuit Injunctions Under the Comity Standard
a. In Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., 6' , discussed above, the
court declined to grant an antisuit injunction enjoining Harrods
from bringing a defamation action against Dow Jones in
London. The court stated:
158. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 926-27 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at928.
160. ld. at 930.
161. Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., 237 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aft'd, 346 F.3d 357
(2d Cir. 2003).
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Absent extraordinary circumstances, it would not comport with
considerations of "practicality and wise administration ofjustice" for
the courts of one nation as a matter of course to sit in judgment of the
adequacy of due process and the quality of justice rendered in the
courts of other sovereigns, and to decree injunctive relief at any time
the forum courts conclude that the laws of the foreign jurisdiction
under scrutiny do not measure up to whatever the scope of rights and
safeguards the domestic jurisprudence recognizes and enforces to
effectuate its own concept of justice. On this larger scale, there can
be no room for arrogance or presumption, or for extravagant rules or
practices that may encourage insularity or chauvinism rather than
respect for comity. It cannot be the proper province of any one judge
in any one country, giving expression to the push of a moment or the
pull of the immediate case, to promulgate judgments that impose that
court's rule and will across all sovereign borders so as to reach the
rest of humankind.
Specifically, an injunction issued by one forum restraining parties
from pursuing litigation pending in a foreign tribunal withjurisdiction
over the matter could invite a duel of injunction and counterinjunction
to thwart the attempt of the enjoining court to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction and protect the foreign state's own judicial power. As the
Laker Airways court noted, in a dispute depicting precisely this
dynamic: "The consequences to international trade and to amicable
relations between nations that would result from the kind of
interference are difficult to overestimate. 1
62
b. ComputerAssocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,163 Plaintiff, Computer
Associates, previously brought and lost a United States
copyright infringement action in the United States. Computer
Associates then brought an action in a French court alleging
infringement on the same computer program. Defendant, Altai,
unsuccessfully sought an antisuit injunction in federal court. On
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
the antisuit injunction. The court found that there was no threat
to the jurisdiction of the U.S. court and that the French action
would in no way affect the decision already rendered by the
U.S. court in the prior action. l" The court also noted that, while
the action may be vexatious, the interests of comity cautioned
against an injunction. 165
162. Dow Jones, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 428-29.
163. 126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 1997).
164. Id. at 372.
165. Id.
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c. Compagnie des Bauxites: ' In Bauxites, CBG, a company that
mines and sells bauxite in the Republic of Guinea, sued its
excess insurers in the U.S. because the insurers allegedly
improperly refused a claim. Four years later, the insurers sued
in England to rescind the insurance contract because CBG
allegedly failed to disclose material facts. The district court
enjoined the insurers from pursuing the English action.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "duplication
of issues and the insurers' delay in filing the London action
were the sole bases for the district court's injunction ....
[T]hese factors alone did notjustify the breach ofcomity among
the courts of separate sovereignties."' 67
d. In Gau Shan,'68 Plaintiff, Gau Shan, was a cotton merchant
engaged in marketing cotton to the People's Republic of China.
Gau Shan sought to purchase a large amount of American
cotton. Gau Shan arranged financing from Banker's Trust, the
primary financier of the American cotton supplier. As part of
the deal, Banker's Trust required that Gau Shan sign a pro-
missory note containing a forum selection clause, which Gau
Shan did under protest. The American cotton supplier failed to
deliver the contracted amount of cotton and Gau Shan refused
to pay on the promissory note. Banker's Trust advised Gau
Shan in a letter that if the promissory note was not paid it would
file suit in Hong Kong. Without responding, Gau Shan brought
an action in the U.S. seeking rescission of the promissory note,
claiming fraud, deceit and negligence. Gau Shan also sought an
antisuit injunction to prevent a Hong Kong action from
proceeding, arguing that a Hong Kong action would allow
Banker's Trust to gain control of Gau Shan through a
receivership. Such a result, according to Gau Shan, would lead
to a voluntary dismissal of the U.S. case in a way which would
threaten the jurisdiction of the U.S. court.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court's grant of an antisuit injunction. The court noted
that threats to jurisdiction are "quite unusual" and that there was
no such threat in this instance.'69 The court observed that "its
jurisdiction was not threatened by the possibility that a ruling of
a foreign court might eventually result in the voluntary dismissal
of the claim before the United States court."' 7 ° Rather than
threatening its jurisdiction, the court found that such a result
166. Compagnie des Bauxites, 651 F.2d 877.
167. Id. at 887.
168. 956 F.2d 1349.
169. Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1356.
170. Id.
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would merely threaten Gau Shan's private interest in
prosecuting its claim.
The court then addressed whether there were any attempts
to evade an important public policy, noting that "courts rarely
resort to public policy as a basis for refusing to enforce a
foreign judgment."'' Gau Shan argued that by filing in Hong
Kong, the defendant was seeking to avoid the regulatory effect
of Tennessee's tort statute. The court dismissed this argument
because Gau Shan had pointed only to Tennessee's public
policy and not to any national public policy. The court went on
to reason that "public policies of a state deserve less weight than
public policies of the nation."'72 Finally, the court stated that
"although evasion of an important national policy might
outweigh certain principles of international comity, we question
whether the public policy of one state could ever outweigh those
principles."' 73
e. In a dispute concerning the default on a letter of credit,
Kookmin Bank brought suit in Korea against Hamilton Bank,
located in the United States. 74 Hamilton Bank brought an
action in federal court seeking an injunction enjoining Kookmin
from proceeding with the Korean action. Hamilton Bank
maintained that it lacked minimal contacts with Korea and was
not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Korean court.
Hamilton Bank argued that to allow the Korean court to obtain
personal jurisdiction under these circumstances would offend
the principles of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
After examining the means by which personal jurisdiction
is obtained in Korea, the court concluded that an exercise of
personal jurisdiction by the Korean court over Hamilton Bank
would not offend U.S. constitutional principles. The court
denied the antisuit injunction, stating that no compelling public
policy grounds justified overriding principles of international
comity.
f. Berkshire Furniture Co. v. Glatstein:'75 In a copyright dispute,
both plaintiff and defendant claimed ownership of several bed
frame designs under United States law. Defendant also claimed
ownership of the designs in United Kingdom and Malaysian
courts. Plaintiff sought an antisuit injunction to prevent defen-
dant from enforcing its intellectual property rights in Malaysia.
The court denied an injunction on two grounds: the
171. Id. at 1358.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Hamilton Bank N.A. v. Kookmin Bank, 999 F. Supp. 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
175. Berkshire Furniture Co. v. Glatistein, 921 F. Supp. 1559 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
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Malaysian litigation posed no threat to its continuing jurisdic-
tion and offended no compelling public policy. First, the court
noted that an intellectual property right cannot be moved from
the court's jurisdictional boundaries, thus depriving the court of
jurisdiction. The court also observed that there had been no
attempt by the defendant to carve out exclusive jurisdiction in
the Malaysian court. In addition, the court found that Malaysian
determination of the validity of the U.K. and Malaysian designs
did not undermine U.S. public policy favoring the protection of
intellectual property of its citizens.
6. Cases GRANTING Antisuit Injunctions Under the Comity Standard
As noted, under the comity standards, antitrust injunctions are issued only
in two situations: i) to protect the U.S. forum's jurisdiction; and ii) to prevent
evasion of important public policies.
a. Foreign Action Threatens the U.S. Court's Jurisdiction. In Mut.
Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Frit lndus. '76 Plaintiff Mutual Service was
an insurer of defendant Frit Industries, a corporation conducting
business in the British Isles. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against
defendant in federal court seeking a determination of the scope
of coverage under the insurance policies. Plaintiff was later
named as a defendant in a counter-claim filed by Frit Industries
in the British Isles and in a cross-claim filed by two other
insurers of Frit Industries in the Cayman Islands.
Plaintiff sought an antisuit injunction enjoining the
proceedings in the British Isles and the Cayman Islands. The
court found that this was a rare instance where there was a
sufficient threat to the court's jurisdiction to justify overriding
the principles of international comity, and granted an antisuit
injunction. Significant to the court's decision was that the
defendants in the British Isles had sought an antisuit injunction
enjoining Mutual Service from continuing the U.S. action. The
court viewed this as an attempt to carve out exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the action. The court, emphasizing that an antisuit
injunction should be no broader than necessary, enjoined the
defendants from seeking to establish the British Isles as the
exclusive forum for the claim, either through injunctive or
declaratory relief.
176. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., 805 F. Supp. 919 (M.D. Ala. 1992), aff'd per curiam,
3 F.3d 442 (11 th Cir. 1993).
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b. Evasion of Important Public Policies. In Farrell Lines Inc. v.
Columbus Cello-Poly Corp.'77 Plaintiff, Farrell Lines, operated
a merchant vessel which was involved in an accident while
delivering cargo in Norfolk, Virginia. As a result of this
accident the cargo suffered $800,000 of damage. After an
exchange of correspondence concerning insurance settlement,
plaintiff Farrell Lines filed suit in the Southern District of New
York, the jurisdiction specified in a forum selection clause. The
court issued a declaratoryjudgment ofnonliability in plaintiff's
favor. Farell Lines also sought an antisuit injunction preventing
defendants from filing or prosecuting a suit related to the
damaged cargo in any other forum, including Italy, where suit
was pending.
Applying the comity standard for determining antisuit
injunctions, the court found that defendants in this case had sued
in a foreign forum to evade two important public policies. The
court determined that the defendants had filed suit in Italy to
avoid the U.S. policy favoring enforcement of forum selection
clauses. In addition, the court found that the defendants sued in
Italy to evade the contractual liability limitation provisions.
Finally, the court noted that since it had already granted a
declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff, there was less
justification for permitting litigation in a foreign court.'78
D. Vexatiousness Standard
1. Basic Principles
a. U.S. courts that have adopted the vexatiousness standard for
granting antisuit injunctions are more likely to grant them than
those that have adopted a comity standard.
b. A court operating under the vexatiousness standard will issue
an antisuit injunction if allowing the foreign proceeding to go
forward would
i) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction;
ii) be vexatious or oppressive;
iii) threaten the issuing court's jurisdiction; and
iv) result in delay, inconvenience, expense, inconsistency or
race to judgment.'79
177. Farrell Lines Inc. v. Columbus Cello-Poly Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd
sub nom Farrell Lines Inc. v. Ceres Terminals Inc., 161 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1998).
178. See also Int 7 Fashion Prods., B. V. v. Calvin Klein, Inc., 1995 WL 92321 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
1995) (enjoining foreign suit filed in violation of forum selection clause).
179. See Seattle Totems, 652 F. 2d at 855.
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2. Cases DENYING An Antisuit Injunction Under the
Vexatiousness Standard
a. In Robinson v. Jardine Ins. Brokers Int'l Ltd.,' Plaintiff,
Robinson, was a California citizen and a former employee of
defendant, Jardine Insurance, an English corporation. Robinson
resigned from employment with defendant and allegedly began
to solicit defendant's colleagues and clients in violation of a
non-compete clause. The defendant obtained a temporary
restraining order in England enjoining Robinson from com-
peting with his former employer. Robinson sought an antisuit
injunction to prevent the defendant from enforcing the
temporary restraining order issued by the English court.
The district court for the Northern District of California,
following the vexatiousness standard, granted an antisuit injunc-
tion prohibiting the defendant from enforcing the English
temporary restraining order in the United States, but not
precluding the defendants from enforcing it in England. The
court reasoned that the English order frustrated California's
public policy disfavoring unreasonable restrictions on lawful
competition. The court noted, however, that under the
principles of international comity, it would defer to the English
court's injunction preventing plaintiff from competing against
his former employer in England.
b. In Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak
Dan Gas Bumi Negara,'81 the Fifth Circuit considered the issue
of whether or not to grant an antisuit injunction in connection
with a proceeding to enforce a Swiss arbitration award in the
United States.
Karaha Bodas Company ("KBC"), a power company,
entered into two contracts with the defendant ("Pertamina" an
energy company wholly owned by the Indonesian government)
to construct a power plant in Indonesia. The contract contained
a clause requiring the parties to arbitrate any disputes in
Switzerland under the UNCITRAL rules. Following a dispute
between the parties, KBC initiated arbitration proceedings in
Switzerland, and, following a hearing, the arbitration panel
ruled in favor ofKBC, awarding it damages of over $260 million.
Immediately after the award was rendered, Pertamina
sought to vacate it in the Swiss courts. While that proceeding
180. Robinson v. Jardine Ins. Brokers Int 'Ltd., 856 F. Supp. 554 (N.D.Cal. 1994).
181. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357
(5th Cir. 2003).
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was pending, KBC commenced proceedings in the district court
for the Southern District of Texas to confirm the award pursuant
to the New York Convention. Pertamina defended and also
moved to stay the U.S. proceedings pending the outcome of the
Swiss proceedings. While the district court declined to stay the
proceedings, it agreed to slow the proceedings in deference to
Pertamina's request. After the Swiss court dismissed
Pertamina's action, the district court granted KBC's motion for
summary judgment enforcing the award.
Shortly thereafter, Pertamina began proceedings to vacate
the award in the Indonesian courts and also sought there an
injunction and penalties to enjoin KBC from enforcing the
award in the United States. Just days before the hearing
scheduled by the Indonesian court on the proposed injunction,
KBC sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin
Pertamina from seeking injunctive relief in Indonesia. The
district court issued a TRO ordering Pertamina to withdraw its
application to the Indonesian court for an injunction and
enjoining it from taking any substantive steps in that court.
Pertamina claimed it did not have sufficient time to withdraw its
request for injunctive relief, and the Indonesian court issued an
injunction prohibiting KBC from enforcing the award. KBC
filed a motion asking the district court to hold Pertamina in
contempt for violating the TRO. The district court found KBC
in contempt of the TRO, again ordered Pertamina to withdraw
its Indonesian application for injunctive reliefagainst KBC, and
ordered Pertamina to indemnify KBC for any fines resulting
from the Indonesian injunction. KBC next asked the district
court to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining Pertamina from
enforcing the Indonesian injunction and from further pursuing
the annulment action in Indonesia. Pertamina responded by
filing a motion to purge the contempt order. The district court
granted KBC's motion for a preliminary injunction-enjoining
Pertamina from enforcing the Indonesian injunction and from
taking any substantive steps to prosecute the Indonesian
annulment action. The court also denied Pertamina's motion to
purge contempt. Pertamina appealed.
The Fifth Circuit had to deal with two issues on appeal.
First, did the New York Convention preclude the district court
from issuing an antisuit injunction? Second, assuming the
district court could, consistent with the New York Convention,
issue an antisuit injunction, was it appropriate for the court to
have exercised its discretion to do so?
Pertamina argued that the New York Convention prevented
a district court from exercising its inherent power to issue an
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antisuit injunction. The Fifth Circuit rejected this view on the
ground that nothing in the Convention or the implementing
legislation limited the power of a federal court to issue an
antisuit injunction:
Although these treaty obligations limit the grounds on
which the court can refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award,
there is nothing in the Convention or implementing legislation
that expressly limits the inherent authority of a federal court to
grant injunctive relief with respect to a party over whom it has
jurisdiction. Given the absence of an express provision, we
discern no authority for holding that the New York Convention
divests the district court of its inherent authority to issue an
antisuit injunction.'82
The court then turned to the question of whether it was
appropriate for the district court to have exercised its discretion
to issue an antisuit injunction in the circumstances of the case.
As noted, the Fifth Circuit has adopted the "vexatious and
oppressive" standard for antisuit injunctions. Under this
standard, in determining whether to issue an antisuit injunction,
courts look to such factors as whether the foreign lawsuit will
lead to delay, expense or inefficiency, whether the foreign
lawsuit is duplicative, or whether it threatens the U.S. court's
jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in issuing
an antisuit injunction, reaching this conclusion by examining the
U.S. and Indonesian proceedings in the context of the New
York Convention.
Central to the Fifth Circuit's analysis was that the New
York Convention distinguished between courts of "primary
jurisdiction" and courts of"secondaryjurisdiction." A court of
primary jurisdiction is one with the authority to set aside an
arbitral award. The courts of the country whose arbitration laws
apply to the case, typically the country of the arbitral situs, are
those of primary jurisdiction. The New York Convention is
silent on the grounds on which a court of primary jurisdiction
may rely to set aside an award, such that the issue turns on the
domestic law of that country. A court of secondary jurisdiction
is one with the authority to confirm an arbitral award. Article
V of the New York Convention sets forth the exclusive grounds
on which the court may refuse to confirm an arbitral award.
Moreover, petitions to confirm an arbitral award can be brought
in more than one court of secondary jurisdiction. As a result,
"[b]y allowing concurrent enforcement and annulment actions,
182. Id. at 365.
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as well as simultaneous enforcement actions in third countries,
the Convention necessarily envisions multiple proceedings that
address the same substantive challenges to an arbitral award."' 83
In seeking an antisuit injunction, one central argument
advanced by KBC was that the Indonesian court was not a court
of primary jurisdiction, and, therefore, did not have the
authority to annul the award. The Fifth Circuit did not
necessarily disagree with KBC's assertion that the Indonesian
court did not have primary jurisdiction.84
The Fifth Circuit held, however, that it did not have to
reach the issue of whether or not Indonesia was a court of
primary jurisdiction. "To resolve the instant dispute, however,
it is not necessary for us to address the Indonesian court's
decision to issue its own injunction and to entertain an
annulment action under the Convention."' 5 Rather, it found
that "[s]everal structural aspects of the New York Convention
indicate that none of the factors that usually contribute to
vexatiousness and oppressiveness are at play here."'8 6
First, the court relied on the fact that the New York
Convention permits simultaneous proceedings-both in a court
of primary jurisdiction to vacate an award and in the courts of
secondary jurisdictions to confirm an award. Since "the Con-
vention already provides for multiple simultaneous proceedings,
it is difficult to envision how court proceedings in Indonesia
could amount to an inequitable hardship."'8 7
Second, the court found that "there is little evidence that the
Indonesian injunction or annulment action will 'frustrate and
delay the speedy and efficient determination of the case."" 8
The court noted in this context that a U.S. court can enforce an
arbitral award even if it has been annulled in a country with
primary jurisdiction.8 9 Thus, the fact that there was an
annulment proceeding in Indonesia would result in only a
"slight additional expenditure ofjudicial resources."' 90 This is
183. Id. at 367.
184. Id. at 371 ("We agree that there is strong evidence in this instance favoring Switzerland as the
paramount country of primary jurisdiction under the Convention."). See also id. at 373 ("It is true that
Pertamina is likely in the wrong here, and that Indonesia's injunction and annulment may violate comity and
the spirit of the Convention much more than would the district court's injunction.").
185. Id. at 366.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 368.
188. Id. at 369.
189. Id. at 370 (citing ChromalloyAeroservs. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F.Supp. 907,909-13
(D.D.C. 1996) (enforcing an arbitral award rendered in Egypt notwithstanding annulment in Egypt)).
190. Id. at 370.
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because a U.S. court called upon to confirm an arbitral award
would have to undertake some analysis to decide whether or not
to do so regardless of whether there were annulment proceed-
ings elsewhere, and the additional resources devoted to
determine whether to confirm an award notwithstanding its
annulment by another court would be "inconsequential."''
Third, the issues in the Indonesian case (an action to set
aside the arbitral award) were not identical to those in the U.S.
case (an action to confirm the award). This is because, as noted,
an action to set aside an award is governed by the domestic law
of the country in which the action is brought (i.e., Indonesian
law), whereas an action to confirm an award is governed by the
Convention. "Thus, assuming arguendo that the Indonesian
courts might somehow be deemed to be courts of primary juris-
diction, they still would not precisely duplicate the enforcement
proceedings that took place in the United States."'92
Finally, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Indonesian
court proceedings "do not threaten the integrity of the district
court's jurisdiction or its judgment enforcing the Award....
Thus, the integrity ofourjurisdiction will not be affected unless
we decide that the Indonesian annulment is in fact valid andthat
this annulment outweighs the Swiss court's confirmation of the
Award.' 93 The Fifth Circuit's conclusion on this last point is
questionable as the Indonesian court was not only considering
whether or not to annul the arbitral award, but also had entered
an antisuit injunction enjoining KBC from enforcing the award.
It was an injunction such as this one that the Laker Airways
court found was a threat to its jurisdiction. An antisuit
injunction/although it is aimed at a party to a lawsuit rather than
a foreign court/does have the effect of depriving the foreign
court of jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit did not ignore the effect of the antisuit
injunction on KBC itself, stating:
... as a court of secondary jurisdiction under the New York
Convention, charged only with enforcing or refusing to enforce
a foreign arbitral award, it is not the district court's burden or
ours to protect KBC from all the legal hardships it might
undergo in a foreign country as a result of this foreign
arbitration or the international commercial dispute that spawned
i.194it.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 370.
193. Id. at 370.
194. Id. at 369.
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However, the Fifth Circuit failed to consider that those
"legal hardships"/which may include a fine for contempt of
court/can have the effect of compelling a party to U.S.
proceedings to curtail its action in the U.S., which has the
corollary of depriving the U.S. court ofjurisdiction.
Against the vexations of the Indonesian proceedings, the
court balanced considerations of international comity. Signifi-
cant to its analysis was that allowing the antisuit injunction to
stand "could set an undesirable precedent under the [New York]
Convention, permitting a secondary jurisdiction to impose
penalties on a party when it disagrees with that party's attempt
to challenge an award in another country."' 95
3. Cases GRANTING an Antisuit Injunction
Under the Vexatiousness Standard
a. Kaepa involved a contract between Kaepa, a U.S. athletic shoe
manufacturer, and Achilles, a Japanese corporation which
agreed to distribute Kaepa's footwear in Japan. 196 The contract
explicitly provided that Texas law and the English language
would govern its interpretation, that it would be enforceable in
Texas, and that Achilles consented to the jurisdiction of the
Texas courts. There arose a dispute, and Kaepa filed suit in
Texas. After about a year, during which time discovery had
occurred in the Texas suit, Achilles filed suit in Japan.
Kaepa sought an antisuit injunction from the Texas court
asking it to enjoin Achilles from prosecuting its suit in Japan.
Achilles responded by moving to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds. The lower court denied Achilles' motion
to dismiss and granted Kaepa's motion to enjoin.
Achilles appealed and sought to persuade the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to adopt the comity standard. The
court rejected that standard, declining "to require a district court
to genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity
every time that it must decide whether to enjoin a foreign
action.""' 9 Rather, the court found that an antisuit injunction
was warranted because prosecution of the Japanese action
would be considerably duplicative and would result in
unwarranted inconvenience, expense, and vexation.
195. Id. at 373.
196. Kaepa Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996).
197. Id. at 627.
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b. In Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys.,19 Bull Data
Systems ("BDS"), a French computer manufacturer, negotiated
an insurance agreement with Allendale, an American insurance
company. The insurance policy, covering BDS' French loca-
tions, was negotiated under the French insurance code. After a
suspected arson destroyed a warehouse full of BDS inventory,
a dispute arose regarding the scope of Allendale's insurance
coverage. Pending a criminal investigation into the possible
arson, Allendale refused to indemnify BDS and instead filed an
action in the Northern District of Illinois. BDS commenced suit
in the commercial court of France, a court of limited juris-
diction. Allendale petitioned the district court to enjoin the
French proceedings, arguing that the French court, due to its
limited jurisdiction, was not equipped to resolve the arson issue,
which was an essential component of the insurance dispute.
The district court granted the antisuit injunction after
determining that the U.S. court was a more appropriate forum
to resolve the entire dispute. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of the antisuit injunction after
cautioning that it would be improper to consider the relative
merits of the French and American procedural systems. The
court pointed to the vexatiousness and "absurd duplication of
effort" that would arise out of allowing both actions to
proceed.'"
The court went on to discuss the importance of inter-
national comity. While international comity was a relevant
factor, the court emphasized that it would not presume a threat
to comity without evidence of such a threat. The court then
suggested that such evidence of a threat to foreign relations
could be presented by a representation from the State Depart-
ment or an appropriate foreign body. The court compared the
comity standard to the vexatiousness standard:
The strict cases [those following the comity standard]
presume a threat to international comity whenever an injunction
is sought against litigating in a foreign court. The lax cases
[those following the vexatiousness standard] want to see some
empirical flesh on the theoretical skeleton. They do not deny
that comity could be impaired by such an injunction but they
demand evidence.., that comity is likely to be impaired in this
case.
200
198. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993).
199. Id. at 431.
200. Id.
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c. In Seattle Totems,0' the owners of the Seattle Totems, an ice
hockey team in the now defunct Western Hockey League,
brought a private antitrust action in federal district court against
the National Hockey League, Northwest Sports, and various
other league officers and club owners claiming unlawful
monopolization ofthe ice hockey industry in North America and
seeking to have certain agreements relating to the sale and
management of the Seattle Totems declared void and
unenforceable. Northwest Sports commenced suit in Canada
with respect to the same agreements that were the subject of the
U.S. action. Plaintiff moved for an antisuit injunction in the
U.S. court to enjoin Northwest Sports from pursuing its contract
claim in Canada.
Following the vexatiousness standard, the Ninth Circuit
issued the antisuit injunction after finding that adjudicating the
contract issue in two separate actions would result in
unnecessary delay and substantial inconvenience and expense
to the parties and the witnesses. The court expressed concern
that separate adjudication could result in inconsistent rulings or
a race to judgment. 2 2 The court also found that the claim
brought by defendants in the foreign jurisdiction was in fact a
compulsory counterclaim under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure
13(a) which should be adjudicated where the original claim was
brought.2"3 The court concluded that policies favoring conven-
ience to the parties and witnesses, the interest in efficient
administration of justice, the potential prejudice to the parties,
and the rationale behind Rule 13(a) weighed in favor of granting
the antisuit injunction.
d. Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.2"" A Minnesota
company brought suit against two insurers seeking to recover
losses incurred by an English affiliate. One of the insurers
brought suit against plaintiff Cargill in England to determine the
scope of insurance coverage. The district court, without dis-
cussing principles of international comity, granted plaintiff's
motion for an antisuit injunction. The court based the injunction
on the grounds that it would be vexatious to Cargill and a waste
of judicial resources to require adjudication in two separate
forums. The court also expressed concern about the risk of pre-
judice to plaintiff from possible inconsistent results and a race
to judgment.
201. Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d 852.
202. Id. at 856.
203. Id. at 854.
204. Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 531 F. Supp. 710 (D. Minn. 1982).
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E. Totality of the Circumstances
1. The First Circuit's Decision
a. The Facts: Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler
Bedriyfsrevisoren arose out of an audit engagement undertaken
by a Belgian accounting firm-Klynveld Peat Marwick
Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren ("KPMG-B")--on behalf of
Lemout & Hauspie Speech Products, N.V. ("L&H"). °5 After
L&H collapsed, several securities fraud actions were com-
menced in the U.S. against KPMG-B. These cases were con-
solidated before the district court for the District of
Massachusetts. KPMG-B did not dispute that it was subject to
personal jurisdiction in the U.S., although it unsuccessfully
moved to dismiss the suits on grounds offorum non conveniens
and the failure to satisfy the pleading requirements of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
After KPMG-B's motion was denied, plaintiffs served
document requests on KPMG-B for its audit records and work
papers. KPMG-B refused to produce them, asserting that to do
so would violate Belgian law. Plaintiffs moved to compel, and
the district court granted that motion. In response, KPMG-B
sought relief from the Belgian courts. Specifically, KPMG-B
filed an ex parte petition with a court in Brussels seeking to
enjoin the plaintiffs in the U.S. action from"tak[ing] any step of
a procedural or other nature in order to proceed with the
discovery procedure." To ensure compliance, KPMG-B also
asked the Belgian court to impose a fine of one million Euros
for each violation of the proposed injunction.
The Belgian court refused to act ex parte. Instead, it
required KPMG-B to give notice of the Belgian proceedings to
the plaintiffs in the U.S. litigation, and it scheduled a hearing.
Before that hearing took place, the plaintiffs in the U.S.
proceedings sought an anti-suit injunction from the U.S. court
enjoining KPMG-B from pursuing the proceedings in Belgium.
The district court granted the injunction. KPMG-B
appealed. The First Circuit issued a partial stay of the injunc-
tion (permitting KPMG-B to appear at the hearing in Brussels
for the sole purpose of asking for a continuance), and expedited
the appeal. The First Circuit dealt with two basic issues on
appeal: the standards for appellate review of a district court's
order on an international anti-suit injunction and the standards
205. Quaakv. KlynveldPeat Marwick GoerdelerBedrijfsrevisoren, No. 03-2704,2004 WL 415282
(I st Cir. Mar. 8, 2004).
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a district court should use in deciding whether or not to issue
such an injunction.
b. Standard of Review: While the First Circuit acknowledged that
the grant of preliminary injunctions, as a general matter, should
receive "deferential review" on appeal, the court noted that
because international anti-suit injunctions involve "important
considerations of comity," they warrant "a heightened level of
appellate review." This review is more rigorous than the abuse
of discretion or clear error standard, but involves less scrutiny
than de novo review. "Given our chosen standard of review, we
cede a modest degree of deference to the trier's exercise of
discretion, but we will not hesitate to act upon our independent
judgment if it appears a mistake has been made."
c. Standard for Anti-Suit Injunction: In addressing the appropriate
standard for issuing an anti-suit injunction, the court rejected the
liberal approach because it assigned "too low a priority" to
international comity. And although it found that the conserva-
tive approach "has more to commend it," the First Circuit
"stop[ped] short ... of an uncritical acceptance" of it.
Instead, the First Circuit adopted a third position. It stated
that considerations of international comity "ordinarily establish
a rebuttable presumption against the issuance of an order that
has the effect of halting foreign judicial proceedings." The
court made it clear, however, that, contrary to the conservative
approach, it did not believe that the circumstances in which that
presumption could be overcome should be limited to two
grounds-threat to jurisdiction and public policy. Rather the
court instructed district courts to examine "the totality of the
circumstances" in deciding whether the presumption against the
issuance of an anti-suit injunction had been overcome. These
circumstances "include (but are by no means limited to) such
things as: the nature of the two actions (i.e., whether they are
merely parallel or whether the foreign action is more properly
classified as interdictory); the posture of the proceedings in the
two countries; the conduct of the parties (including their good
faith or lack thereof); the importance of the policies at stake in
the litigation; and, finally, the extent to which the foreign action
has the potential to undermine the forum court's ability to reach
a just and speedy result."
Having articulated a new standard, the court went on to
apply it to the case before it, and found that the district court
was justified in issuing the anti-suit injunction.
d. Applying The New Standard: The First Circuit characterized
the KMPG-B's Belgian action as one seeking "to arrest the
progress of the securities fraud action by thwarting the very
[Vol. 14:2
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discovery that the district court, which is intimately familiar
with the exigencies of the underlying case, has deemed essential
to the continued prosecution of the action against any of the
defendants." While KPMG-B's Belgian action did "not con-
stitute a frontal assault on the district court's jurisdiction," its
effect was the same. A "court has a right-indeed, a duty-to
preserve its ability to do justice between the parties in cases that
are legitimately before it." Thus, the court affirmed the district
court's grant of the anti-suit injunction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine and strategies discussed in this article are critical to parties
involved in international litigation who wish to secure the most favorable forum
for an action.
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VII. APPENDIX A
DRAFT FORUM SELECTION AND RELATED CLAUSES
Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Forum
i. Exclusive Forum
The courts of [Country X] shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all actions relating to or arising out of
this Agreement.
ii. Non-Exclusive Forum
The courts of [Country X] shall have jurisdiction to decide
all actions relating to or arising out of this Agreement,
without prejudice to the right of either party to commence
such actions in any other court of competent jurisdiction.
iii. Asymmetrical Forum Selection Clause
The parties agree that all actions arising out of or in
connection with this Agreement shall be resolved
exclusively in the courts of [Country X], provided
however, that [Party A] shall be also free to commence
such actions in any court of competent jurisdiction,
including without limitation the courts of [Country Y] and
[Country Z].
iv. Defendant's Place of Business As Forum
Any suit relating to this Agreement brought by [Party A]
shall be brought in the place where [Party B's] principal
place of business is located; any suit relating to this
Agreement brought by [Party B] shall be brought in the
place where [Party A's] principal place of business is
located.
v. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
N.B. In the United States, because a party cannot confer
subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court, a party
should provide that either the state or federal courts of that
state shall have jurisdiction. For example:
The state and federal courts of New York shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all actions relating to or arising
out of the Agreement.
2. Scope of Clause
i. Broad Scope
All disputes, claims, controversies, and disagreements
relating to or arising out of this Agreement, or the subject
matter of this Agreement, shall be subject to the exclusive




All disputes relating to this Agreement, with the exception
of claims arising under Article 1II, shall be resolved
exclusively in the courts of [Country X].
3. Other Common Provisions
i. Consent to Service of Process
[Party A] irrevocably designates, appoints and empowers
[Agent D], with offices on the date hereof at [Address in
City E], as its agent with respect to any action or
proceeding in [Country X] to receive, on its behalf, and in
respect of its property, service of any and all legal process,
summons, notices and documents which may be served in
any such action or proceeding, and agrees that the failure
of the agent to notify [Party A] of any such service of
process does not impair or affect the validity of service.
[Party A] further irrevocably consents to the service of
process out of any of the courts listed in [Article II] by the
mailing of copies by registered or certified mail, postage
prepaid, to [Party A] at its address set forth in [Article III],
such service to become effective 30 days after such
mailing. If for any reason [Party A] shall cease to be
available to act as agent, [Agent D] agrees to designate a
new agent in [City E] on the same terms and for the same
purposes.
ii. Waiver of Foreign Sovereign or State Immunity
[Party A] is subject to civil and commercial law with
respect to its obligations under this Agreement. The
execution, delivery and performance by [Party A] of this
Agreement constitute private and commercial acts rather
than public or governmental acts. Neither [Party A], nor
any of its properties or revenues, is entitled to or will
claim any right of immunity in any jurisdiction from suit,
jurisdiction,judgment, attachment (whether before or after
judgment), set-off or execution of ajudgment or from any
other legal process or remedy relating to the obligations of
[Party A] under this Agreement.
iii. Choice-of-Law Clauses
a. Scope of Choice-of-Law Clause
This agreement shall be interpreted in accordance
with, and governed by, the laws of [Country X]. OR
This agreement shall be construed in accordance
with the laws of [Country X]. OR
This Agreement will be governed by, and all
disputes relating to or arising out of this Agreement
[or the subject matter of this Agreement] shall be
2008]
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resolved in accordance with, the laws of [Country
X].
b. Renvoi Versus "Whole Law"
This Agreement will be governed by, and all
disputes relating to or arising out of this Agreement
shall be resolved in accordance with, the laws of
[Country X] (to the exclusion of its conflict of laws
rules).
iv. Waiver of Forum Non Conveniens
Each party waives any right to invoke, and agrees not to
invoke, any claim of forum non conveniens, inconvenient
forum, or transfer or change of venue.
v. Waiver of Jury Trial
[Party A] expressly waives any right to a trial by jury with
respect to disputes relating to this Agreement, and agrees
not to seek or claim any such right.
vi. Application of Forum Selection Clauses to Actions
Seeking Provisional or Interim Relief
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent either party from
applying to a court that would otherwise have jurisdiction
for provisional or interim measures, including but not
limited to any claim for preliminary injunctive relief. OR
All disputes relating to this Agreement shall be resolved
exclusively in the courts of [Country X], provided that
claims alleging unlicensed or otherwise unauthorized use
of the [Trademarks] may be asserted in any court of
competent jurisdiction. OR
All disputes relating to this Agreement (with the exception
of claims arising under Article X) shall be resolved
exclusively in the courts of [Country X].
vii. Basic Forum Selection Clause
All disputes relating to this Agreement shall be subject to
the exclusivejurisdiction ofthe courts of[Country X], and
shall be decided in accordance with the laws of [Country
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THAWING A FROZEN
CONFLICT: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
SEPARATIST CRISIS IN MOLDOVA
Special Committee on European Affairs of the New York City Bar*
INTRODUCTION
Moldova is the poorest country in Europe and it is enmeshed in a
seemingly intractable separatist conflict involving ethnic tensions, Russian
troops, Soviet-era arms stockpiles, smuggling, money-laundering, and
corruption. Bordering Romania and Ukraine, with a majority of ethnic
Romanians, it is a country that has been largely overlooked by the West.1 This
report examines the key legal issues of this "frozen" conflict and assesses the
legal or quasi-legal arguments made by the Government of Moldova and the
separatists.
At issue is who should control a strip of land nestled between the Dniestr
River and the border of Ukraine. Variously called Transnistria, Trans-Dniester
and, by Russian speakers, Pridnestrov'ia,2 this region is less than 30 kilometers
wide, with 4,118 square kilometers in total area, making it roughly the size of
Rhode Island. Transnistria has a population of approximately 580,000, while
the rest of Moldova has 3.36 million inhabitants.4 Nonetheless, Transnistria
* Previously published in The Association of the Bar of the City ofNew York, Special Committee
on European Affairs, Thawing a Frozen Conflict: LegalAspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova, 61 THE
RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 196 (2006).
Reprinted with permission from The Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
I. The Soviets, however, labeled this population as ethnically "Moldovan," and asserted that they
were not ethnically Romanian. The USSR also called the Romanian language "Moldovan," and underscored
this by outlawing the use of the Latin alphabet and requiring the use of Cyrillic letters. Although the reason
for this nomenclature was political, rather than ethno-linguistic, it was carried over by the current Moldovan
government after independence.
2. CHARLES KING, THE MOLDOVANS: ROMANIA, RUSSIA, AND THE POLITICS OF
CULTURE 178 (2000).
3. Id., at 178.
4. U.S. Department of State 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for the Republic
of Moldova (hereafter "Moldova 2004 Country Report"), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2004/41697.htm; a Transnistrian census from November 2004 set Transnistria's population at approximately
555,500, which could indicate the ongoing flight of people from the region. Preliminary Results of the Census
in Transnistria, Olvia-press (Tiraspol) Sept. 7,2005. By contrast, a 1989 census found the region's population
to be 679,000.
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contains Moldova's key industrial infrastructure, power plants, and,
importantly, a significant stockpile of Soviet-era arms. Since 1994, it has been
under the effective control of a separatist regime that calls itself the
Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (TMR).5
In late May 2005 the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (NY
City Bar), through its Special Committee on European Affairs (Committee) sent
a legal assessment team (Mission) to the Republic of Moldova, including
Transnistria. The Mission consisted of Barrington D. Parker, Jr., a United
States Circuit Court Judge in the Second Circuit; Robert Abrams, a partner at
Strrock & Stroock & Lavan LLP and former Attorney General of the State of
New York; Elizabeth Defeis, Professor of Law and former Dean of Seton Hall
University Law School; and Christopher J. Borgen, Assistant Professor of Law
at St. John's University School of Law. It was led by Mark A. Meyer, a
member of Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., and the Chair of the Committee.
As will be described below, the Mission met with the key policy leaders
in Moldova and in the breakaway region, including the President of Moldova
and the leader of the Transnistrian separatists, and has completed the first
independent analysis of the legal issues involved in the Transnistrian crisis.
Beholden to none of the stakeholders, the NY City Bar is able to consider these
issues from an objective standpoint. One should note that the NY City Bar's
work historically has not been confined to New York. In fact, the Transnistria
mission is not the first foreign mission by a committee of the Association. Over
the past twenty-five years, the Association has conducted a number of missions
to places as diverse as Cuba, Singapore, Malaysia, Turkey, Hong Kong,
Argentina, Uganda, Northern Ireland, and, most recently, India. In addition, the
Association has worked with bar organizations in the Czech Republic and
Kyrgyzstan to bolster the independence of the bar and judiciary. Perhaps due
to this historical involvement in international law, the various interested parties,
including the governments of Moldova, Russia, Romania, Ukraine, and the
United States, as well as the Leadership of Transnistria, assisted the Mission by
making government representatives, policymakers and experts available for
interview. In preparation of this Report, the Mission met with the following
individuals, as well as many others not listed here:
5. This report will use the "Transnistria" nomenclature although when we quote another author's
work we will preserve that author's nomenclature within the quotation. For example, the TMR may variously
be referred to as the Dniestr Republic, the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (PMR), Transdniestria, or other
such name based on the nomenclature adopted by the author being quoted. Similarly, this report's spelling
of other proper names normally spelled in the Cyrillic alphabet may differ from the spellings within the





Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev
Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan
Minister of Reintegration Vasilii Sova
Chairperson of the Supreme Court Valeria Sterbert
Chairperson of the Constitutional Court Victor Puscas
Justice Minister Victoria Iftodi
General Ion Ursu, Chief of the Information and Security Services
Leaders of all of the Parliamentary factions
Deputy Attorney General Valeriu Gurbulea
Deputy Speaker of the Parliament Maria Postoico
US Ambassador Heather Hodges
Russian Ambassador Nicolay Ryabov
Ukrainian Ambassador Petro Cealyi
Romanian Ambassador Filip Teodorescu
OSCE Ambassador William Hill
ABA/CEELI Country Director Samantha Healy
Farmers and local municipal and county leaders from the Dubasari area
In Transnistria
President Igor Nikolaevich Smirnov
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Grigoriy Stepanovich Marakutsa6
Foreign Minister Valeriy Anatolevich Litskai
Minister of Justice Viktor Balala, Chairperson of the Constitutional Court
Vladimir Grigoriev
In Romania
Foreign Minister Mihai Ungureanu
Experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Trade and Economy
US Deputy Chief of Mission Tom Delare
In New York
Ambassador Andrey Denisov
Permanent Representative of Russia to the United Nations Ambassador
Seva Grigore
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova to the United
Nations Ambassador Mihnea Motoc
6. Marakutsa, who had been in office since the original separatist conflict, was replaced in
December 2005 with the election of Yevgeny Shevchuck as the new Chairman of the Supreme Soviet.
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Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations Senior
representatives of the Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations
In Washington, D.C.
Ambassador Stephen Mann, Special Negotiator for Eurasian Conflicts
Elizabeth Rood
Deputy Director
Office of the Special Negotiator for Eurasian Conflicts
The National Security Council's Director for Europe
Damon Wilson Various Department of State experts on Moldova and
regional conflicts Ambassador Sorin Ducaru
Romania's Ambassador to the United States and his staff Ambassador
Mihai Manoli
Moldova's Ambassador to the United States and his staff
The resulting report has five parts. In Part I we review the history of the
conflict over Transnistria. Part II is an overview of the work of the Mission of
the European Affairs Committee of the New York City Bar regarding the
situation in Transnistria. Part III turns to the substantive question of
determining the status of the so-called "Transnistrian Moldovan Republic"
(TMR) under international law. This will include discussions of self-deter-
mination, secession, and the status of defacto regimes. Part IV considers what
the TMR may or may not do regarding the conversion of property. Part V
assess the legal duties of third parties that become involved in secessionist
conflicts. Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the main points of this report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report considers three main legal issues:
a) Whether the TMR has a right under international law to
autonomy or possibly sovereignty;
b) What the legal concerns are regarding the transfer of
property located in Transnistria by the TMR leadership;
and
c) What role "third-party" States have in the ongoing conflict
and, in particular, the international legal implications of




The Status of the TMR under International Law
The central question to this report concerns the status of the TMR under
international law and, in particular, the evaluation of claims by Transnistrian
leaders that the TMR has a legal right either to autonomy within Moldova or to
secede. We found neither claim persuasive and conclude that the TMR is best
characterized as a "de facto regime."
No Right to Autonomy
First, under international law there is no "right" to fiscal or governmental
autonomy within a state. While the TMR leadership may make political argu-
ments that one may or may not find persuasive, we did not find a legal basis for
a claim of autonomy. The two strongest quasi-legal arguments in favor of
autonomy are: a) That due to the denunciation by the USSR of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, which had established the modem boundaries of Moldova,
Transnistria should revert to an autonomous state; and, b) self-determination as
a basis for autonomy. The denunciation argument is a chimera. Simply
denouncing a treaty does not revert the political system to the status quo ante;
it merely means that the treaty will not be in force going forward. This is
especially true in treaties that include boundary delimitation provisions.
The second argument made by the Transnistrians, linking autonomy with
the right of self-determination, opens up numerous complex issues in public
international law. One thing is clear: rather than a right to autonomy--or even
a specific set of characteristics that define this term-intemational law in the
last century has focused on the elucidation of the norm of self-determination.
Self determination, and its relation to autonomy and secession, is discussed at
greater length below.
In sum, we found that international law has little to say as to any supposed
"right" to autonomy, and that grants of "autonomy" are largely issues of
domestic law. In the Transnistrian case, the Government of Moldova has
proposed various plans that are effectively grants of varying levels of
policymaking and regulatory autonomy; all have been rejected by the TMR.
We conclude that, based on their words and deeds, the TMRs leaders seem less
interested in autonomy than in full sovereignty.
Self-Determination, Sovereignty, and Secession
The norm of self-determination is not a general right of secession. It is the
right of a people to decide on their culture, language, and government. It has
evolved into the concepts of "internal self-determination," the protection of
minority rights within a state, and "external self-determination," secession from
2008]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
a state. While self-determination is an internationally recognized principle,
secession is considered a domestic issue that each state must assess itself.
Influential decisions and reports concerning self-determination, such as the
report concerning the status of the Aaland Islands in 1921 and the Badinter
Commission opinions concerning the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and other
examples of state practice have been consistent in the view that a successful
claim for self-determination must at least show that:
a) The secessionists are a "people;"
b) The state from which they are seceding seriously violates their
human rights; and
c) There are no other effective remedies under either domestic law
or international law. None of these prongs are satisfied in the
case of Transnistria, with the possible exception of(a).
The term "people" has been generally used in recent state practice to refer
to an ethnic group, or a "nation" in the classic, ethnographic, sense of the word.
However there are some, such as the TMRs leadership, who suggest the term
should mean something else, perhaps a group with common goals and norms.
While the norm of self-determination may evolve such that a people may be
more readily identified as merely a like-minded group, we do not find that
current state practice supports such a proposition. Regardless, deciding on a
single definition of the term "people" is not dispositive in this case, as none of
the other requirements for external self-determination are met.
Concerning the second prong, the existence of serious violations of human
rights, the argument of the Transnistrians can be organized into three main
groupings:
a) Violations of linguistic, cultural, and political rights;
b) The brutality of the 1992 War; and
c) The denial of economic rights. Taking into account the
significant changes in Moldova since 1992, none ofthese claims
is convincing today.
The actual history of Moldova since the end of the 1992 War shows that
the country has improved its respect of minority rights. In contrast, the TMR
has had a poor human rights record including a lack of due process, persecution
of religious minorities, and retaliation against political dissenters. The 1992
War itself caused 1,000 deaths, but we found that. In light of state practice, the
events of the 1992 War in and of themselves do not make a persuasive claim of
secession as a legal right. If they did, the world would be rife with secessionist
conflicts. Similarly, the economic rights claim, which is essentially about
allocation of tax revenues, does not lead to a legal right to dismember a state.
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This argument is really about policy, not the form of a polity. Finally, we note
that there is a general sense among commentators, opinions, and decisions, that
the human rights violations that are cited in support of a claim of secession
must be ongoing violations. Although Moldova still has many possible pitfalls
on its road to becoming a fully modem democratic state, it is clear that it is
nonetheless traveling the road in the right direction, albeit with some fits and
starts. Thus, the second prong-ongoing serious violations of human rights-is
not met.
The third prong asks whether there are any other options available besides
secession. This conflict has been frozen not so much because there are no other
options under domestic and international law besides secession, but because the
separatists have chosen to make the conflict seem intractable by repeatedly
refusing any options short of effective sovereignty for the TMR. For example,
while Moldova has sought to decrease ethnic tensions, the TMR has attempted
to exacerbate them and subsequently claim that separation is necessary in order
to avoid ethnic conflict and possibly genocide. Such "gaming the system" is
not persuasive.
We thus conclude that there is no solid basis for a claim of secession under
external self-determination. The most basic requirements for a legal claim are
not met.
The TMR as a De Facto Regime
If Transnistria is not a state, then what is it? We considered two issues:
a) the role of recognition in the process of state formation; and b) whether the
TMR is a defacto regime. There is no obligation to recognize the TMR, even
if it does have effective control of territory. Rather, it is likely that the forcible
acquisition of territory, the ongoing objections by the pre-existing state,
Moldova, and the evident reliance of the TMR on military, economic, and
political support from Russia for its survival argue against recognition andfor
nonrecognition in this case. In similar cases the Security Council and/or the
General Assembly call on UN member states not to recognize such seceding
entities. Inasmuch as the TMR has effective control over Transnistria but is not
recognized, the TMR can best be understood by using the doctrine of defacto
regimes. Such defacto regimes are treated as partial subjects of international
law. Their unique status does give rise to certain rights and responsibilities,
primarily related to acts required for the support and well-being of the
population. It may conclude agreements that are held at a status below treaties.
Besides the right to act in order to support its population, a defacto regime may
also be held responsible for breaches of international law.
While the defacto regime thus has certain rights and responsibilities, the
acts of defacto regimes have uncertain legal effect. Acts of such a regime may
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become invalid with the disappearance of the regime, for instance, if the
territory is reabsorbed into the parent state. However, the reintegrated state
after a failed defacto regime may be held liable for the acts of the defacto
regime that were part of the normal administration of the territory based on the
assumption that such acts were neutral and that the state would probably have
undertaken similar such acts. If, on the other hand, the de facto regime
becomes a state, then its acts will be binding on the new state.
The TMR and the Conversion of Property in Transnistria
At the heart of the dispute between the Government of Moldova and the
TMR's leadership is the issue of the control of the economic assets of
Transnistria. Does the TMR have the right to convert the property in its area
of effective control? If the two parts of Moldova are reintegrated, must these
decisions of the TMR be respected?
We used two theoretical frameworks to answer these questions. The first,
the concept of defacto regime, was discussed above. The second is an analogy
to the international law of the administration of occupied territories, the most
complete statement of which is found in the Fourth Geneva Convention. We
use these rules only by analogy as one might argue that the TMR actually is not
bound by the Fourth Geneva Convention. Nonetheless, we find the rules
concerning the administration of occupied territories and those concerning de
facto regimes to be useful, especially as they are also remarkably consistent as
they both draw from the same root concepts of property rights that tap all the
way down to the Roman law of usufruct, use of property by one who does not
own that asset.
Applying the international law of defacto regimes, the TMR does not have
the right to sell-off Moldovan state assets or any private property. Any such
sales face possible challenge and repudiation should Transnistria become
reintegrated into Moldova. By not only applying the conception of the TMR
as a de facto regime, but also by analogizing to the international law of the
administration of occupied territories, we find that an occupying power or its
analog:
a) May confiscate state property, other than real property, if it is
usable for military purposes or in the administration of the
territory;
b) May only administer non-military state real property without
destroying or otherwise converting the economic value of the
property; and
c) May not confiscate private property unless it is war materiel.
Based on the foregoing, the TMR's privatization program is
thus exceedingly difficult to justify. Any private party taking
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part in this program as a purchaser consequently does so at its
own risk.
THIRD-PARTY STATES AND SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS
The third and final main legal issue we consider is the role of "third-party"
states. States have a basic duty not to intervene or otherwise interfere with the
resolution of an internal conflict within another state. Under circumstances
where self-determination or, more clearly, external self-determination is
implicated, or where the Security Council finds that a conflict has become a
threat to international peace, then third-party states may have more freedom of
action concerning the conflict. This fundamental norm of non-intervention is
linked with concepts of sovereignty, self-determination, and peaceful
coexistence. The role of third-party states is especially important in this case
as Russia and Ukraine have taken on the role of "guarantor" states, states that
have a special interest in ensuring an end to the conflict and formally commit
to devoting resources to conflict resolution. Being a guarantor puts a state into
a position in which it becomes involved in an ongoing crisis in another country,
but that state must nonetheless respect international law in its actions. The
report considers the actions of Russia and Ukraine in light of these rules of
conduct.
Russia
Russia, not least because it maintains troops in Transnistria, is not only a
guarantor, but a key player in the conflict. We consider four main issues:
a) The activities of the Russian Army and other organs of the
Russian Federation in Transnistria;
b) Economic pressure by the Russian Federation on Moldova;
c) Ties between the TMR leadership and Russian leadership; and
d) The general diplomatic stance of the Russian Federation.
The role of the Russian Army can be split into two phases: assistance
during the 1992 War and ongoing activities, including maintenance of arms
stockpiles in Transnistria. The Russian 14th Army played a decisive role in the
1992 War by intervening in the fighting on behalf of the separatists. Despite
treaty promises to demobilize and repeated Moldovan requests that Russia
remove its troops from Transnistria, the troops remain. Consequently, they
prop up the viability of the TMR and make reintegration more difficult. They
also provide materiel, expertise, and other support to the TMR on an ongoing
basis. Similarly, the Soviet-era arms stockpile under control of the 14th Army
has been used to support the TMR both directly and as a source of revenue
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through joint Russian-TMR sales of army materiel on the world market.
Moldova thus wants the immediate removal of the weapons stockpiles. Russia
has so far refused to remove the stockpiles (or the troops) until there is a
comprehensive political settlement and has also argued that the Transnistrians
will not let them remove the arms.
Besides the use of the army to either hamper the Moldovans or assist the
TMR, the second main issue is that Russia has also used economic pressure and
economic assistance as a carrot and stick. Economic pressure is generally not
barred by international law. However, such pressure on a state or assistance to
separatists may make the third-party state liable under the law of state
responsibility if its pressure would either frustrate Moldova's sovereign
privileges or would breach one of the third-party state's pre-existing commit-
ments to Moldova. In considering the present situation, there are four areas of
particular interest:
a) The use of energy prices as a carrot or a stick;
b) The increased use of tariff barriers against Moldovan goods;
c) Economic assistance to the TMR; and
d) The shared economic interests of Russian and Transnistrian
elites. Taken as a whole, there is a significant intervention on
behalf of the TMR.
On the third issue, the ties between TMR and Russian leadership, there is
ample circumstantial evidence. Smirnov, Minister of Justice Balala, and Chief
of Internal Security Vladimir Antufeyev all arrived in Moldova at the start or
since the start of the separatist crisis. The TMRs ruling elite is largely Russian
and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainian, and have Russian citizenship. They have
been granted Russian nationality. Certain members came to the TMR from
senior positions in the Russian government, particularly the Russian parliament
(Duma) and the Russian Army.
Finally, the various activities described above-the economic pressure, the
military assistance to the TMR, the energy politics-need to be understood in
light of the constant Russian rhetoric in favor of the TMR and critical of
Moldova. While we do not contend that any single activity described could
lead to state responsibility (although the troop situation may rise to that level)
we believe that these acts seen as a whole, combined with constant Russian
statements supporting the TMR and criticizing Moldovan efforts at
reintegration, form a compelling picture of inappropriate intervention by Russia




Due to its common border with Moldova-and particularly with
Transnistria-as well as the significant ethnic Ukrainian population in
Transnistria and throughout Moldova, Ukraine is a key stakeholder in the
Transnistrian conflict. Ukraine has been critical of Transnistrian separatism
and has advocated the complete withdrawal of Russian troops, but has also been
perceived (rightly or wrongly) as allowing smuggling through its territory and
possibly being open to relations with the TMR. Although Ukraine has acted in
many ways as a counterbalance to Russian influence in Transnistria, its
attentions have often been viewed by the Moldovans with a mixture of hope and
suspicion. Ukraine has made what may be a good faith effort at plotting a path
towards a solution of the crisis; however an actual final plan needs to be seen
before its legal implications can be assessed. The stricter border controls that
are currently being implemented are a necessary, though not conclusive, step
in resolving the Transnistrian crisis. Now that Ukraine has become a more
active participant in the Transnistrian crisis, its actions will need to be
monitored, as have those of Russia and Moldova, by the various stakeholders.
CONCLUSIONS
The report thus concludes:
Concerning the Status of the TMR
Attempted secessions are largely viewed as domestic affairs that need to
be resolved by the state itself. There is no right to secede as a general matter.
At most, secessions may be accepted in cases where a people have been
oppressed and there is no other option for the protection of their human rights.
In light of these rules, the TMR has not made a legally sufficient case that it has
a right to external self-determination or secession. Consequently, the effective
control of the TMR of the Transnistrian part of Moldova is that of a defacto
regime and may be viewed as analogous to control by an occupying power. The
TMR is thus limited as to what it may legally do with the territory it
administers.
Concerning the Conversion of Property by the TM?
The law of occupation recognizes that the occupying power may, as a
matter of fact, control the economic resources within a territory but, as a matter
of law, the rightful owners are the previous owners. The final disposition of the
property is not decided by the current effective control by the occupier and as
such, the occupier has the legal duty not to destroy the economic value of the
property. Any economic activities undertaken jointly with the separatists or
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insurgents by another party are at the peril of that party. There is no comfort
that such activities will be sanctioned after the final resolution of the separatist
conflict and they may, in fact, be "unwound."
In light of the rules governing de facto regimes and also the law of
occupation, the TMR's privatization program can leave investors with no
confidence that these transactions would be enforced if the TMR is reintegrated
into Moldova.
Concerning the Responsibilities of Third-Party States
Interventions by third parties are not favored and are assessed in relation
to the norms of nonintervention set out in numerous global and regional treaties
and legal documents. Sovereignty requires that a state's wishes concerning
affairs within its own territory be respected up to the point that some other core
interest of the international system is implicated. Thus, for example, the
garrisoning of troops on foreign soil is not allowed if the host state requests that
the troops leave.
Russia's activities concerning the Transnistrian situation, particularly the
intervention of the 14th Army on behalf of the separatists, the ongoing military
assistance to the TMR, the economic support of the TMR, and effectively
bargaining on behalf of the TMR using energy process and other levers of
power against Moldova, leads to credible claims of state responsibility on the
part of Russia for the continuing separatist crisis and its proximate results.
Similarly, in light of the experience with Russia, Ukraine's increased
participation in the conflict should be monitored.
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It is with pleasure that I join my esteemed colleagues on the panel. With
the importance of the reliability of energy supply in today's world and the
impact of the energy sector on global warming and international security, a
review of the only multilateral treaty that deals specifically and exclusively
with energy is timely. As last night's plenary session addressed climate change
issues, I will also discuss the important role the Energy Charter Treaty can play
in fostering greenhouse gas mitigation and sustainable development.
I. ENERGY CHARTER TREATY BACKGROUND
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) had its genesis in the ending of the Cold
War, which offered an opportunity for mutually beneficial cooperation between
Russia and its many neighbors who needed major investments in their energy
* Copyright 2007, Edna Sussman. Reprinted with permission. Edna Sussman, esussman@
hnrklaw.com, of counsel to Hoguet Newman Regal & Kenney LLP in New York City is a litigator and an
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rich resources and the states of western Europe who had a strategic interest in
diversifying their sources of energy. As stated in Article 2, the ECT
"establishes a legal framework in order to promote long term cooperation in the
energy field"; by so doing, it increases confidence by investors and the financial
community and promotes investment and trade flow among members.'
The ECT was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1998. It has been
signed or acceded to by fifty-one states, mainly countries in Europe and the
former U.S.S.R., as well as the EU, Japan and Australia (Contracting Parties).
The ECT has many states with observer status including the United States
(U.S.), China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates,
and many other Persian Gulf states as well as international organizations such
as the World Bank and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2
The ECT provisions3 include:
a) Investment protections intended to create a "level playing field"
and reduce to a minimum the non-commercial risks associated
with energy sector investments;
b) Trade provisions consistent with WTO rules and practice;
c) obligations to facilitate transit of energy on a non-discriminatory
basis consistent with the principle of free transit;
d) energy efficiency and environmental provisions which require
states to formulate a clear policy for improving energy
efficiency and reducing the energy cycle's negative impacts on
the environment; and
e) dispute resolution mechanisms for investment related disputes
between an investor and a Contracting Party or between one
state and another as to the application or interpretation of the
ECT.
The focus of this presentation will be on the investment protection and
dispute resolution provisions of the ECT. With the increasing globalization of
the world's economy, the interdependence of the energy sector, and the long
term and highly capital intensive nature of energy projects, multilateral rules for
international cooperation are needed. The ECT was negotiated to meet that
need. As the arbitral tribunal stated in Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic
ofBulgaria, the ECT is the "first multilateral treaty to provide as a general rule
the settlement of investor-state disputes by international arbitration" and
1. The Energy Charter Treaty, 34 I.L.M. 360, 385 (1995) [hereinafter ECT]. For comprehensive
information about the ECT and the activities of the Energy Charter Treaty Secretariat, see www.encharter.org.
2. The Energy Charter, Members & Observers, available at http://www.encharter.org/index.php
?id=61 (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).
3. ECT, supra note I.
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provides "a covered investor an almost unprecedented remedy for its claims
against a host state."
II. ECT INVESTMENT PROTECTIONS
Article 10 of the ECT provides for a variety of protections for foreign
investments, including:
Generalprotections: Contracting Parties must accord "fair and equitable
treatment," "constant protection and security" and "shall in no way impair by
unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use
enjoyment or disposal of an investment;" in no case shall "treatment be less
favorable than that required by international law;"5
Discrimination: Contracting Parties must accord investors treatment no
less favorable than that accorded to its own investors or to investors of any
other state;
6
Expropriation: Investments shall not be expropriated, nationalized or
subjected to measures which have an effect equivalent to expropriation or
nationalization unless certain limited exceptions are met and then only if a
prompt, adequate and effective compensation payment equivalent to fair market
value is made;7
Fund Transfers: Contracting Parties guarantee freedom to transfer funds
in and out of the country without delay and in a freely convertible currency; 8
Interplay with Other Treaties: If two or more Contracting Parties enter
into a prior or subsequent international agreement, the provision more favorable
to the Investor shall govern where there are disparities.9
III. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS
In international disputes, resorting to arbitration over domestic courts has
generally been viewed as preferable because of concerns about neutrality,
competence, process, efficiency and respect for rule of law in local courts.
Equally important is the question of enforceability of any decision rendered.
The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) is the most successful
4. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, 44 I.L.M. 721, 739, 742 (2005) [hereinafter
Plama].
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international treaty to date with over 130 countries as signatories.'0 Pursuant
to the New York Convention, the signatory countries have committed to
enforcing arbitration awards; the grounds for refusing to enforce arbitration
awards are extremely limited. " There is no parallel international treaty that has
been broadly adopted for recognition of foreign court decisions. While the new
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2 may change that, it is
years away from widespread adoption and it is not yet clear how widely it will
be accepted. Thus the ECTs provisions governing dispute resolution are of
great importance to the protection of investors in the energy sector.
The ECT enables an investor to make claims against a Contracting Party
in case of a breach of an obligation relating to investment protection. It
mandates conciliation as a first step, but if that fails the investor can choose the
forum for dispute resolution: either a domestic court or international arbitration.
The ECT creates "arbitration without privity," i.e. the host country need not be
a party to the investment contract to be subject to the claim. 3 Under the ECT
the Contracting Party gives its "unconditional consent to the submission of the
dispute to international arbitration."' 4 This commitment is viewed as an "offer"
which can be "accepted" by the investor.
Arbitration under the ECT is to be submitted to either the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) if one or both parties are
party to the ICSID Convention, to a sole or ad hoc arbitration tribunal
established under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or to an arbitral proceeding under the
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
IV. DECISIONS UNDER THE ECT
As the ECT is a relatively new treaty there have been few cases decided
to date, but claims under the treaty are emerging. Several publicly reported
decisions on the merits are of interest: Petrobart won a claim against the
Kyrgyz Republic for the state's decision to transfer assets out of KGM, a state
owned company, to which Petrobart had delivered gas to their own detriment
as KGMs judgment creditor.'5 Nykomb Synergetics won a claim against the
10. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
("New York Convention"), 21 U.S.T. 2517 (1970).
I1. Id.
12. See generally Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 44 I.L.M. 1294, available
at http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act=conventions.text&cid--98 (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
13. See ECT, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. See generally Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyz Republic, Arb. No. 126/2003, available at http://www.
iisd.org/pdf/2005/investsd_petrobartkyrgyz.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2008).
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Republic of Latvia for changing a government policy and amending legislation
which had the effect of altering an incentive system for environmental
investment and depriving the claimant of double tariffs in connection with the
construction of a cogeneration power plant. 6 In both of these decisions the
tribunals addressed the applicability of the ECT and found in favor of the
claimant. In the Plama (jurisdictional) decision, the tribunal found in favour
of a narrow scope for the most favoured nation clause and controversially
restricted the scope of application for the "denial of benefits" to "mailbox"
companies. 7
An interesting case is presented in the $10 billion claim of Libananco, a
Cypriot company affiliated with Turkish interests, against Turkey for
cancellation of several large-scale electric power concessions asserted to be
politically motivated. The case raises the question as to what extent companies
from within the ECT area are protected by the Treaty's arbitration and
investment protection provisions, even if some of the major shareholders are
from the respondent country.
Another interesting case now pending was brought in connection with the
Yukos Oil Company dispute in which the Group Menatep shareholders are
seeking $30 billion against Russia claiming that Russia's actions in connection
with the forced auction of Yukos amounted to virtual expropriation. This
arbitration will likely require the tribunal to address the question of whether
Russia, which signed but has not ratified the ECT, is governed by its provisions.
The ECT in Article 45 commits each signatory to apply the ECT "provisionally
pending its entry into force.., to the extent that such provisional application
is not inconsistent with its constitution, laws or regulations."' 18 This provision
will undoubtedly be argued to bind Russia to the ECTs provisions. Article 25
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties expressly provides for
provisional application if the treaty so provides.' 9 The ECT specifically
authorizes states to deliver a declaration that they are not able to accept
provisional application; several states did deliver such a declaration but Russia
did not do so. 21
16. Nykomb Synergistics Tech. Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case
No. 118/2001 (2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ Nykomb-Finalaward.doc (last visited
Mar. 2, 2008).
17. Plarna, 44 I.L.M. at 739, 742.
18. ECT, supra note 1, art. 45.
19. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 25, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
20. See Matteo Winkler, Arbitration Without Privity and Russian Oil: The Yukos Case before the
Houston Court, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 115, 146 ( 2006).
2008]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
The recent decision in Ioannis Kardassapoulos v. Georgia 21 is likely to
be argued to be of precedential value on this issue, as the tribunal explored for
the first time the issue of jurisdiction under the ECT pursuant to the
"provisional application" language.2 Claimant contended that Respondent, the
Republic of Georgia (Georgia), had violated the terms of the ECT after issuing
a decree which was alleged to have expropriated a concession granted earlier
for reconstruction of energy pipelines and infrastructure.23 In its procedural
defenses to the proceeding, Georgia challenged the tribunal'sjurisdiction under
the ECT because the actions in issue, although they took place after Georgia
signed the ECT, occurred before it ratified the ECT and before the ECT took
effect upon ratification by thirty states.24 The arbitral tribunal rejected this
argument noting that if it were to limit the application of the ECT to after it
definitively entered into force, it would "exclude from the scope of the ECT"
the provisional period before entry into force and "such a result would strike at
the heart of the clearly intended provisional language. 25
As the filing of investor-state claims pursuant to rights claimed under
investment treaties continues to grow, the ECT, a relatively young treaty, is one
to watch. The growing body of decisions interpreting the ECT 6 will create
greater certainty as to the meaning, scope and application of its provisions. 27
V. UNITED STATES AND THE ECT
The United States was heavily involved in the early stages of the develop-
ment of the Energy Charter, but it is not a party to the ECT. Ria Kemper, then
Secretary General of the Energy Charter Secretariat delivered a speech in 2001
stating that she had been informed that the United States had not signed the
treaty because:
21. Kardassapoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1 8, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/Kardassopoulos-jurisdiction.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008), [hereinafter Kardassapoulos]. For
a discussion of this decision, see Investment Treaty News, August 2007, at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/
itn aug 10_2007.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
22. Kardassapoulos, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/I 8.
23. Id. (A)(2), at 1.
24. Id. (B)(23), at 6.
25. Id. (D)(I)(A)(222), at 59.
26. For a complete list of publicly known cases under the ECT, see the Energy Charter Treaty
website at http'/www.encharter.org/index.php?id=213&L0 (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
27. For an excellent discussion of many issues under the ECT see Thomas Walde, Investment
Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of Key Issues, TRANSNATiONAL DISPUTE
MANAGEMENT, volume I, Issue 2, 2004, available at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/
samples/freearticles/tvl-2-article224b.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
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a) The protections of investments in the ECT are not as strong as
those contained in U.S. bilateral agreements;
b) There is a potential conflict between the ECTs unconditional
provisions on most favored nation treatment and the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment to the 1970 U.S. Trade Act; and
c) There would be difficulty in ensuring that the ECTs provisions
are implemented on a sub-federal level. Others have suggested
that the U.S. did not become a party to the treaty because no
resolution was reached on how to legally bind the parties at the
pre-investment stage which relates to such issues as access
conditions as opposed to the post-investment risks ultimately
covered by the ECT2
As the United States is not a party to the ECT, many practitioners recom-
mend that in structuring deals for multi-national U.S. companies, consideration
be given to selecting an entity domiciled in a state that is party to the ECT, as
the contracting party, in order to benefit from its protections. Indeed, as there
are many countries that are parties to the ECT with whom the U.S. has not
entered into a bilateral investment treaty, it would seem advisable in structuring
deals to conduct a review of which countries will be involved in the project and
what investment treaties are in effect that may be applicable with respect to
those countries; many energy projects span several countries, last for decades
and require enormous capital investments making investor protection parti-
cularly significant. While tax treaty considerations are generally considered to
be of greater importance in structuring the deal, the investment protection
aspects should not be ignored. In fact, investment treaty protection is becoming
a more significant factor in the corporate structuring of foreign investment
transactions.
If seeking coverage under the ECT, the selection of the corporate domicile
of the contracting entity should include a review of Section 17 of the ECT.
This section provides that a Contracting Party reserves the right to deny the
benefits of the ECT to a legal entity if citizens or nationals of a third state own
or control that entity, and that entity has no substantial business activities in the
area of the Contracting Party.29
28. For a discussion of the United States in the context of the ECT negotiations, see William Fox,
The United States and the Energy Charter Treaty: Misgivings and Misperceptions, in THE ENERGY
CHARTER TREATY: AN EAST WEST GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENTAND TRADE 194 (Thomas Walde ed., 1996).
For a review of the ECT negotiation process and its provisions, see Craig Bamberger, Jan Linehan and
Thomas Waelde, The Energy Charter Treaty, in ENERGY LAW IN EUROPE, 171 (Roggenkamp ed., 2000),
available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/3917lCharter.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2008). A re-written
version by Bamberger & Wiilde will appear in 2008 in the 2nd edition of this book.
29. See also ECT, supra note 1.
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Additional signatories to the ECT and broad provisional application of the
ECT may be in the wings. Pakistan recently became an ECT observer and is
in the process of acceding to the ECT. Afghanistan is also in the process of
acceding to the ECT. Other countries are in serious discussions on accession
to the treaty. While the ECT does not expressly provide how it should be
applied temporally parties will undoubtedly argue that the investor protections
of the ECT govern with respect to contracts entered into before accession to the
ECT by a Contracting Party but where the incriminated governmental
misconduct took place after the treaty became effective. While whether such
a construction will prevail has yet to be decided, in Nykomb Syngernetics
Technology Holding vs. the Republic ofLatvia, supra, the tribunal determined
that Latvia was subject to the ECT for action with respect to a contract entered
into before the ECT came into force but subsequent to Latvia's signature and
ratification of the treaty.
VI. ECT POTENTIAL TO FOSTER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT IN EMERGING
ECONOMIES TO ADDRESS GLOBAL WARMING AND FOSTER SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
As the theme of last night's plenary session was global warming, we
should consider what role the ECT can play in addressing this important issue.
The recent scientific reports issued by the International Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC)3° forcefully confirm that the earth is warming due principally
to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions generated by human use of fossil fuels.
The reports vividly describe the dire consequences of continued releases of
GHGs at the projected rates. In the wake of these reports all avenues to address
the problem must be studied. As the ECT is the only multi-lateral treaty that
deals specifically with the energy sector it must be carefully reviewed to see if
it can play a role. One must conclude that it can and should. As I will discuss
in further detail, the importance of international investment in the energy sector
in the developing countries to arrest the growth of GHG has been a theme of the
discussions on climate change for many years. The developing countries have
steadfastly refused to be bound by GHG emissions caps. Having rejected
emissions caps binding on them, it behooves the developing countries to combat
climate change by fostering foreign investment to mitigate GHG emissions in
their countries. Accession to the ECT would contribute significantly to the
attractiveness of investment in the developing countries and should serve to
reduce the cost of such investments, thus making more investment possible.
30. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report, (Nov. 2007), available
at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syrspm.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). The
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports are available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ (last
visited Mar. 3, 2008).
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Building on the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC)3", under the Kyoto Protocol32, which over 160 nations have
ratified, all of the major industrialized countries, with the exception of the
United States, have committed to reduce their GHG emissions and have set
binding emission reduction goals through 2012. However, the developing
countries, which are parties to the Kyoto Protocol, have no GHG limits and
have taken the position that to similarly bind them to reducing their emissions
would preclude them from developing their economies and bettering the lives
of their populations as energy generation and usage is crucial to modem life and
the growth of modem economies. They argue that imposing an emissions cap
on developing nations would not be equitable as the industrialized countries
have grown and developed by polluting the world for decades as the principal
emitters of GHGs, and that the industrialized nations should accordingly bear
the bulk of the current burden and allow the developing countries' economies
to catch up. The developing countries have accordingly consistently refused to
be bound by GHG emission caps.
The developing countries' contribution to global GHG emissions is
significant and increasing exponentially. Any solution to climate change must
deal with this reality. It was reported that in 2007, while the United States
remained the largest emitter of GHG on a per capita basis, China exceeded the
United States in total GHG emissions. The growth of GHG emissions in the
developing countries is expected to burgeon in the coming years if no action is
taken. The International Energy Association (LEA) reported that on a business
as usual basis the world's energy demand would be well over 50% higher in
2030 than today, and that China and India alone account for 45% of this
increase in demand and developing countries as a group account for 74% of the
increase.33 In this business as usual scenario the lEA projected a 57% jump in
global GHG emissions by 2030"4 rather than the 80% reduction by 2050 that the
IPCC warns is needed to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. 3
There is a general consensus that the path to mitigating GHG emissions
lies in moving towards sustainable development and the developing countries
are looking to the industrialized nations to assist them in accomplishing that
31. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992).
32. For a general discussion on the Kyoto Protocol, see http://unfccc.int/kyotoprotocoVitems/
2830.php (last visited Mar. 3, 2008); Edna Sussman, New York Addresses Climate Change with the First
Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas Program, 78 NYSBAJ. 43 (May 2006), available at http://www.hnrklaw.
com/articles/pdfs/RGGI_NYSbarjoumal5-06.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
33. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2007, China and India Insights, 3, 11
(Nov. 2007), available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEO2007SUM.pdf(last visited Mar. 3,2008).
34. Id. at 11.
35. See Sussman, supra note 32.
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goal. Transfers of technology, technical assistance and investment in sustain-
able development projects in the developing nations have been accepted by all
as a crucial, albeit only a part, of the solution to climate change. Indeed, the
Kyoto Protocol expressly allows credit against emission caps under the "Clean
Development Mechanism" (CDM)36 for sustainable development emission
reduction projects in developing countries. At the December 2007 United
Nations conference under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol on climate
change, vigorous negotiations were held over the respective obligations of
developing and developed countries. The "Bali Roadmap," which sets out a
framework for negotiations over the next two years, included an acceptance by
all countries of a proposal from India that the developing countries would agree
to take "measurable, reportable and verifiable" mitigation actions but their
actions would be supported by "technology, financ(e) and capacity-building"
from the developed countries which would also be "measurable, reportable and
verifiable., 37 Thus the stage is set diplomatically to negotiate binding measures
consistent with these guidelines; measures which would seem to include
significant investment-related commitments by all parties.
Progress on such investments is essential and must be fostered and
supported. Immense investments in GHG mitigation projects in the developing
countries will be necessary to keep their GHG emissions to a minimum as their
economies grow. The ECT can serve an important role in making such invest-
ments more attractive. The need for equitable, stable and effective legal
regimes to promote investment in the energy sector has been recognized
repeatedly at gatherings of nations. At the G8 Summit in 2006 the Energy
Security Declaration3" issued explicitly "support[ed] the principles of the
Energy Charter and the efforts of participating countries to improve inter-
national energy cooperation" and committed to a set of principles which
included: "open, transparent, efficient and competitive markets for energy
production, supply, use, transmission and transit services as a key to global
energy security; [and] transparent, equitable, stable and effective legal and
regulatory frameworks, including the obligation to uphold contracts, to generate
sufficient, sustainable international investments upstream and downstream;"39
36. For a background discussion of the international climate change regime, see Sussman, supra
note 27.
37. Bali Action Plan, IM (1)(b)(i)-(ii), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/
application/pdf/cpbali action.pdf(last visited Mar. 3, 2008). The decisions adopted at COP 13 and CMP
3 which comprise the Bali Roadmap are available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/copl 3/items/4049.php (last
visited Mar. 3, 2008).
38. G8/2006 Russia, Global Energy Security, (Jul. 16, 2006), available at http://www.global





The 2007 G8 Summit Declaration' noted the importance of "improving
(the) investment climate in the energy sector", supported the principles of the
Energy Charter and invited China, Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa and
other emerging economies to adopt the Global Energy Security Principles
established at the G8. 4'
Accession to the ECT by emerging nations would improve the investment
climate in the energy sector by: (1) creating a more secure investment
environment and (2) lowering the cost of investments. The marketplace reacts
favorably to investment protection treaties. There is increasing sensitivity in
investment decision making to whether the protection of an investment treaty
is available. A recent survey conducted by The Economist in conjunction with
the Columbia Program on International Investment reported that 67% of
respondents were greatly or somewhat influenced by the existence of an
international investment treaty in deciding in which markets to invest.42 This
is particularly true in the energy sector. Recent incidents of direct or masked
expropriations in various countries have raised concerns about investments in
this sector which may spill beyond the borders of the countries involved.
Moreover, the economics of many sustainable clean energy projects are
40. G8 Summit 2007 Heiligendamm, Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy, (Jun. 7,
2007), available at http://www.g-8.de/Content/EN/Artikel/_g8-summit/anlagen/2007-06-07-
gipfeldokument-wirtschaft-engtemplateld--rawproperty=pubicationFie.pdf/2007-06-07-gipfeldokument-
wirtschaft-eng (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
41. Id. at 14; Other regional organizations have issued similar pronouncements. The ASEAN
nations recognize the importance of creating an investment friendly environment for energy as stated in The
25th ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting (AMEM), Energy Policy and Planning Office, Singapore, Aug.
23, 2007, available at http://www.eppo.go.th/inter/asean/AMEM25/20844.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
("The Ministers encouraged Member Countries to create suitable conditions that facilitate energy
infrastructure investments, in particular, in energy production, to secure adequate and stable supply of energy.
The Ministers expressed hope that through energy infrastructure investments and cross-border trade, ASEAN
economies can better access the energy resources and technologies to meet the region's energy needs."),
Riyadh Declaration, The Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of OPEC Member Countries, Nov.
17, 2007, available at http://www.opec.org/aboutus/l/l%20OPEC%20Summit/20Declaration.pdf (last
visited Mar. 3, 2008) (The OPEC nations too have recognized the importance of facilitating investment and
in The Riyadh Declaration of the Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of OPEC Member
Countries November, 2007 resolved to: "Work with other governments, international organizations and the
international business community to facilitate investment in, and the transfer of technology to, our Member
Countries, in order to diversify our economies and achieve social progress and sustainable development.")
42. Economic Intelligence Unit, World Investment Prospects to 2011, Foreign Direct Investment
and the Challenge of Political Risk, 96 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.cpii.columbia.edu/pubs/
documents/WorldlnvestmentProspectsto201 I .pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). Nineteen percent responded
that they were influenced to a very great extent and forty-eight percent responded that they were influenced
to a limited extent. Only twenty-three percent responded that they were not influenced at all and nine percent
responded that they did not know.
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grounded in part on local governmental subsidies and incentives and require
that those be maintained in the form presented at the time the investment is
commenced. There is considerable concern in the investment community
currently about the stability of the relevant rules and regulations in many of the
developing countries.
As demonstrated by the decision in the Nykomb matter, the ECT, if
binding on the host country, would create rights for investors against a host
government for changing incentives and subsidies committed to a foreign
investor or other laws or regulations in violation of the ECT investor protection
provisions.43 The increased certainty afforded by investment treaty protection
should serve to significantly increase the availability of funds for investment in
GHG mitigation projects in the developing countries. In essence, membership
in the ECT enables a host state to make a credible and internationally enforce-
able promise about investment incentives and guarantees with respect to
climate-change promoting energy investment.
With the reduced investment risk resulting from the investor protections
afforded by the ECT, the cost of investment should go down allowing a greater
number of investments to be made. Risk is a factor in determining the rate of
return necessary to make an investment attractive. Reduced risk should lead to
lower expected rates of return; those lowered rates of return as applied to a
variety of projects should make more projects financially attractive. Moreover,
where prudence would dictate the purchase of political risk insurance, the
existence of an investment treaty may, in many cases, obviate the need for
expensive political risk insurance, or at the least drive down the cost of such
insurance.' Again this would drive down the cost of the investment and make
a greater number of sustainable energy investments attractive.
There are numerous and extensive international negotiations ongoing
under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol to develop an international treaty
regime that addresses climate change. Theoretically these negotiations could
also encompass investor protections to achieve the goals I have discussed.
However, there are incredibly complex tasks already before the negotiators
including: whether emissions caps should be binding and on which nations; at
what level the emissions caps should be set over what period of time; what
trading mechanisms should be in place and how to create linkages among them
to create the most robust trading market; what nations without emission caps
43. Nykomb Synergistics, Inst. of the SCC, Case No. 118/2001 at 31-32.
44. See generally Noah D. Rubins & N. Stephan Kinsella, International Investment, Political Risk,
and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner's Guide (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2005); P. COMEAUX & N.
KINSELLA, REDUCING POLITICAL RISK IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES,




should be obligated to do and what support for them from developed countries
will be required; what kinds ofprojects in what nations should count as offsets
and how to make sure that they are additional, verifiable, permanent, and
enforceable; how to prevent further deforestration, how to address the critical
issue of adaptation and much more. A suggestion that these negotiators also
address is the issue of how to craft an acceptable multi-lateral investment treaty
that is simply not practical and the ECT presents a ready made investment
protection treaty already ratified by over fifty nations. It is this treaty that the
developing nations should be urged to adopt as an important contribution on
their part to arresting climate change, in the absence of GHG emission
reduction caps binding on them.
The application of the ECT to climate change solutions is well grounded
in its original intention and in its provisions. The ECT specifically recalls the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in its preamble. As
set forth in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,45 this
preamble reference is relevant to the interpretation of the ECT. Article 1 6
of the ECT defines covered "Investments" as investment associated with an
"Economic Activity in the Energy Sector" which is defined in 5 as an
"economic activity concerning the exploration, extraction, refining, production,
storage, land transport, transmission, distribution, trade, marketing or sale of
Energy Materials (or) Products." ' These are defined in 4 as including the
items listed in Annex EM.47 Annex EM covers nuclear energy, coal, natural
gas, petroleum and petroleum products, and "electrical energy."48
These provisions are broad enough to cover many if not all of the currently
known GHG mitigation measures including nuclear energy, coal gasification
and carbon sequestration. "Electrical energy" includes all of the newer techno-
logies including solar, wind, biomass, tidal, wave, hydropower and even plug
in hybrid cars. Indeed "electrical energy" has to be read to also include energy
efficiency, green building and other measures such as geothermal or combined
heat and power, that serve to reduce the demand for energy as they are
"economic activity concerning" energy items listed in Annex EM. The ECT
should also be read broadly to include technological improvements relating to
energy in the industrial sector that reduce GHG emissions such as improve-
ments in cement production which is a major emitter of GHG or aluminum
product manufacture, which is a highly energy intensive process, as they reduce
"trade" and "sale" through energy efficiency and thus would constitute
"economic activity concerning" products specified in Annex EM. In addition,
45. See Vienna Convention, supra note 19.
46. ECT, supra note 1, art. 1, $$ 5-6.
47. Id. at 41.
48. Id. at 93.
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the ECT specifically provides in Article 1 6 that "Investment" also refers to
investments designated by a Contracting Party in its Area as a "Charter
efficiency project" and so notified to the Secretariat. Any uncertainty as to the
scope of coverage of the ECT to include climate change mitigation measures
that are now known and those as yet unknown can be resolved by adopting an
amendment, understanding or declaration to the ECT.
VII. CONCLUSION
The number of investor-state arbitrations based on international investment
agreements is growing; of the over 2000 known investor-state arbitrations to
date, two-thirds commenced since the beginning of 2002. Several of these
commenced under the ECT and more will likely follow. The ECT is a young
treaty and the Energy Charter Secretariat is working on raising awareness of the
ECT, developing areas of consensus among member states and observers on key
issues such as energy security, transit issues and energy efficiency, and
attracting additional Contracting Parties.
With today's focus on climate change and energy security it is essential
that there be a thorough review of how the ECT can be utilized to shape
decisions on how energy is developed around the world. Investment treaty
analysis and climate change concerns have developed since the drafting of the
ECT and political changes and realignments have occurred which may require
some fine tuning or adjustments in the ECT provisions; modifications necessary
to gain broad scale global acceptance should be considered.49 The ECT
Secretariat has been working cooperatively with other prominent organizations
that deal with climate change and global energy concerns. Such collaborative
efforts should facilitate the development of a workable global energy
investment environment that promotes sustainable energy projects which serve
to mitigate GHG emissions.
49. For example, a clarification of the treatment under the investment treaty protections of
environmental limits established to respond to climate change may be advisable in order to achieve the twin
goals of investment and regulatory predictability.
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This article briefly discusses the substantive protections of the Energy
Charter Treaty (ECT) (Section I, infra), the ECT's dispute resolution provisions
(Section II, infra), and the ECT arbitral jurisprudence to date, including
composition of ECT tribunals (Section III, infra).' This article focuses on the
four decisions and awards handed down to date under the ECT: Nykomb v.
Latvia (combinedjurisdiction and merits award);2 Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic
* The authors practice international arbitration in the New York office of Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer LLP. This article contains only their personal views and not the views of the firm or other lawyers
in the firm. This article is based on a presentation given by Lucy Reed on October 26, 2007 at the American
Branch of the International Law Association's International Law Weekend, held at the New York City Bar
Association. The authors wish to thank Lara Woodward for her assistance in finalizing this article.
1. For general reading on the Energy Charter Treaty, see INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE
ENERGY CHARTER TREATY (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006).
2. Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case
No. 118/2001 (2003), available at http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=213 (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
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(combined jurisdiction and merits award); 3 Plama v. Bulgaria (jurisdiction
decision only);' and Kardassopoulos v. Georgia (jurisdiction decision only).5
Due to the authors' representation of parties involved with ongoing cases under
the ECT, this article does not purport to provide any prescriptive insight into
current or future jurisprudence, and instead it sets out in a descriptive manner
the main findings of the four ECT tribunals to date.
I. INVESTOR PROTECTIONS
This section summarizes the general purpose of the ECT (Section A), and
the individual protections afforded to investors, including the prohibition on
expropriation without compensation (Section B), and the requirements of fair
and equitable treatment (Section C), no unreasonable and discriminatory
treatment (Section D), constant protection and security (Section E), observing
obligations (Section F), the most favored nation (Section G) and the minimum
standard of treatment (Section H).
A. The Purpose of the ECTP
Like all investment treaties, the ECT aims to promote and protect foreign
investment. The preamble states this aim as being to "catalyse economic
growth by means of measures to liberalize investment and trade in energy."7
Article 2 confirms that the ECT aims to create a "legal framework in order to
promote long-term cooperation in the energy field, based on complementarities
and mutual benefits."8 The ECT provides foreign investors with substantive
protections when they invest in ECT states, and thus aims to stimulate foreign
investment in part by protecting investors abroad.
For a general discussion of this award, see Richard Happ, The Nykomb Case in the Light of Recent ICSID
Jurisprudence, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 315 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed.,
2006).
3. Petrobart Ltd. v. The Kyrgyz Republic, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case No. 126/2003 (2005),
available at http://www.encharter.orglindex.php?id=213 (last visited Mar. 2, 2008). The State's application
to set aside the award was rejected by the Svea Court of Appeal on April 13, 2006 (Case T 5208-05), and the
State was ordered to pay Petrobart's court costs.
4. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, 44 1.L.M. 721 (ICSID 2005). Lucy Martinez
previously worked as an associate at White & Case LLP, and was a member of the legal team representing
the Republic of Bulgaria in this case.
5. Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18 (July 2007), available at
http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=213&L=0 (last visited Mar. 2, 2008).
6. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.").
7. Energy Charter Treaty, Preamble, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360, 382 [hereinafter ECT].
8. ECT, supra note 7, art. 2.
[Vol. 14:2
Reed & Martinez
The substantive protections of the ECT are all found in Part III, although
the ECT also contains provisions relating to trade, competition, transit,
technology, access to capital (Part II), and environmental aspects, transparency,
and taxation (Part IV). Disputes regarding these matters cannot be referred to
international arbitration pursuant to ECT Article 26, which permits arbitration
only for disputes "which concern an alleged breach of an obligation of [a
Contracting Party] under Part 1H."
B. Expropriation: ECT Article 13°
Generally, a host state must compensate a foreign investor if the state
expropriates their investment. This basic principle is enshrined in ECT Article
13, which provides in full as follows:
1) Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of
any other Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, expropria-
ted or subjected to a measure or measures having effect equiva-
lent to nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to
as "Expropriation") except where such Expropriation is:
a) For a purpose which is in the public interest;
b) Not discriminatory;
c) Carried out under due process of law; and
d) Accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation.
Such compensation shall amount to the fair market value
of the Investment expropriated at the time immediately
before the Expropriation or impending Expropriation
became known in such a way as to affect the value of the
Investment (hereinafter referred to as the "Valuation
Date.") Such fair market value shall at the request of the
Investor be expressed in a Freely Convertible Currency on
the basis of the market rate of exchange existing for that
currency on the Valuation Date. Compensation shall also
include interest at a commercial rate established on a
market basis from the date of Expropriation until the date
of payment.
9. ECT, supra note 7, art. 26.
10. See generally Christoph H. Schreuer, The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other
Investment Protection Treaties, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 108
(Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006); Katia Yannaca-Small, Indirect Expropriation and the Right of the Governments
to Regulate Criteria to Articulate the Difference, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER
TREATY 159 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006); Audley Sheppard, The Distinction Between Lawful and Unlawful
Expropriation, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 169 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed.,
2006).
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2) The Investor affected shall have a right to prompt review, under
the law of the Contracting Party making the Expropriation, by
a judicial or other competent and independent authority of that
Contracting Party, of its case, of the valuation of its Investment,
and of the payment of compensation, in accordance with the
principles set out in paragraph (1).
3) For the avoidance of doubt, Expropriation shall include
situations where a Contracting Party expropriates the assets of
a company or enterprise in its Area in which an Investor of any
other Contracting Party has an Investment, including through
the ownership of shares."
Thus, the host state may not expropriate foreign-owned property or take
measures tantamount to expropriation unless the measure was:
1) conducted for a purpose in the public interest;
2) not discriminatory;
3) carried out under due process of law; and
4) accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective
compensation.
There is a distinction between direct expropriation, being an outright
taking by the state, where the investor loses title and control over property, and
indirect expropriation, where the investor retains legal title, but its rights of
ownership are eroded by being substantially deprived of the use or enjoyment
of its investment. Examples of indirect expropriation include denial of access
to infrastructure, environmental regulations, and the revocation of a license.
Indirect expropriation covers creeping expropriation, where a series of
measures together deprive the investor of the economic benefit of the invest-
ment, although none alone would necessarily qualify as indirect expropriation,
and regulatory expropriation, where the host state takes regulatory measures
that affect the economic value of the asset owned by the foreign investor.
The Nykomb Tribunal rejected the claim of indirect expropriation via the
state's non-payment of a double tariff for electricity, finding that:
[T]he decisive factor for drawing the border line towards
expropriation must primarily be the degree ofpossession taking [sic]
or control over the enterprise the disputed measures entail. In the
present case, there is no possession taking [sic] of Windau or its
assets, no interference with the shareholder's rights or with the
management's control over and running of the enterprise-apart from
11. ECT, supra note 7, art. 13.
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ordinary regulatory provisions laid down in the production licence,
the off-take agreement, etc. The Tribunal therefore concludes that the
withholding of payment at the double tariff does not qualify as an
expropriation or the equivalent of an expropriation under the Treaty. 2
The Petrobart Tribunal also rejected the claim of indirect expropriation
through forcible transfer of assets of other companies and state intervention in
judicial proceedings, concluding that:
[T]here was no formal expropriation of Petrobart's investment. Nor
does it appear that the measures taken by the Kyrgyz Government and
state authorities, although they had negative effects for Petrobart,
were directed specifically against Petrobart's investment or had the
aim of transferring economic values from Petrobart to the Kyrgyz
Republic.... The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the measures
taken by the Kyrgyz Republic, while disregarding Petrobart's
legitimate interests as an investor, did not attain the level of defacto
expropriation. The Arbitral Tribunal therefore concludes that the
Republic's action does not fall within Article 13(1) of the Treaty. 3
Thus, no ECT tribunal to date has found a host state to be in breach of
ECT Article 13 on the basis of expropriation, although many ECT cases are just
beginning to enter the merits phase.
C. Fair and Equitable Treatment: ECT Article 10(1)14
Article 10 of the ECT is headed "PROMOTION, PROTECTION AND
TREATMENT OF INVESTMENTS," and paragraph 1 relevantly provides:
12. Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case
No. 118/2001 33 (2003).
13. Petrobart Ltd. v. The Kyrgyz Republic, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case No. 126/2003 77 (2005).
14. See generally Lucy Reed & Daina Bray, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Fairly and Equitably
Applied in Lieu of Unlawful Indirect Expropriation? (forthcoming 2008, on file with author) (based on a
presentation given at the Fordham Conference on International Arbitration and Mediation in June 2007);
Stephen Fietta, Expropriation and the "Fair and Equitable" Standard: The Developing Role of Investors'
"Expectations" in International Investment Arbitration, 23 J. INT'L ARB. 375, 398 (2006); T. Westcott,
Recent Practice on Fair & Equitable Treatment, 8 J. WORLD INV'T & TRADE 409 (2007); Peter Muchlinski,
'Caveat Investor'? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment
Standard, 55 INT'L & COMP.L.Q. 527 (2006); Elizabeth Snodgrass, Protecting Investors' Legitimate
Expectations: Recognizing andDelimiting a General Principle, 21 ICSID REVIEW- FOREIGN INVESTMENT
L.J. (2006); Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties, 39 INT'L
LAw 87 (2005); Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. WORLD INV'T
& TRADE 357 (2005). In relation to the interpretation of all clauses in ECT Article 10, see generally ECT,
supra note 7, decl. 4 (setting out the position of the United States and Canada (neither of which ultimately
ratified the ECT) regarding Article 10).
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Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of
this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and
transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to
make Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a
commitment to accord at all times to Investments of Investors of other
Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment."5
The first sentence provides a slightly more fleshed-out formulation of the
fair and equitable treatment standard than that found in other investment
treaties. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
requires "treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security;"' 6 the (now superseded)
1994 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) provides that "[e]ach Party
shall at all times accord to covered investments fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security, and shall in no case accord treatment less favorable
than that required by international law;"' 7 and the new 2004 U.S. Model BIT
requires "treatment in accordance with customary international law, including
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security."'"
The "fair and equitable treatment" clause sets a flexible standard, with
considerable room for discretion on the part of tribunals. This provision may
cover many different sorts of state conduct, including a breach of legitimate
expectations created by the state and relied upon by the investor, actions
without transparency, the giving of insufficient reasons for decisions relating
to the investment, the state not acting in a reasonable or predictable way, or the
state failing to provide an opportunity for the investor to be heard or other
denial ofjustice.
The Petrobart case involved a claim by a Gibraltar company for breach of
contract for the supply and transfer of stable gas condensate. The Kyrgyz
Republic took certain measures to restructure the oil and gas sector, allegedly
"to ensure a satisfactory supply of oil and gas to the population."' 9 The
Tribunal found a breach of the fair and equitable treatment clause, stating:
The Arbitral Tribunal does not doubt that there may have been good
reasons for restructuring the system for supply of oil and gas in the
Kyrgyz Republic. The Arbitral Tribunal considers, however, that as
a Contracting Party to the Treaty the Republic was under an
15. ECT, supranote 7, art. 10.
16. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,1992,32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
17. U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 1](3)(a) (1994) (amended 2004).
18. U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 5(1) (2004).
19. Petrobart Ltd. v. The Kyrgyz Republic, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case No. 126/2003 74 (2005).
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obligation to carry out this reorgani[z]ation in a way which showed
due respect for investors such as Petrobart.20
Citing the state's forcible transfer of assets and intervention in court
proceedings to the detriment of Petrobart, the Tribunal found: "such
Government intervention in judicial proceedings is not in conformity with the
rule of law in a democratic society and . . . it shows a lack of respect for
Petrobart's rights as an investor having an investment under the Treaty."'2 The
Tribunal also found that the state's intervention in the court proceedings
violated ECT Article 10(12), which requires that domestic law provide effective
means for asserting claims and enforcing rights. 22  The Tribunal awarded
Petrobart USD $1.1 million, with interest, being compensation for payment of
delivered goods; no additional damages were awarded for the intervention in
the court proceedings, because Petrobart did not show that it suffered additional
damage from these actions. 23 The Tribunal refused to award compensation for
lost profits, and each party was ordered to bear their own costs.
24
Many of the pending ECT cases allege breach of the fair and equitable
treatment clause, and accordingly, further jurisprudence on this clause is
inevitable.
D. Unreasonable/Discriminatory Treatment: ECT Article 10(1)
Article 1 0(1) of the ECT provides that investments "shall also enjoy the
most constant protection and security and no Contracting Party shall in any way
impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures their management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal."25
Under this provision, the state cannot treat an international investment in
a less favorable manner than a national investment, without any reasonable
basis for this difference of treatment. The investor does not need to show
discriminatory intent, only discriminatory treatment in fact. A breach of the
"fair and equitable treatment" provision usually-but not always-leads to
breach of this standard also.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 75. The Tribunal also criticized certain retroactive legislation, noting that the "adoption
of a new law which establishes that a previous law shall be interpreted in a restrictive way is retroactive
legislation which is likely to have negative effects for some legal or physical persons in respect of previous
business transactions," but concluded that in this case there was no breach of the ECT. Id. at 76.
22. Id. at 77.
23. Id. at 85.
24. Petrobart Ltd., SCC Case No. 126/2003 at 87-88.
25. ECT, supra note 7, art. 10.
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The Nykomb Tribunal held that the state had breached the "unreason-
able/discriminatory measure" clause of ECT Article 10(1).16 In that case, the
Latvian state-owned joint stock company, Latvenergo, entered into a contract
for the purchase of electricity with Windau, a subsidiary of the Swedish
company, Nykomb (the claimant in the ECT arbitration).27 A dispute arose
between the parties regarding the tariff to be paid under the contract. Nykomb
claimed that the law in effect when the contract was signed offered double
tariffs for eight years to foreigners investing in the Latvian energy sector, while
Latvenergo asserted that it was only obliged to pay 0.75 times the average
general tariff.2" Leaving aside issues of jurisdiction, the Tribunal agreed that
Windau originally had both a statutory and contractual right to the double tariff
for an eight-year period, and that Windau had not received this tariff, although
other companies were receiving a double tariff. 29
The Tribunal rejected Nykomb's claim of indirect expropriation, but found
that Latvia acted in a discriminatory manner in violation of ECT Article 10(1)
in depriving Nykomb of the benefit of the double tariff.30 The Tribunal
accepted that in evaluating whether there is discrimination in the sense of the
ECT, "one should only 'compare like with like.""'3 The Tribunal found that the
companies were all comparable, yet only Windau was not receiving the double
tariff-which Latvia could not adequately explain:
In such a situation, and in accordance with established international
law, the burden of proof lies with the Respondent to prove that no
discrimination has taken or is taking place. The Arbitral Tribunal
finds that such burden of proof has not been satisfied and therefore
concludes that Windau has been subject to a discriminatory measure
in violation of Article 10(1).32
In relation to the assessment of damages, the Nykomb Tribunal concluded
that the principles of compensation provided in Article 13 (relating to expro-
priation) were not applicable to the assessment of damages or losses found to
be caused by a breach of Article 1 0. The Tribunal assessed "compensation for
26. Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case
No. 118/2001 34 (2003).
27. Id. at 28.
28. Id. at 30.
29. Id. at 29-30.
30. Id. at 33-34.
31. Nykomb, SCC Case No. 118/2001 at 34.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 38.
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the losses or damages inflicted on the Claimant's investment," although there
was limited evidence before it to enable a precise calculation of these
damages. 4 The Tribunal thus made "a discretionary award of one third of the
estimated loss in purchase prices of electricity up to the time of this award...
as a reasonable basis for quantification of the Claimant's assumed losses up to
the time of this award," awarding Nykomb approximately USD $3 million, and
ordered Latvia to pay approximately USD $300,000 of Claimant's costs. 35 The
Tribunal also ordered Latvia to ensure the payment at double tariff for electric
power delivered under the contract for the remainder of the eight year contract
period.36
E. Most Constant Protection and Security: ECT Article 10(1)
Article 10(1) of the ECT provides that investments "shall also enjoy the
most constant protection and security and no contracting party shall in any way
impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures their management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal."37
This provision requires due diligence and vigilance by the host state to
protect the investment and to ensure, as far as is reasonably possible, that no
harm comes to the investment. This clause has traditionally been used for
claims of violence and civil unrest affecting an investment,3" but more recently
it has been the basis for claims for legal and economic protection and security
for an investment. To date there has been no published ECT award on this
clause.
F. The Umbrella Clause: ECT Article 10(1)"9
Under ECT Article 10, a state must "observe any obligations it has entered
into with an Investor or an Investment."4 This is called an "umbrella clause"
because it may operate to bring contract breaches under the protective umbrella
of the treaty. The jurisprudence on umbrella clauses is complicated and beyond
34. Id. at 39.
35. Id. at 41.
36. Nykomb, SCC Case No. 118/2001 at 41.
37. ECT, supra note 7, art. 10.
38. See, e.g., Asian Agricultural Products, Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka (H.K. v. Sri Lanka), 30
I.L.M. 577, 583 (ICSID 1991) (security forces destroyed shrimp farm and killed employees while combating
Tamil insurgents).
39. See generally Thomas W. Walde, Contract Claims undertheECT's Umbrella Clause: Original
Intentions versus Emerging Jurisprudence, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER
TREATY 205 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006).
40. ECT, supra note 7, art. 10.
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the scope of this modest article. For umbrella clause claims under the ECT, it
is important to note that four states have ratified ECT Annex IA, which
provides that disputes with these states under the umbrella clause cannot go to
international arbitration."
In the ECT context, the Tribunal in Nykomb stated that if the claimant
"were to be understood as pursuing a contractual claim directly and exclusively
based on the agreements.. . , such claims would not be admissible since Article
26 only allows arbitration of claims based on alleged breaches of the Treaty. 42
However, the Tribunal found that the claimant was making claims on its own
behalf, rather than on behalf of its subsidiary, which was the party to the
relevant contract, and therefore that the claims were treaty claims."3
G. MEN and National Treatment: ECT Articles 10(3), 10(7)
Article 10 of the ECT relevantly provides:
(3) For the purposes of this Article, "Treatment" means treatment
accorded by a Contracting Party which is no less favourable than that
which it accords to its own Investors or to Investors of any other
Contracting Party or any third state, whichever is the most favourable
... (7) Each Contracting Party shall accord to Investments in its Area
of Investors of other Contracting Parties, and their related activities
including management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal,
treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to Investments
of its own Investors or of the Investors of any other Contracting Party
or any third state and their related activities including management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, whichever is the most
favourable.'
These clauses prohibit states from discriminating against companies on the
basis of nationality and require states to provide equally favorable treatment to
investors. Under the national treatment standard, the host state must treat
foreign investors and their investments no less favorably than those of its own
nationals and companies in similar circumstances. This clause thus overlaps
with the discriminatory treatment clause. Under the most favored nation
41. ECT, supra note 7, Annex IA. The four States listed on this Annex are Australia, Canada,
Hungary and Norway, although Canada has not signed the ECT, and Australia has not ratified the ECT.
42. Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case
No. 118/2001 9 (2003).
43. Id.
44. ECT, supra note 7, art. 10.
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(MFN) clause, the host state must give the foreign investor the highest standard
of treatment given to any other foreign investor from any other state. To date
there has been no published ECT award on this clause.45
H. Minimum Standard Clause: ECTArticle 10(1)
ECT Article 10(1) states: "In no case shall such Investments be accorded
treatment less favourable than that required by international law, including
treaty obligations." '46 At the adoption session of the ECT on 17 December
1994, the Chairman noted the Russian Federation's views on this clause, being
"that the reference to international law in Article 10(1) is not intended to
impose most favoured nation obligations with regard to making of investments.
This is clearly in accordance with the intent of the negotiators who decided not
to include in this first Treaty MFN obligations for the pre-investment stage. 4 7
To date there has been no published ECT award on this clause.
II. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS 48
The key ECT dispute resolution provisions are contained in Part V of the
ECT: Article 26 (relating to investor-state disputes); Article 27 (state-state
disputes), and Article 28 (limiting the application of Article 27 in certain ways).
This article focuses on investor-state disputes, which are the only sorts of
disputes that have arisen (at least publicly) under the ECT to date.
Article 26 provides in full as follows:
1) Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another
Contracting Party relating to an Investment of the latter in the
Area of the former, which concern an alleged breach of an
obligation of the former under Part III shall, if possible, be
settled amicably.
45. The Plama Tribunal concluded that a MFN clause could not be used to import dispute
settlement rights when none previously existed, but this holding related to the MFN clause in the Bulgaria-
Cyprus BIT, not the MFN clause in the ECT. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, 44 I.L.M. 721,
750 (ICSID 2005).
46. ECT supra note 7, art. 10. See also Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference,
IV(17), in Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter Final Act] ("[t]he reference to
treaty obligations in the penultimate sentence of Article 10(l) [being the sentence quoted above] does not
include decisions taken by international organizations, even if they are legally binding, or treaties which
entered into force before 1 January 1970.").
47. Chairman's Statement at Adoption Session on December 17, 1994, available at
http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=28&L=0 (follow "Click to download the 1994 Treaty and all related
documents (0.8 MB in .pdf format)" hyperlink).
48. See generally Laurent Gouiffes, The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the Energy Charter
Treaty, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 22 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006).
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2) If such disputes can not be settled according to the provisions of
paragraph (1) within a period of three months from the date on
which either party to the dispute requested amicable settlement,
the Investor party to the dispute may choose to submit it for
resolution: (a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the
Contracting Party to the dispute; (b) in accordance with any
applicable, previously agreed dispute settlement procedure; or
(c) in accordance with the following paragraphs of this Article.
3) (a) Subject only to subparagraphs (b) and (c), each Contracting
Party hereby gives its unconditional consent to the submission
of a dispute to international arbitration or conciliation in
accordance with the provisions of this Article.
(b) (i) The Contracting Parties listed in Annex ID do not give
such unconditional consent where the Investor has previously
submitted the dispute under subparagraph (2)(a) or (b). (ii) For
the sake of transparency, each Contracting Party that is listed in
Annex ID shall provide a written statement of its policies,
practices and conditions in this regard to the Secretariat no later
than the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification,
acceptance or approval in accordance with Article 39 or the
deposit of its instrument ofaccession in accordance with Article
41.
(c) A Contracting Party listed in Annex IA does not give such
unconditional consent with respect to a dispute arising under the
last sentence of Article 10(1).
4) In the event that an Investor chooses to submit the dispute for
resolution under subparagraph (2)(c), the Investor shall further
provide its consent in writing for the dispute to be submitted to:
(a) (i) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, established pursuant to the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and Nationals
of other states opened for signature at Washington, 18 March
1965 (hereinafter referred to as the "ICSID Convention"), if the
Contracting Party of the Investor and the Contracting Party
party to the dispute are both parties to the ICSID Convention;
or (ii) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, established pursuant to the Convention referred to in
subparagraph (a)(i), under the rules governing the Additional
Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat
of the Centre (hereinafter referred to as the "Additional Facility
Rules"), if the Contracting Party of the Investor or the
Contracting Party party to the dispute, but not both, is a party to
the ICSID Convention;
(b) a sole arbitrator or ad hoc arbitration tribunal established
under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission
[Vol. 14:2
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on International Trade Law (hereinafter referred to as
"UNCITRAL"); or
(c) an arbitral proceeding under the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
5) (a) The consent given in paragraph (3) together with the written
consent of the Investor given pursuant to paragraph (4) shall be
considered to satisfy the requirement for: (i) written consent of
the parties to a dispute for purposes of Chapter II of the ICSID
Convention and for purposes of the Additional Facility Rules;
(ii) an "agreement in writing" for purposes of article II of the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, 10 June
1958 (hereinafter referred to as the "New York Convention");
and (iii) "the parties to a contract [to] have agreed in writing"
for the purposes of article 1 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules.
(b) Any arbitration under this Article shall at the request of any
party to the dispute be held in a state that is a party to the New
York Convention. Claims submitted to arbitration hereunder
shall be considered to arise out of a commercial relationship or
transaction for the purposes of article I of that Convention.
6) A tribunal established under paragraph (4) shall decide the
issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable
rules and principles of international law.
7) An Investor other than a natural person which has the
nationality of a Contracting Party to the dispute on the date of
the consent in writing referred to in paragraph (4) and which,
before a dispute between it and that Contracting Party arises, is
controlled by Investors of another Contracting Party, shall for
the purpose of article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention be
treated as a "national of another Contracting State" and shall for
the purpose of article 1(6) of the Additional Facility Rules be
treated as a "national of another State."
8) The awards of arbitration, which may include an award of
interest, shall be final and binding upon the parties to the
dispute. An award of arbitration concerning a measure of a sub-
national government or authority of the disputing Contracting
Party shall provide that the Contracting Party may pay monetary
damages in lieu of any other remedy granted. Each Contracting
Party shall carry out without delay any such award and shall
make provision for the effective enforcement in its Area of such
awards.49
49. ECT, supra note 7, art. 26.
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As noted by the Plama Tribunal, "Article 26 is a very important feature of
the ECT which is itself a very significant treaty for investors, marking another
step in their transition from objects to subjects of international law."5
The ECT adopts the same general approach to investor-state dispute
resolution as the approach taken in most BITs and NAFTA, requiring the
satisfaction of certain jurisdictional conditions before a party can invoke the
dispute resolution provisions of the ECT. These requirements relate to ratione
personae (Section A below), ratione materiae (Section B, infra) and ratione
temporis (Section C, infra). This article also addresses certain procedural
issues relating to the ECT dispute resolution provisions (Section D, infra).
A. Ratione Personae: Investor, ECT Contracting State51
To commence arbitration under the ECT, the claimant must be protected
under the ECT (Section 1, infra), and the respondent state must be bound by the
obligations of the ECT (Section 2, infra), including the obligation to arbitrate
disputes falling within the scope of the ECT.
1. The Claimant-Investor
The claimant-investor must meet the definition of "Investor" in article
1(7), which provides in full as follows:
"Investor" means:
a) With respect to a Contracting Party: (i) a natural person having
the citizenship or nationality of or who is permanently residing
in that Contracting Party in accordance with its applicable law;
(ii) a company or other organization organized in accordance
with the law applicable in that Contracting Party;
b) With respect to a "third state," a natural person, company or
other organization which fulfils, mutatis mutandis, the condi-
tions specified in subparagraph (a) for a Contracting Party.52
The Petrobart Tribunal rejected the state's claim that Petrobart, a company
incorporated in Gibraltar, was not protected by the ECT because the United
50. Plama Consortium Ltd., 44 I.L.M. at 742.
51. See generally Emmanuel Gaillard, Investments and Investors Covered by the Energy Charter
Treaty, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 54 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006);
Stephen Jagusch & Anthony Sinclair, The Limits of Protection for Investments and Investors under the
Energy Charter Treaty, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 73 (Clarisse
Ribeiro ed., 2006).
52. ECT, supra note 7, art. 1(7).
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Kingdom did not ratify the ECT on behalf of Gibraltar. 3 The Tribunal rejected
these claims partly because they were raised by the Kyrgyz Republic so late in
the proceedings, but also because the UK had declared that provisional
application of the ECT extended to Gibraltar (although the UK had not declared
that ratification of the ECT also extended to Gibraltar). 4 Thus, the claimant
was an investor within the meaning of ECT Article 1(7). 5
The ECT's broad definition of "Investor" in article 1(7) is narrowed by
ECT article 17, which permits ECT states to deny the benefits of the ECT to
investors under certain circumstances. Article 17 provides in full as follows:
Each Contracting Party reserves the right to deny the advantages of
this Part to:
1) a legal entity if citizens or nationals of a third state own or
control such entity and if that entity has no substantial business
activities in the Area of the Contracting Party in which it is
organized; or
2) an Investment, if the denying Contracting Party establishes that
such Investment is an Investment of an Investor of a third state
with or as to which the denying Contracting Party:
(a) does not maintain a diplomatic relationship; or
(b) adopts or maintains measures that: (i) prohibit transactions
with Investors of that state; or (ii) would be violated or
circumvented if the benefits of this Part were accorded to
Investors of that state or to their Investments. 6
The Petrobart Tribunal briefly considered article 17(1), but concluded that
the "conditions for application of article 17(1) ...are not present in this
case."
57
The Plama Tribunal considered article 17(1) at length, and held that a
state's denial of benefits under ECT article 17(1) must be expressly exercised
by the state, and that any such exercise has prospective effect only;58 this ruling
has been criticized by commentators.5 9 The Plama Tribunal reserved to the
53. Petrobart Ltd. v. The Kyrgyz Republic, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, CaseNo. 126/2003 60-63 (2005).
54. Id. Provisional application is discussed further below in relation to ratione temporis issues.
55. Id. at 70. This conclusion was affirmed by the Svea Court of Appeal, which found no
administrative error on the part of the Tribunal in their assessment of this objection to jurisdiction.
56. ECT, supra note 7, art. 17.
57. Petrobart Ltd., SCC Case No. 126/2003 at 63.
58. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, 44 I.L.M. 721, 745 (ICSID 2005).
59. See, e.g., Jagusch & Sinclair, supra note 5 1, at 100-01; James Chalker, Making the ECT Too
Investor Friendly: Plama Consortium Limited v. the Republic of Bulgaria 3 (No. 5) TRANSNAT'L DIsPuTE
MGMT. 1 (2006); Lawrence Shore, The Jurisdiction Problem in ECT Claims, 10 (No. 3) INT'L ARB. L. REV.
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merits phase its decision on the application of the "ownership or control" aspect
of article 17(1) to the factual circumstances of that case.6'
2. The Respondent State
The respondent to the dispute must be an ECT Contracting Party, defined
in Article 1(2) as being "a state or Regional Economic Integration Organization
which has consented to be bound by this Treaty and for which the Treaty is in
force."'" There are currently fifty-two parties to the ECT.62 Notable absences
from the list of ECT Contracting Parties are the United States and Canada,
although both were involved in the negotiation of the treaty in the early 1990s.
Issues of attribution may arise in determining whether a claim can be
commenced under the ECT, particularly when the investor has dealt directly
with a state-owned company rather than with the state itself.63 In Nykomb v.
Latvia, as noted above, the Latvian state-owned joint stock company,
Latvenergo, entered into a contract for, inter alia, the purchase of electricity
with Windau, a subsidiary of the Swedish company, Nykomb (the claimant in
58, 64 (2007); Barry Appleton, A Closer Look: An analysis ofPlama v. Bulgaria, I (No. 3) APPLETON'S
INT'L INVESTMENT L. & ARB, NEWS 12, 12-15 (2005).
60. Plama Consortium Ltd., 44 I.L.M. at 746.
61. ECT, supra note 7, art. 1(2).
62. See Energy Charter Members & Observers, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=6 I&L=O
(last visited Mar. 16, 2008) for a full list of ECT states. Fifty-one European and Asian countries have signed
the Energy Charter Treaty; the Treaty has also been signed collectively by the European Union so the total
number of parties to the Treaty is fifty-two. The member states are Albania, Armenia, Australia*, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Belarus*, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, European Communities, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland*,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway*, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation*, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, United Kingdom. (* denotes State in which ratification of the Energy
Charter Treaty is still pending).
63. See generally Kaj Hobr, State Responsibility and Investment Arbitration, in INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 261 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006); Anatoly S. Martynov,
State Responsibility under the Energy Charter Treaty and other Investment Protection Treaties, in
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 290 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006). See also
ECT, supra note 7, art. 22, regarding State and privileged enterprises. Article 22 is in Part IV, not Part HI
of the ECT, but the Nykomb Tribunal found that "the interpretation and application of the relevant Articles
of the Treaty, Articles 10 and 13, are best considered under the merits part of this award, and that the
references to Article 22 cannot as such be dismissed as inadmissible in the form that the references are relied
on." Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case No.
118/2001 8 (2003). The Petrobart Tribunal rejected the claim based on Article 22 regarding actions by the
State-owned enterprise. Petrobart Ltd. v. The Kyrgyz Republic, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case No. 126/2003
77 (2005).
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the ECT arbitration).' A dispute arose between the parties regarding the tariff
to be paid under the contract. The Republic of Latvia made a number of
jurisdictional objections, including that Latvenergo's conduct was not
attributable to Latvia. The Tribunal rejected this argument, concluding that
Latvenergo:
[W]as clearly an instrument of the State in a highly regulated
electricity market .... It had no freedom to negotiate electricity
prices but was bound, and considered itself to be bound, by the
legislation and the regulatory bodies' determination of the purchase
prices to be paid for electric power produced by cogeneration plants.
Latvenergo cannot be considered to be, or to have been, an
independent commercial enterprise, but clearly [was] a constituent
part of the Republic's organization of the electricity market and a
vehicle to implement the Republic's decisions concerning the price
setting for electric power.5
B. Ratione Materiae: The Dispute66
Only certain disputes can be referred to international arbitration pursuant
to ECT Article 26. In particular, the dispute must relate to an investment in the
energy sector and to an alleged breach of ECT Part III.
"Investment" is broadly defined in ECT Article 1(6) as follows:
"Investment" means every kind of asset, owned or controlled directly
or indirectly by an Investor and includes:
a) tangible and intangible, and movable and immovable, property,
and any property rights such as leases, mortgages, liens, and
pledges;
b) a company or business enterprise, or shares, stock, or other
forms of equity participation in a company or business enter-
prise, and bonds and other debt of a company or business enter-
prise;
c) claims to money and claims to performance pursuant to contract
having an economic value and associated with an Investment;
d) Intellectual Property;
e) returns;
64. Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case
No. 118/2001 1 (2003).
65. Id. at 31.
66. See generally Gaillard, supra note 51; Jagusch & Sinclair, supra note 51.
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f) any right conferred by law or contract or by virtue of any
licences and permits granted pursuant to law to undertake any
Economic Activity in the Energy Sector.
A change in the form in which assets are invested does not affect their
character as investments and the term "Investment" includes all
investments, whether existing at or made after the later of the date of
entry into force of this Treaty for the Contracting Party of the Investor
making the investment and that for the Contracting Party in the Area
of which the investment is made (hereinafter referred to as the
"Effective Date") provided that the Treaty shall only apply to matters
affecting such investments after the Effective Date. "Investment"
refers to any investment associated with an Economic Activity in the
Energy Sector and to investments or classes of investments designated
by a Contracting Party in its Area as "Charter efficiency projects" and
so notified to the Secretariat.67
The investment must be in the energy sector, defined in Article 1(5) as
meaning:
[A]n economic activity concerning the exploration, extraction,
refining, production, storage, land transport, transmission, distribu-
tion, trade, marketing, or sale of Energy Materials and Products
except those included in Annex NI [relating to non-applicable energy
materials and products, such as charcoal or fuel wood], or concerning
the distribution of heat to multiple premises.68
The Nykomb Tribunal accepted that a contract to build a cogeneration
plant, to produce electric power and heat on the basis of natural gas, and for the
purchase of that electric power, was an "investment" within the meaning of the
ECT.69
The Petrobart Tribunal found that the rights arising under a one year
contract for the supply and transfer of gas condensate were an "investment"
within the meaning of the ECT, although the wording of Article 1(6) was
67. ECT, supra note 7, art. 1(6). See also Final Act, supra note 46, at IV(3) (which sets out factors
to consider in determining whether an Investment "is controlled, directly or indirectly, by an Investor of any
other Contracting Party .... "); id. at VI(1) (which sets out the Russian Federation's opinion on Article 1(6)
and the need to reconsider the importance of national legislation with respect to the issue of control as
expressed in the Understandings).
68. ECT, supra note 7, art. 1(5). See also Final Act, supra note 46, at IV(2)(b) (setting out certain
activities as "illustrative of Economic Activity in the Energy Sector; [including] (i) prospecting and
exploration for, and extraction of e.g., oil, gas, coal and uranium; [and] (ii) construction and operation of
power generation facilities, including those powered by wind and other renewable energy sources.").
69. Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case
No. 118/2001 1, 8, 38 (2003).
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ambiguous in parts.7° The Tribunal found that "a right conferred by contract to
undertake an economic activity concerning the sale of gas condensate is an
investment according to the Treaty. This must also include the right to be paid
for such a sale."'" An earlier UNCITRAL tribunal had found that Petrobart had
not made a "foreign investment" within the meaning of the Kyrgyz Foreign
Investment Law, and dismissed Petrobart's claims for lack of jurisdiction.72
The dispute must also relate to an alleged breach of ECT Part III, which
contains the substantive protections provided by states to investors (discussed
in Section I above).
One potential limitation on disputes that can be submitted to arbitration
under the ECT is ECT Annex ID, which is the "fork in the road" provision. For
the twenty plus countries listed on Annex ID, if the investor has pursued its
claim in national courts, the investor cannot bring the claim to international
arbitration.73 The Tribunal in Petrobart noted that the Kyrgyz Republic was not
listed in Annex ID, and took this into account in determining the resjudicata
effect of the previous UNCITRAL arbitration and national court litigation.74
The investment may also be required to be a valid investment under the law of
the host state and international law, meaning that it was not procured by fraud,
corruption, misrepresentation or other breach of law. In Kardassopoulos v.
Georgia, the Tribunal stated that:
70. Petrobart Ltd. v. The Kyrgyz Republic, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case No. 126/2003 71-72(2005).
[T]he Contract and the judgment [a court judgment relating to the contract] are not in
themselves assets but merely legal documents or instruments which are bearers of legal
rights, and these legal rights, depending on their character, may or may not be
considered as assets. The relevant question which requires consideration is therefore
whether the rights provided for in the Contract and confirmed in the judgment
constituted assets and were therefore an investment in the meaning of the Treaty. In
other words, the question is whether Petrobart's right under the Contract to payment
for goods delivered under the Contract was an asset and constituted an investment
under the Treaty.
Id. at 71.
After reviewing other awards, the Tribunal concluded that "investment is often a wide concept in
connection with investment protection and that claims to money may constitute investments even if they are
not part of a long-term business engagement in another country."
Id.
71. Id. at 72. This conclusion was confirmed by the Svea Court of Appeal.
72. Id. at 9-10.
73. The countries are Australia, Azerbaij an, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
European Communities, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey (added in 1999), United States
of America. Australia, Norway and the Russian Federation are listed but have not yet ratified; Canada and
the United States are also listed but have not yet signed the ECT. ECT, supra note 7, annex ID.
74. Petrobart Ltd., SCC Case No. 126/2003 at 66.
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"Protection of investments" under a BIT is obviously not without
some limits. It does not extend, for instance, to an investor making an
investment in breach of the local laws of the host State. A State thus
retains a degree of control over foreign investments by denying BIT
protection to those investments that do not comply with its laws. As
noted by one scholar, "no State has taken its fervour for foreign
investment to the extent of removing any controls on the flow of
foreign investment into the host State."75
However, the Kardassopoulos Tribunal found that a state may be estopped
from objecting to a Tribunal's jurisdiction ratione materiae under the ECT if
the state approved the investment without objection as to its legality.76
C. Ratione Temporis
The dispute must have arisen, and the investment must have been made,
when the ECT was in effect, which raises questions regarding provisional
application, addressed by ECT Articles 44 and 45:
Article 44
1) This Treaty shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the
date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification,
acceptance or approval thereof, or of accession thereto, by a
state or Regional Economic Integration Organization which is
a signatory to the Charter as of 16 June 1995.
2) For each state or Regional Economic Integration Organization
which ratifies, accepts or approves this Treaty or accedes
thereto after the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of
ratification, acceptance or approval, it shall enter into force on
the ninetieth day after the date of deposit by such state or
Regional Economic Integration Organization of its instrument
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
3) For the purposes of paragraph (1), any instrument deposited by
a Regional Economic Integration Organization shall not be
75. Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18 49 (July 2007), available at:
http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=213&L=O (last visited Mar. 2,2008). These statements were made
in the context of the BIT rather than the ECT. See also Plama Consortium, Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, 44
I.L.M. 721,739-40 (ICSID 2005) (rejecting as untimely a jurisdictional challenge to an "Investment" within
the meaning of Article 1(6) if the Claimant had materially misrepresented or willfully failed to disclose the
Claimant's true ownership to the Bulgarian authorities in violation of Bulgarian law; issues of
misrepresentation were reserved for determination in the merits phase).
76. Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case No. AB/5/18 at 54.
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counted as additional to those deposited by member states of
such Organization.77
Article 45
1) Each signatory agrees to apply this Treaty provisionally pending
its entry into force for such signatory in accordance with Article
44, to the extent that such provisional application is not
inconsistent with its constitution, laws or regulations.
2) (a) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) any signatory may, when
signing, deliver to the Depository a declaration that it is
not able to accept provisional application. The obligation
contained in paragraph (1) shall not apply to a signatory
making such a declaration. Any such signatory may at any
time withdraw that declaration by written notification to
the Depository.
(b) Neither a signatory which makes a declaration in accor-
dance with subparagraph (a) nor Investors of that signa-
tory may claim the benefits of provisional application
under paragraph (1).
(c) Notwithstanding subparagraph (a), any signatory making
a declaration referred to in subparagraph (a) shall apply
Part VII provisionally pending the entry into force of the
Treaty for such signatory in accordance with Article 44, to
the extent that such provisional application is not
inconsistent with its laws or regulations.
3) (a) Any signatory may terminate its provisional application of
this Treaty by written notification to the Depository of its
intention not to become a Contracting Party to the Treaty.
Termination of provisional application for any signatory
shall take effect upon the expiration of 60 days from the
date on which such signatory's written notification is
received by the Depository.
(b) In the event that a signatory terminates provisional
application under subparagraph (a), the obligation of the
signatory under paragraph (1) to apply Parts III and V
with respect to any Investments made in its Area during
such provisional application by Investors of other
signatories shall nevertheless remain in effect with respect
to those Investments for twenty years following the
effective date oftermination, except as otherwise provided
in subparagraph (c).
77. ECT, supra note 7, art. 45.
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(c) Subparagraph (b) shall not apply to any signatory listed in
Annex PA. A signatory shall be removed from the list in
Annex PA effective upon delivery to the Depository of its
request therefore.
4) Pending the entry into force of this Treaty the signatories shall
meet periodically in the provisional Charter Conference, the
first meeting of which shall be convened by the provisional
Secretariat referred to in paragraph (5) not later than 180 days
after the opening date for signature of the Treaty as specified in
Article 38.
5) The functions of the Secretariat shall be carried out on an
interim basis by a provisional Secretariat until the entry into
force ofthis Treaty pursuant to Article 44 and the establishment
of a Secretariat.
6) The signatories shall, in accordance with and subject to the
provisions of paragraph (1) or subparagraph (2)(c) as
appropriate, contribute to the costs ofthe provisional Secretariat
as if the signatories were Contracting Parties under Article
37(3). Any modifications made to Annex B by the signatories
shall terminate upon the entry into force of this Treaty.
7) A state or Regional Economic Integration Organization which,
prior to this Treaty's entry into force, accedes to the Treaty in
accordance with Article 41 shall, pending the Treaty's entry into
force, have the rights and assume the obligations of a signatory
under this Article.78
The Nykomb Tribunal rejected Latvia's ratione temporis arguments
because, although the relevant investment contracts had been signed before the
ECT came into force for Latvia in March 1998, the claims were based on
subsequent changes in law and breaches of contract.79
The Petrobart Tribunal also addressed provisional application issues,
because the United Kingdom had declared that its provisional application of the
ECT extended to Gibraltar (the country of incorporation of the claimant
investor in that case), but the UK's declaration of ratification did not include
Gibraltar.8' The Tribunal concluded that they should adopt "a rather formal
approach based on the wording of the Treaty"'" regarding provisional
application, and continued:
78. ECT, supra note 7, art. 44.
79. Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia), Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case
No. 118/2001 10-11, 34-35 (2003).
80. Petrobart Ltd. v. The Kyrgyz Republic, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case No. 126/2003 60-62 (2005).
81. Id. at 62.
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[T]he fact that the ratification, for political or other reasons, did not
include Gibraltar does not justify the conclusion that the United
Kingdom intended to revoke the application of the Treaty to Gibraltar
on a provisional basis. It may be observed that what is at issue here
is not only the rights of investors from Gibraltar in other states but
also the protection of foreign investors in Gibraltar. The Arbitral
Tribunal therefore finds that the Treaty continues to apply on a
provisional basis to Gibraltar despite the fact that the United
Kingdom's ratification does not cover Gibraltar.82
The Plama Tribunal noted in passing that, under Article 45(1) of the ECT,
the treaty was "provisionally applied from the date of a [S]tate's signature,
unless that [S]tate declared itself exempt from provisional application under
Article 45(2)(a). '83
The Kardassopoulos Tribunal held that provisional application means that
the ECT comes into effect for a state party as of the date of signature, unless
national law precludes such provisional application. 4 The Kardassopoulos
Tribunal thus held that, under the provisional application regime of the ECT,
states are bound from the date of signature of the ECT (December 1994),
regardless of when the ECT actually entered into force for the individual state.85
The "domestic law" exception, as recognized in article 45, is where provisional
application would be inconsistent with the state's constitution, laws or
regulations.8 6
This issue of provisional application will likely be important in the context
of the pending Yukos ECT arbitrations,87 because Russia has signed, but not
ratified, the ECT.
D. Procedural Issues
The investor commences a claim under the ECT by filing a Request for
Arbitration. The investor has the choice of arbitral institutions, and can choose
among ICSID (or the Additional Facility if the respondent state has ratified the
82. Id. at 62-63.
83. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, 44 I.L.M. 721, 742 (ICSID 2005).
84. Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case No. ARB/5/18 at 57 ("the language used in [ECT] Article 45(1)
is to be interpreted as meaning that each signatory State is obliged, even before the ECT has formally entered
into force, to apply the whole ECT as if it had already done so.").
85. Id. at 59.
86. ECT, supra note 7, art. 45(2)(c).
87. Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Federation, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005) (Pending); Hulley
Enterprises Ltd. v. Russian Federation, (Penn. Ct. Arb. 2005) (Pending); Veteran Petroleum Trust v. Russian
Federation, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005) (Pending).
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ECT but not the ICSID Convention, which is true, for example, for Poland),
UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration, or the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
There is no default seat under the ECT, but the default seat for ICSID
arbitration is Washington, D.C. The tribunal and parties may agree to hold
hearings in other locations for convenience, and often do so.88
The law applicable to the arbitration is the ECT itself, and applicable rules
and principles of international law.89 ECT awards, like all arbitration awards,
are not strict precedents, but tribunals often look to prior awards.
The advantages of international arbitration (including arbitration under the
ECT) include a neutral forum and ease of enforcement in a variety of
jurisdictions, in light of the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention
(if the arbitration is brought under the auspices of ICSID). Parties should be
aware, however, that international arbitration under the ECT, like most treaty-
based arbitration, can be long and expensive.
II. CASES To DATE
The Annex to this article sets out the Energy Charter Secretariat's very
useful summary of cases filed under the ECT, on their website as of April
2008.90 A few general observations will suffice for present purposes.
There were very few cases in the first five years of the ECT, but the slow trickle
of cases is now increasing.9
A total of eighteen cases have been filed. The first case was filed in April
2001 (AES v. Hungary), which was an ICSID claim by the British subsidiary of
a U.S. company for approximately USD $300 million regarding a power
purchase and sale agreement and privatization contract. This case settled, but
88. For example, the Plama jurisdictional hearing was held in Paris, and the Kardassopoulos
jurisdictional hearing was held in London. See Plama Consortium Ltd., 44 I.L.M. at 724; Kardassopoulos,
ICSID Case No. ARB/5/18 at 2.
89. ECT, supra note 7, art. 26(6) ("A tribunal established under paragraph (4) shall decide the
issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international law.").
See also ICSID Convention Regulations and Rules, art. 42(1), Oct. 14, 1966, amended Apr. 10, 2006,
ICSID/I 5, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR -English-final.pdf (last
visited Mar. 16, 2008) ("The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be
agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting
State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as
may be applicable.").
90. See Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=213 (last
visited Apr. 3, 2008). See also Thomas W. Walde, Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty:
An Overview ofKeylssues, TRANSNAT'L DISPUTE MGMT. (May 2004), available at http://www.transnational-
dispute-management.com/samples/freearticles/tv 1-2-article224b.htm.
91. See List of Pending Cases, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSED/FrontServlet?requestType=Cases
RH&actionVal=ListPending (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
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in 2007 another AES entity filed an ICSID claim under the ECT against
Hungary; this case remains pending.92
Like many other treaty-based arbitrations, the ECT cases to date have
involved extended preliminary jurisdictional phases, where the state has
objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal or the admissibility of the claims on
various grounds. Thus, most cases are just now moving into the merits phase.93
As noted above, no ECT tribunal to date has found a breach of Article 13
relating to expropriation. One tribunal has found a breach of the fair and
equitable treatment clause and a breach of the requirement that domestic law
provide effective means for asserting claims and enforcing rights (Petrobart).
One tribunal has found a breach of the discriminatory treatment clause
(Nykomb).9
Relatively low damages amounts have been awarded (USD $1-3 million),
but many claims are pending for large amounts, such as the Yukos claims
against the Russian Federation for USD $30 billion (three UNCITRAL/PCA
claims brought by three shareholders of Yukos Oil Company), and Libananco
v. Republic of Turkey, for USD $1 1 billion.95
Two of the eighteen filed cases have settled; two have gone through to
merits awards (Nykomb and Petrobart); two have proceeded through a juris-
dictional phase and are currently in the merits phase (Plama and Kardasso-
poulos); twelve cases have not yet had any decision on the jurisdiction or
merits.96
The ECT panels constituted to date include many experienced arbitrators.
The chart below sets out the names of the arbitrators, with the cases listed in
order of filing; the bold names reflect multiple appointments. All of these
arbitrators appear to be lawyers, some are law professors and many are
practitioners. Tribunals have been constituted in all seventeen cases (although
the three Yukos cases have the same Tribunal); a number of people have been
appointed twice; most are Europeans and North Americans.97
92. See Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=213 (last
visited Apr. 3, 2008).
93. Id.
94. Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, Arb. Inst. of the SCC, Case
No. 118/2001 34 (2003).
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LIST OF ECT TRIBUNALS CONSTITUTED TO DATE (APRIL 2008)98
ECT Case TRIBUNAL
AES v. Hungary Allan Philip (chair); FRANCISCO ORREGO VICURA;
(2001 case) Prosper Weil
Nykomb v. Latvia Bjorn Haug (chair); Rolf A. Schfitze; Johan Gemandt
Plama v. Bulgaria Carl F. Salans (chair); Albert Jan van den Berg; V.V.
VEEDER
Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyzstan Hans Danelius (chair); Jeroen Smets; Professor Ove
Bring
Alstom Power v. Mongolia MARC LALONDE (chair); JAN PAULSSON; Sir
Anthony Mason
Yukos v. Russian Federation; L. YVES FORTIER (CHAIR); Charles Poncet (replacing
Hulley v. Russian Federation; Daniel Price); Stephen Schwebel
Veteran v. Russian Federation
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia L.YvEs FORTIER (CHAIR); FRANCISCO ORREGO VICU"A;
VAUGHN LOwE (APPOINTED FOLLOWING THE PASSING
OF ARTHUR WATTS)
Amto v. Ukraine Bemardo Cremades (chair), Per Runeland, Christer
Srderlund
Hrvatska Elektropriveda d d David A. R. Williams (chair); JUDGE CHARLES N.
(HEP) v. Republic of Slovenia BROWER; JAN PAULSSON
Libananco v. Republic of Michael Hwang (chair); Henri Alvarez; Sir Franklin
Turkey Berman Q.C.
Azpetrol International SIR ARTHUR WATTS QC (chair) (Sir Watts passed away
Holdings v. Azerbaijan in November 2007, his replacement has not yet been
announced); Professor Christopher Greenwood QC
CMG; JUDGE CHARLES N. BROWER
Cementownia. v. Republic of Pierre Tercier (Chair), MARC LALONDE, Christopher
Turkey Thomas
Europe Cement v. Republic of Donald McRae (Chair); Julian D M Lew QC; Laurent
Turkey L vy
Limon Caspian Oil v. Karl-Heinz Brcksteigel (Chair); Kaj Hrber; James A.
Republic of Kazakhstan Crawford
Electrabel v. Hungary V.V. VEEDER, Gabrielle Kaufmnann-Kohler, BRIGITTE
STERN
AES v. Hungary (2007 case) Claus von Wobeser (Chair); J. William Rowley;
BRIGITTE STERN
98. See Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases, supra note 90; List of Pending Cases, supra note
91 (listing the recent constitution of the Tribunals in AES v. Hungary (the 2007 case) and Electrabel v.
Hungary).
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IV. CONCLUSION
With fourteen pending cases, the relatively small universe of ECT
jurisprudence is certain to expand in the near future. Tribunals assessing claims
under the ECT will face challenges similar to all treaty-based tribunals,
including complicated questions ofjurisdiction and merits, and investors may
also face challenges in ensuring payment of awards.
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ANNEX-LIST OF ECT CASES99
1. AES SUMMIT GENERATION LTD. (UK SUBSIDIARY OF US-BASED AES
CORPORATION) V. HUNGARY
Counsel: Allen & Overy (S. Jagusch & J. Gill) v. information not publicly available
Case registered. 25.04.2001
Forum & reference: ICSID Case no. ARB/01/4
Arbitrators: Allan Philip (chair); Francisco Orrego Vicufia; Prosper Weil
Subject matter: Electricity sale agreement
Status of proceeding: Settlement agreed by the parties and proceeding
discontinued at their request (3 January 2002)
Claim: Information not publicly available
Award: N/A
2. NYKOMB SYNERGETICS TECHNOLOGY HOLDING AB (SWEDEN) V. LATVIA
Counsel: Hellstr6m & Partners Adv. (J. Wetterfors & P. Winnberg) v.
Setterwalls Adv. (F. Wennerholm & P. T6rnquist) Grunte & Cers, Riga (G. Cers)
Case registered: 11.12.2001
Forum & reference: Arbitration Institute of the SCC - Case n.* 118/2001
Arbitrators: Bjorn Haug (chair); Rolf A. Schiitze; Johan Gemandt
Subject matter: Electricity sale agreement
Status ofproceeding: Award rendered on 16.12.2003
Claim: Information not publicly available
Award: 4253.523
3. PLAMA CONSORTIUM LTD. (CYPRUS) V. BULGARIA
Counsel: Shearman & Sterling LLP (E. Gaillard & J. Savage) v. Bulgarian
Ministry of Finance (I. Kondov); White & Case LLP (P. Friedland - New-York;
C.B. Lamm; A. Cohen Smutny - Washington DC); Tomov & Tomov (L.
Tomov)
Case registered: 19.08.2003
Forum & reference: ICSID Case no. ARB/03/24
Arbitrators: Carl F. Salans (chair); Albert Jan van den Berg; V.V. Veeder
Subject matter: Oil refinery investment
Status ofproceeding:
08.02.2005 - Pending
28.10.2005 - Decision on jurisdiction
25.05.2006 - Tribunal issues Procedural Order No. 5 concerning the schedule
for the filing of written submissions
28.07.2006 - Respondent files a counter-memorial on the merits
99. See Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases, supra note 90 (current as of April 2008).
432 [Vol. 14:2
Reed & Martinez
13.04.2007 -Tribunal issues Procedural Order no. 11 concerning the procedural
calendar.
27.07.2007 - Respondent files a Rejoinder on the merits
30.10.2007 - Tribunal issues Procedural Order No. 12 concerning its pre-
hearing telephone conference of 22 October 2007
Claim: USD 300 million (Shearman & Sterling website)
Award: N/A
4. PETROBART LTD. (GIBRALTAR) V. KYRGYZSTAN
Counsel: Setterwalls Adv. (F. Wennerholm & J. Sidklev) v. Leboeuf, Lamb,
Green & McRae (E. Claes - Brussels; J.T. Corrigan & N. Aldashec - Bishkek)
Case registered: 01.09.2003
Forum & reference: Arbitration Institute of the SCC - Case no. 126/2003
Arbitrators: former Justice Hans Danelius (chair), Jeroen Smets, Professor Ove
Bring
Subject matter: Gas delivery contract
Status ofproceeding:
Award rendered on 29.03.2005
Application for setting aside of award rejected by Svea Court of Appeal on 13.04.2006
Claim: Information not publicly available
Award.- See website
5. ALSTOM POWER ITALIA SPA, ALSTOM SPA (ITALY) V. MONGOLIA
Counsel: Lovells (A.R. Marshall & J. Reynolds), James Crawford SC & Simon
Olleson v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP (M.D. Nolan & E. Baldwin)
Case registered: 18.03.2004
Forum & reference: ICSID Case no. ARB/04/10
Arbitrators: Marc Lalonde (chair); Jan Paulsson; Sir Anthony Mason
Subject matter: Thermal energy project, dispute relating to boiler rehabilitation
Status of proceeding: Settlement agreed by the parties and proceeding
discontinued at their request. (Order taking note of the discontinuance pursuant
to Arbitration Rule 43(1) issued by the Tribunal on 13.03.2006)
Claim: Information not publicly available
Award. N/A
6. YUKOS UNIVERSAL LTD. (UK - ISLE OF MAN) V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Counsel: Shearman & Sterling (E. Gaillard, Y. Banifatemi, P. Pinsolle) v.
Cleary Gottlieb (R.T. Greig, C. Annacker)
Case registered: 03.02.2005
Forum & reference: ad hoc UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Arbitration
administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague
Arbitrators: L. Yves Fortier (chair); Charles Poncet (replacing Daniel
2008]
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Price); Stephen Schwebel
Subject matter: Discriminatory measures and expropriation of investments
Status of proceeding: Tribunal appointed. First hearing on jurisdiction
scheduled for spring of 2008
Claim: US$33 billion (total amount of compensation sought for disputes 6, 7,
8 - Shearman & Sterling website)
Award. N/A
7. HULLEY ENTERPRISES LTD. (CYPRUS) V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Counsel: Shearman & Sterling (E. Gaillard, Y. Banifatemi, P. Pinsolle) v.
Cleary Gottlieb (R.T. Greig, C. Annacker)
Case registered: 03.02.2005
Forum & reference: ad hoc UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Arbitration
administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague
Arbitrators: L. Yves Fortier (chair); Charles Poncet (replacing Daniel
Price); Stephen Schwebel
Subject matter: Discriminatory measures and expropriation of investments
Status of proceeding: Tribunal appointed. First hearing on jurisdiction
scheduled for spring of 2008
Claim: US$33 billion (total amount of compensation sought for disputes 6, 7,
8 - Shearman & Sterling website)
Award." N/A
8. VETERAN PETROLEUM TRUST (CYPRUS) V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Counsel: Shearman & Sterling (E. Gaillard, Y. Banifatemi, P. Pinsolle) v.
Cleary Gottlieb (R.T. Greig, C. Annacker)
Case registered: 03.02.2005
Forum & reference: ad hoc UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Arbitration
administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague
Arbitrators: L. Yves Fortier (chair); Charles Poncet (replacing Daniel
Price); Stephen Schwebel
Subject matter: Discriminatory measures and expropriation of investments
Status of proceeding: Tribunal appointed. First hearing on jurisdiction
scheduled for spring of 2008
Claim: US$33 billion (total amount of compensation sought for disputes 6, 7,
8 - Shearman & Sterling website)
Award: N/A
9. IOANNiS KARDASSOPOULOS (GREECE) V. GEORGIA
Counsel: Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (UK) LLP (K. Nairn & D.




Forum & reference: ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18
Arbitrators: L.Yves Fortier (chair); Francisco Orrego Vicufia; Vaughan Lowe
(appointed following the passing away of Arthur Watts)
Subject matter: Oil and gas distribution enterprise
Status ofproceeding: Pending
27.02.2006 - tribunal constituted;
13.07.2006 - Claimant files a memorial on the merits
29.09.2006 - Respondent files a memorial on jurisdiction
05.01.2007 - Claimant files a counter-memorial on jurisdiction
15.01.2007 - Tribunal holds a first hearing on jurisdiction
06.07.2007 - Decision on jurisdiction
09.09.2007 -Tribunal issues Procedural Order No. 1 concerning the procedural
calendar
19.11.2007 - Poceeding suspended pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 10(2)
(Following the passing away of Arthur Watts, the Secretary-General notifies the
parties of the vacancy on the Tribunal)
Claim: USD 350 million (DLA Piper website)
Award. N/A
10. AMTO (LATVIA) V. UKRAINE
Counsel: Mannheimer Swartling (K. H6ber) & Svahnstr6m (S. Svahnstr6m)
v. Information not publicly available
Case registered: November 2005
Forum & reference: Arbitration Institute of the SCC
Arbitrators: Bernardo Cremades (chair), Per Runeland, Christer S6derlund
Subject matter: Nuclear power plant (dispute arising out of the bankruptcy of
a nuclear power plant and default under contracts to provide services in relation
to high voltage electrical equipment used in Zaporizhya power plant in
Ukraine)
Status ofproceeding: Pending
Claim: Information not publicly available
Award: N/A
11. HRVATSKA ELEKTROPRIVEDA D.D. (HEP) (CROATIA) V. REPUBLIC OF
SLOVENIA
Counsel: Information not publicly available v. Allen & Overy (S. Jagusch, M.
Levy, A. Sinclair & M. Jain - London; L. Gouiff~s - Paris)
Case registered: 28.12.2005
Forum & reference: ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24
Arbitrators: David A. R. Williams (chair); Judge Charles N. Brower; Jan
Paulsson
Subject matter: Nuclear power plant
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Status ofproceeding: Pending
20.04.2006 - Tribunal constituted
03.07.2006 - the Tribunal holds a first session in London
08.12.2006 - Respondent files objection to jurisdiction
22.03.2007 -Tribunal issues a Procedural Consent Order embodying the parties'
agreement on the procedural timetable
06.07.2007 - the Respondent files a counter-memorial on the merits and a
memorial on objections to jurisdiction and admissibility
10.12.2007 - the Claimant files a reply on the merits and a counter-memorial on
objections to jurisdiction and admissibility
Claim: 31.7 Million Euros (statement from Croatia's Ministry of Economy)
Award: N/A
12. LIBANANCO HOLDINGS Co. LIMITED (CYPRUS) V. REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
Counsel: Crowell & Moring LLP (S.H. Newberger, D. Contratto) & A.L.
Demetriades, Barrister (Cyprus) v. Information not publicly available
Case registered: 19.04.2006
Forum & reference: ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8
Arbitrators: Michael Hwang (chair), Henri C. Alvarez and Sir Franklin Berman
Q.C.
Subject matter: Electricity generation and distribution concessions
(expropriation)
Status ofproceeding: Pending
18.12.2006 - Tribunal constituted
12.02.2007 - the Tribunal holds a first session in New York
12.10.2007 - Claimant files a memorial on jurisdiction and the merits
19.12.2007 - the Respondent files requests for the suspension of the proceeding,
for production of documents, and for provisional measures
25.02.2008 - the Respondent files a reply in support of its request for
provisional measures
Claim: USD 10 billion (claim announced 23.02.2006 www.crowell.com)
Award: N/A
13. AZPETROL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS B.V, AZPETROL GROUP B.V. AND
AZPETROL OIL SERVICES GROUP B.V (NETHERLANDS) v. AZERBAIJAN
Counsel: McDermott Will & Emery UK LLP (J. Blanch & A. Moody) v. Allen
& Overy (S. Jagusch, J. Gill & A. Sinclair - London; L. Gouiffes - Paris)
Case registered: 30.08.2006
Forum & reference: ICSID Case No. ARB/06/15
Arbitrators: Sir Arthur Watts QC (chair), Professor Christopher Greenwood
QC CMG, Judge Charles N. Brower




02.03.2007 - Tribunal holds its first session by telephone conference
19.12.2007 - the parties agree to extend the time limit for the co-arbitrators to
appoint a new chair
10.03.2008 -the Respondent files a reply on objections tojurisdiction and admissibility
Claim: Information not publicly available
Award: N/A
14. CEMENTOWNIA "NOWA HUTA" S.A. (POLAND) V. REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
Counsel: Mannheimer Swartling Advokatbyrfi (K. H6ber, J. Ragnwaldh & N.
Eliasson) v. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (J. Paulsson, L. Reed & B. King)
and Cosar Avukatlik BUrosu (Aydin Cosar, U. Cosar & Arzu Cosar)
Case registered: 16.11.2006
Forum & reference: ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2
Arbitrators: Pierre Tercier (Chair), Marc Lalonde, Christopher Thomas
Subject matter: Electricity concessions
Status ofproceeding: Pending
11.05.2007 - Tribunal constituted
23.08.2007 - Tribunal holds a first session in Paris
19.12.2007 - the Respondent files requests for the suspension of the proceeding,
for production of documents, and for provisional measures
Claim: USD 4.6 billion (www.globalarbitrationreview.com)
Award: N/A
15. EUROPE CEMENT INVESTMENT AND TRADE S.A. (POLAND) v. REPUBLIC OF
TURKEY
Counsel: Mannheimer Swartling Advokatbyr (K. H6ber, J. Ragnwaldh & N.
Eliasson) v. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (J. Paulsson, L. Reed & B. King)
and Cosar Avukatlik BUrosu (Aydin Cosar, U. Cosar & Arzu Cosar)
Case registered: 06.03.2007
Forum & reference: ICSID Case n*. ARB(AF)/07/2
Arbitrators: Donald McRae (Chair); Julian D M Lew QC; Laurent L6vy
Subject matter: Electricity concessions
Status ofproceeding: Pending
13.09.2007 - Tribunal constituted
19.12.2007 - the Respondent files request for the suspension of the proceeding,
for production of documents, and for provisional measures. The Claimant files
a request for provisional measures
Claim: USD 3.8 billion (www.globalarbitrationreview.com)
Award: N/A
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16. LIMAN CASPIAN OIL BV (THE NETHERLANDS) AND NCL DUTCH
INVESTMENT BV (THE NETHERLANDS) V. REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
Counsel: Clifford Chance (A. Sheppard, A. Panayides & I. Suarez Anzorena)
v. Reed Smith LLP (D. Warne & G. Bhattacharya) and 3 Verulam Buildings (A.
Malek QC & C. Harris)
Case registered: 16.07.2007
Forum & reference: ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14
Arbitrators: Karl-Heinz Bickstiegel, Kaj H6ber and James R. Crawford
Subject matter: Exploration and extraction of hydocarbons
Status ofproceeding: Pending
24.01.2008 - Tribunal constituted
Claim: Information not publicly available
Award: N/A
17. ELECTRABEL S.A. V. REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY
Counsel: Clifford Chance LLP (J. Beechey, A. Sheppard- London & Z. Faludi
- Budapest) v. Arnold & Porter LLP (J. Engelmayer Kalicki - Washington DC.,
T. Frazer - London, L. Gyselen - Brussels & Dr. J. Katona - Budapest)
Case registered: 13.08.2007
Forum & reference: ICSID Case No.ARB/07/19
Arbitrators: V.V. Veeder (Chair); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler; Brigitte Stern
Subject matter: Electricity generation
Status ofproceeding: Pending
05.12.2007 - Tribunal constituted
21.12.2007 - the Claimant files a proposal for the disqualification of an
arbitrator and the proceeding is suspended in accordance with ICSID
Arbitration Rule 9(6)
25.02.2008 - the proposal for disqualification of an arbitrator is declined and
the proceeding is resumed pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 9(6)
Claim: Information not publicly available
Award: N/A
18. AES SUMMIT GENERATION LIMITED AND AES-TISZA EROMI KFT. V.
REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY
Counsel: Allen & Overy (S. Jagusch, R. Farnhill & J. Sullivan) v. Arnold &
Porter LLP (J. Engelmayer Kalicki - Washington DC, T. Frazer - London, L.
Gyselen - Brussels and Dr. J. Katona - Budapest)
Case registered: 13.08.2007
Forum & reference: ICSID Case No.ARB/07/22
Arbitrators: Claus von Wobeser (Chair); J. William Rowley; Brigitte Stem
Subject matter: Electricity generation
Status ofproceeding: Pending
438 [Vol. 14:2
2008] Reed & Martinez 439
20.11.2007 - Tribunal constituted
09.01.2008 - the Tribunal holds a first session in London
07.03.2008 - the Claimants file a memorial on the merits
Claim: Information not publicly available
Award: N/A
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I. INTRODUCTION
I propose to deal with a topic which is at the crossroads of what I see as
the main tension in international law today. This is the tension-not to say
more-between state sovereignty, on one side, and the protection of the human
rights of individuals on the other.
It is quite banal to say that we are evolving from the Westphalian society
where the state was at the center of everything and the sole subject of
international law, to what some call the cosmopolitan society or-to be really
"in"--the post-modem society, where the individual is the center or at least
where numerous new private actors put in question the centrality of state
sovereignty. These private actors range from multinational corporations and
individuals to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and pretend to become
not only actors, but subjects of international law.
There is a topic where this conflict between state sovereignty and the
protection of fundamental human rights reaches its climax-this is the question
* Professor at the University of Paris 1, Panthon Sorbonne. This paper has been transcribed from
manuscript notes and edited by Pedro Muftoz, a Costa Rican lawyer and founding partner of an important
Central American law firm, which I sincerely thank for his help.
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of state immunities. The parameters of the problem are quite simple, even if the
ways to answer the problem are controversial.
The first element would be the fact that it is well known that in order to
protect the sovereignty of states, immunities were granted to states and their
representatives.
The second element that is raised today is the question whether these
immunities should still stand when an international crime is committed. Before
asking how this question should be resolved, I will study some elements of the
general problem by firstly presenting the extent of the immunities granted to
states and their representatives and secondly, the contours of what is known
today as an international crime.
H. ELEMENTS OF THE GENERAL PROBLEM
First, a few words on immunities-while clearly stating that I am not
dealing here with national immunities, only with international immunities.
Immunities are deemed to protect state sovereignty. Therefore, they benefit the
state and its representatives, the heads of state, diplomats, and other high
officials.
Immunities have two cumulative aspects: immunity from jurisdiction
means that a state cannot be brought to court in another state against its will.
Immunity from execution means that even if a state has accepted to go to court
in another country, the judgment cannot be executed against it, and its assets
and properties cannot be seized.
At the beginning these immunities were absolute. The state was always
immune for all civil actions that could be brought against it. The acting heads
of state or diplomats were immune from all civil and criminal actions. The
former heads of state and diplomats were immune for all acts performed in the
exercise of their functions, which means that they could only be prosecuted for
their private acts and only after they had left their functions.
It is quite clear that granting such broad immunities resulted in the
irresponsibility of states and heads of states or diplomats. Everybody knows the
famous story in the nineteenth century of the Sultan of Johore, Sultan Abu
Bakar, who presented himself as Albert Baker.' He was studying in England,
dated an English girl, promised to marry her and then disappeared, so the girl
sued him.2 The English courts determined in 1894 that they had no jurisdiction
over an independent foreign sovereign, and did not grant any relief to the
English girl.3
1. Mighell v. Sultan ofJohore, I Q.B. 149 (1894).
2. Id. at 150-51.
3. Id. at 164.
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It is also well known-and I give you this free advice as an international
lawyer-that if you have a house or apartment to rent, do not rent it to a
diplomat or a king. If they do not pay their rent, you cannot sue them because
they have immunity.
With the development of the rule of law, these immunities are
progressively shrinking. However, each attack on these immunities has led to
huge controversy, and states have been extremely reluctant to see their
privileges shrink and their accountability augmented. All the restrictions to
immunities flow from the same idea that the sovereign function, and nothing
else, is to be protected. In other words, all the acts that do not pertain to the
sovereign function should be excluded from the benefit of immunities.
Two main evolutions can be witnessed. A first evolution towards a
restrictive conception of state immunities is well known. It started at the
beginning of the twentieth century, but really found its way in the 1970s when
it was considered that what should be protected by immunities was the core
political sovereignty. In other words, when a state acts dejure imperii, as a
sovereign, it should be immune. When a state acts dejure gestionis, acting like
an economic actor performing acts that anybody could do, like buying paper for
the administration, it should not benefit from immunities. This evolution was
not smooth and was strongly opposed by developing countries that, in the
course of pursuing the development of their economy, considered that they were
also acting as sovereign in fostering their economic sovereignty. However, the
distinction between acts de jure imperii and acts de jure gestionis is today
uncontroversial in its principle, although it is not always easy to characterize
the different acts performed by states.
A second evolution, on which I shall concentrate, has started more
recently, at the end of the 1990s, and has been launched by the development of
a universal concern for human rights. This time, the idea is not only to exclude
commercial acts, considered as outside the sovereign functions of the state, but
also some acts so egregious that they should not possibly be considered as
entering into the functions of the state or one of its representatives. More
precisely, the question today is whether international crimes, whether attributed
to a state or one of its representatives, should benefit from immunities.
Secondly, after a presentation of the extent of state immunities, I will say
a few words concerning the concept of international crime. This concept covers
what the international community considers today as acts that should be
condemned worldwide. These acts have therefore been qualified as inter-
national crimes at the international level through custom or treaty. The inter-
national crimes that can be prosecuted before the International Criminal Court
(ICC)--that the United States does not like, I should say, even hate-comport
essentially the following:
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a) War crimes;
b) Crimes against humanity;
c) Genocide;
d) Torture.4
Now that the framework of the problem that I want to discuss with you is
presented, I want to ask you the central question:
IIM. HOW TO SOLVE THE QUESTION RAISED?
In your view: Can a state or a head of state claim immunity when there is
an accusation of torture? So, I will ask you to vote: Who thinks that in order
to maintain the stability of international society immunity should prevail when
there is an accusation of torture? Who thinks that immunity should not be a bar
to prosecution when there is an accusation of torture? 5
Both the judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), as unbelievable as it seems, have
considered that immunities should prevail. I will refer to this later in more
detail.
Also, I want to point out here that national courts are far more keen to have
human rights prevail-like the Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte case illustrates-
while international courts, rooted in the international system based on state
sovereignty, have a tendency to protect this sovereignty far more than is
acceptable in my view. In other words, the forces of progress that bring about
less impunity are in national courts, whereas the forces of resistance are to be
found in international courts. Today, we are in a transitional phase where the
conflict of interest between these contradictory forces is not settled.
I will now illustrate what I just said with two examples: A criminal
prosecution against a representative of a state accused of torture and a civil
action for damages against a state for torture.
IV. A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AGAINST A REPRESENTATIVE OF A STATE
ACCUSED OF TORTURE
Let us look successively at the manner in which the English courts and the
ICJ have dealt with a criminal prosecution against a representative of a state
accused of torture. I will first address the Pinochet cases and then the Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000 case involving the Democratic Republic of Congo
and Belgium.
4. From now on, I will take torture as the example of an international crime.
5. This paper was first presented as the Keynote speech at the closing luncheon of the International
Law Weekend of the American Branch of the International Law Association (ABILA), in New York, on
October 27, 2007, and the quasi-unanimity of the participants voted in favour of the second proposition.
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A. The Pinochet Case before the English Courts
Here, we have a former head of state accused of torture.6 In 1998,
Pinochet went to an English clinic. The lawyers of torture victims, injured
under Pinochet's rule, asked that he be arrested. The High Court of London
granted him immunity whilst the House of Lords, in two successive decisions,
refused to grant him those immunities.7
I recall here what I said earlier, that former heads of state will only be
granted immunities for acts performed in the exercise of their functions. Of
course, this can be analyzed in two different ways: acts performed in the
exercise of their functions can mean that all official acts performed while in
office are covered by immunity, and only private acts-like a head of state
killing his wife-could be prosecuted. It can also mean that only those acts that
can be considered as entering into the functions of a head of state will continue
to enjoy immunity when he or she has left power.
It is well known that in the first decision of 25 November 1998, by a three
to two majority, the House of Lords adopted a historic ruling revoking the
immunity of Pinochet.8 In the second decision of 24 March 1999, the same
solution was adopted by a six to one majority.9 Taken together the three
minority Law Lords decided to stick with the traditional interpretation,
according to which all official acts committed during the time when the head
of state was in power, are covered by immunity.1"
The nine majority Law Lords adopted an innovative interpretation
considering that certain unacceptable acts, like international crimes, must be
considered per se as falling outside the functions of a head of state." Lord
Nicholls, for example, stated that, and I quote "it hardly needs saying that
torture of [Pinochet's] own subjects, or of aliens, would not be regarded by
international law as a function of a head of state."' 2 Lord Steyn added that it
follows inexorably from the reasoning of the High Court granting immunity
"that when Hitler ordered the 'final solution' his act must be regarded as an
official act deriving from the exercise of his functions as Head of State."' 3
6. Exparte Pinochet Ugarte, 4 All E.R. 897 (H.L. 1998).
7. Id. at 898; Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3), 2 All E.R. 97, 115(d) (H.L. 1999) [hereinafter
Pinochet No 3].
8. Exparte Pinochet Ugarte, 4 All E.R. at 898.
9. Pinochet No 3, 2 All E.R. at 115(d).
10. Pinochet No 3, 2 All E.R. at 168-69 (Saville, L., dissenting); Pinochet No 3, 2 All E.R. at 171
(Millett, L., dissenting); Pinochet No 3, 2 All E.R. at 185-86 (Phillips, L., dissenting).
11. Id. at 113-15 & 119-20.
12. Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 4 All E.R. at 939.
13. Id. at 945.
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So, after.the decisions in the Pinochet cases, it seemed clear that the acts
for which a former head of state does not benefit from immunity are not only
private acts that are functionally outside the exercise of official duties, but also
international crimes like torture, which even if performed as part of the exercise
of power, are to be considered as teleologically outside the functions of a head
of state. But unfortunately, the situation is less clear after the decision of the
ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case.
B. The Arrest Warrant Case before the ICJ
This case was brought by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
against Belgium before the ICJ. 4 What triggered the case was an arrest warrant
launched against the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC by a Belgian judge
using universal jurisdiction, permitting to prosecute in Belgium international
crimes committed outside the country towards foreigners and by foreigners. 5
The DRC pleaded that this arrest warrant was violating the traditional
immunities of a representative of the state.' 6 The ICJ considered that indeed
this was so, which is not surprising, as the immunities of a person still in
function are absolute. 7 This was also reiterated by the Law Lords in the
Pinochet case.' 8 Nonetheless, the Court decided to add an obiter dictum in
order to reverse the solution adopted in the Pinochet case for former heads of
state, when it stated: "a court of one State may try a former Minister for
Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or subse-
quent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed
during that period of office in private capacity."19 No word about the exclusion
of international crimes committed while in function.
In my view, this statement is unfortunate, especially as the prosecution of
a former head of state would permit a better protection of human rights, and
does not endanger the state sovereignty, which is the basic justification for
granting immunities.
Interestingly, we can perceive exactly the same dichotomy between
national courts and international courts when the problem raised is a civil action
against a state for damages due to torture.




17. Id. at *68.
18. Exparte Pinochet Ugarte, 4 All E.R. at 919.
19. Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. LEXIS at *25.
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V. A CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST A STATE FOR TORTURE
A. In the National Courts
Here, I have no breakthrough case like the Pinochet cases to present, but
it is possible to say that there are some national decisions here and there that
have lifted immunities when extremely serious violations of human rights were
committed. I can give the example of a Federal District Court in the District of
Colombia that refused the immunity to Chile for the murder of Mr. Letelier-
who was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile and then Ambassador-by
Chilean National Intelligence Directorate (DINA) agents in Washington, D.C.20
Many other examples could be given, but I would like now to proceed to
present the position on the question at the international level.
B. In the European Court of Human Rights
Here, I will speak of a famous case, the Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom
case. 2 ' The facts were the following: Mr. Al-Adsani was a British and Kuwaiti
citizen who was tortured in Kuwait and tried to obtain damages from Kuwait
before the English Courts.2 2
When the English Courts-High Court, Court of Appeal-granted
immunity to Kuwait, Al-Adsani went to Strasbourg to the ECHR, claiming a
violation of his right to a fair trial.23 By a decision rendered by a nine to eight
majority, on 21 November 2001, the European Court upheld the position of the
English court-in other words, it considered that the commission of torture
does not justify the lifting of immunity.24 Although the Court considered that
torture was a violation of ajus cogens rule, it stated that the fact of granting
immunity to a state in civil matters, even when torture is at stake, is not a
disproportionate restriction to the access ofjustice guaranteed by Article VI of
the European Convention on Human Rights.25
Eight dissenting judges considered that immunity should not have been a
bar to the granting of damages. Their reasoning was the following:
1) Torture is a violation ofjus cogens;
2) Rules on immunities are notjus cogens
3) Immunities must be set aside so thatjus cogens can prevail. 26
20. Letelier v. Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).





26. Al-Adsani, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. O-119-OV3.
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Although I consider the outcome of the dissenting opinion preferable to the
outcome of the decision, I have to confess that I consider its reasoning as some-
what simplistic. The main reason why the dissenting opinion is not legally
convincing is that, in international law, a hierarchy of norms only applies
between norms having the same object. Thejus cogens rule forbidding torture
is a substantive rule, while immunities are a procedural device and so there is
no evident hierarchy between them.
Does this mean that the solution of the Court should prevail? I do not
think so-I think, on the contrary, that the solution of the dissenting judges
should have been adopted, but on the basis of a legally stronger reasoning quite
similar to the one adopted by the majority of the Law Lords in the Pinochet
cases: immunities should have been lifted, as torture should be considered as
outside the functions of a state.
If we summarize what is today the positive international law, it is possible
to say that for states, immunity stands even in the face of an international crime
like torture in civil actions.27 For heads of state and other representatives in
office, immunity stands, as well, in the face of an international crime whether
in criminal or civil cases. 2' For former heads of state and other representatives
of the state, immunity does not stand in criminal matters according to the House
of Lords, but does stand according to the ICJ.29
Of course, NGOs are advocating that the Pinochet solution should be
extended to acting heads of state and that immunity should also be set aside for
acting heads of state if they can be charged with an international crime.
Personally, I am not in favor of such a move as it might create political
manipulations. As an example, I can cite a judgment of a court in Belgrade a
few years ago sentencing George H. Bush, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair to
twenty years of prison because of war crimes committed by the North American
Treaty Organization (NATO) in the bombing of Kosovo.3" This, of course,
does not mean that I favor impunity for heads of state in office committing
international crimes-they can indeed be prosecuted before the ICJ.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, although there is still an intense debate, I foresee--or at
least, I wish-that just as it is nowadays well accepted that immunity does not
apply to acts de jure gestionis in civil matters, immunities should not be
permitted to protect a state or its representatives either in criminal cases or in
27. Al-Adsani, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 51. No criminal case can be brought against a state.
28. Pinochet No 3, 2 All E.R. at 111.
29. Exparte Pinochet Ugarte, 4 All E.R. at 941(c); Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. LEXIS at *53.
30. For a discussion on this, see NATO Leaders Sentenced by Belgrade Court, CNN.cOM,
http://edition.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/09/2 l/yugoslavia.court/index.html (last visited Mar. 13,2008).
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civil cases when an international crime is committed, since such an act should
be considered as dramatically outside the functions of a state. Only then, could
it be possible to say that there is a new vision of international law, where
impunity of states and their representatives for international crimes, condemned
by the international community, will no longer prevail.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Hall Street Associates,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. on March 28, 2008.' The case had triggered discussion
in the United States and in other jurisdictions, including Canada, about the
central issue: whether parties to an arbitration agreement can contractually vary
the statutory grounds for judicial review of an arbitral award and, if so, to what
extent.
In Hall Street, the agreement for a domestic arbitration provided broader
grounds of judicial review than are specified in the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).' The agreement stated that the district court shall vacate, modify or
correct the arbitration award where the arbitrator's conclusions of law are
incorrect.
The main question posed to the court was whether parties can
contractually expand the grounds forjudicial review of their arbitral award. In
other words, is a U.S. court barred from enforcing an arbitration agreement that
provides for more expansive grounds ofjudicial review than are specified in the
FAA?
* Barry Leon, a partner in the Toronto office of Torys LLP, practices international and domestic
litigation and arbitration. Laila Karimi is a student-at-law in the Toronto office of Torys LLP.
I. See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc.,170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008).
2. Federal Arbitration Act § 11,9 U.S.C.A. §§ 10-11 (1947).
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The Supreme Court held that if parties to an arbitration agreement want to
make use of the expedited review of awards contemplated by the FAA, they
cannot modify the grounds for judicial review by agreement.
The issue of varying statutory grounds of review has been the subject of
limited Canadian judicial consideration and only in the context of whether
parties can contract those grounds.
II. OVERVIEW OF HALL STREET
Hall Street involved a dispute between a landlord and tenant. The
landlord, Hall Street, leased property to Mattel. The property had been used by
Mattel and its predecessors as a toy manufacturing facility. It was undisputed
that the well water on the property, used for drinking and bathing, was
contaminated and that Mattel and its predecessors, in contravention of the
Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act (ODWQA),3 did not test the well water for
contaminates. Hall Street commenced an action claiming that Mattel was
required to indemnify it from all actions by any parties in relation to the
condition of the property. Under a settlement agreement, the parties decided
to arbitrate, and the agreement specifically stated that the district court "shall
vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's findings of facts
are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's
conclusions of law are erroneous."4 The District Court approved and adopted
the agreement as an order.
The arbitrator found that despite Mattel's violation of the ODWQA, it had
not violated any "applicable environmental laws." Under the lease, a violation
of applicable environmental laws would result in the landlord gaining broad
indemnification rights. The arbitrator found that because the ODWQA was not
designed to protect either human health, or landowners' property from
environmental contamination, it was not an applicable environmental law.
Therefore, the arbitrator concluded that Mattel was exempt from the
indemnification requirements of the lease.
The district court, in remanding the case back to the arbitrator, granted
Hall Street's motion to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the
arbitrator's conclusion that the ODWQA was not an applicable environmental
law was wrong. The arbitrator then reversed his decision in favor of Hall
Street. On judicial review, the district court upheld the arbitrator's amended
decision. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit followed its en banc decision in Kyocera
3. See Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act (ODWQA), OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
448.119-448.285, 454.235, 454.255 (2007).




Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc.5 and reversed the district court's
initial vacation of the arbitrator's initial erroneous award holding that "the
terms of an arbitration agreement controlling the [grounds] of judicial review
[is] unenforceable and severable."6 On remand to the district court, the court
held that an arbitrator exceeds his powers within the meaning of the FAA when
the award is based on an implausible interpretation of a contract, as was the
arbitrator's interpretation that the ODWQA was not an applicable
environmental law. It again vacated the original arbitration award. Mattel
appealed to the Ninth Circuit again and the court reversed the district court's
decision by holding that "[i]mplausibility is not a valid ground for avoiding an
arbitration award."7
The district courts have been split on this issue. The Ninth and Tenth
Circuit Courts have held that the FAA sets the exclusive standard by which an
arbitrator's decision maybe reviewed;8 other district courts, however, have held
that parties may contractually expand the grounds for judicial review9 or may
supplant the review set out in the FAA with clear contractual language.'0
The importance of the issue attracted a number of intervenors to the
appeal. In support of the petitioner, the Wireless Association submitted that
arbitration agreements as drafted by the parties should be enforced; otherwise,
Congress's intention to encourage parties to arbitrate would be undermined.
The New England Legal Foundation and the National Federation of
Independent Business Legal Foundation intervened jointly, advancing the
position that the FAA provides a default standard ofjudicial review upon which
the parties may expand, that contractual freedom would reduce the burden on
courts, and foster reliance on arbitration. In addition, the Pacific Legal
Foundation advocated that the FAA was designed to encourage freedom of
choice and that expanding the grounds of review by contract is simply a choice
of procedure as opposed to an expansion of the courts' jurisdiction.
The American Arbitration Association and the United States Council for
International Business supported the respondent, arguing that expanding
judicial review would result in the loss of the element of finality of arbitration
decisions. They also argued that such a finding would go against the plain
meaning of the FAA and that it would open the floodgates and strain judicial
5. Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel Inc., 113 F.App'x 272,273 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2003)).
6. Hall Street, 113 F.App'x at 273.
7. Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel Inc., 196 F.App'x 476, 477 (9th Cir. 2006).
8. Hall Street, 113 F.App'x at 273; Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925,930 (10th Cir.
2001).
9. Gateway Technologies Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir.
1995); Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cit. 1997).
10. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 21 (1st Cir. 2005).
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resources. They also offered the contention that since other leading
jurisdictions limit the grounds for judicial review, the United States would
become a less attractive forum for arbitration.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision placed considerable emphasis on the
literal text of the FAA. The Court held that the grounds for vacatur and
modification set out in sections 10 and 11 of the FAA are the exclusive grounds
for review by virtue of section 9, which states that "the court must grant such
an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in
sections 10 and 11 of this title"[emphasis added]." In focusing on the
language of section 9, the Court determined that it provides for no flexibility;
rather, section 9 of the FAA
unequivocally tells courts to grant confirmation in all cases, except
when one ofthe "prescribed" exceptions applies. This does not sound
remotely like a provision meant to tell a court what to do just in case
the parties say nothing else.12
Instead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see the three
provisions, §§9-11, as substantiating a national policy favoring
arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain
arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. Any
other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary
appeals that can "rende[r] informal arbitration merely a prelude to a
more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process"...
and bring arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process.13
The Supreme Court did not differentiate between contractually expanding
or limiting rights of review in an arbitration agreement. Rather, the Court
rejected any modification of the grounds of review set out in sections 10 and 11
of the FAA.
The intervenors on behalf of Hall Street argued that parties will flee
arbitration if expanded review is not permitted, whereas one of the intervenors
on behalf of Mattel argued that parties will flee the courts if expanded review
is permitted. The Court gave little weight to these arguments, stating that
"whatever the consequences . . . the statutory text gives us no business to
expand the statutory grounds."' 4
Despite the strict adherence to sections 10 and 11 of the FAA, the Court
recognized that the FAA is not the only way in which parties can have arbitral
11. Federal Arbitration Act § 11, 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 9(1947).
12. Hall Street Assocs., 170 L. Ed. 2d at 264.
13. Id. at 265.
14. Id. at 266.
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awards reviewed. The Court pointed to state statutes and the common law as
other means of having courts review arbitral awards. The Court outlined that
the holding of this case applies only to parties taking advantage of the expedited
judicial review under the FAA. In the end, the decision was remanded to the
Ninth Circuit for consideration of other issues.
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority for ignoring the historical
context in which the FAA was passed. Justice Stevens maintained that the core
purpose of the FAA is to favor the enforceability of fairly negotiated arbitration
agreements, stating that section 2 of the FAA makes written arbitration
agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." He went on to state that
reliance on the literal text of the FAA "is flatly inconsistent with the overriding
interest in effectuating the clearly expressed intent of the contracting parties."' 5
Ill. CANADIAN CASE LAW ON VARYING GROUNDS OF REVIEW
In Canada, very few court decisions have considered whether parties to an
international arbitration agreement can contractually vary the statutory grounds
for judicial review of an arbitral award.
In Canada's common law jurisdictions, the international arbitration
statutes are Model Law 16 statutes. There are separate domestic arbitration
statutes that in some cases deal differently with rights of appeal and review. In
Quebec, arbitration provisions are contained in the Civil Code, with a provision
for the Model Law to be considered in international arbitration.
Those few Canadian court decisions on the subject of varying grounds of
review in international arbitration have considered the question of limiting the
grounds as opposed to expanding them.
A. Food Services ofAmerica, Inc. v. Pan Pacific Specialties Ltd (British
Columbia)
In Food Services ofAmerica, Inc. v. Pan Pacific Specialties Ltd,7 a 1997
decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court, a trial-level court, the parties
included a clause in their international arbitration agreement in which they
"expressly waive any entitlement they have or may have to rely upon" the
statutory grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement of an international
arbitral award. 8
15. Hall Street Assocs., 170 L. Ed. 2d at 268 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. See UNITED NATIONS, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/mil-arb/06-54671 Ebook.pdf
(last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
17. Food Services of America Inc. v. Pan Pacific Specialties Ltd., (1997), 32 B.C.L.R. (3d) 225
(B.C.S.C. Mar. 24, 1997).
18. Id. 110.
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Section 36 of the International Commercial Arbitration Act of British
Columbia (BC ICAA), a Model Law statute, provides the grounds upon which
a party may oppose recognition and enforcement of an international arbitration
award in British Columbia, as follows:
Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement
36 (1) Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective
of the state in which it was made, may be refused only
(a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party
furnishes to the competent court where recognition or enforcement is
sought proof that
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity,
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the
parties have subjected it or, failing any indication of that law, under
the law of the state where the arbitral award was made,
(iii) the party against whom the arbitral award is invoked was not
given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the
arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present the party's
case,
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of
the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration may be recognized and enforced,
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement ofthe parties or, failing any
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the state where the
arbitration took place, or
(vi) the arbitral award has not yet become binding on the parties or
has been set aside or suspended by a court of the state in which, or
under the law of which, that arbitral award was made, or
(b) if the court finds that
(i) the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of British Columbia, or
(ii) the recognition or enforcement of the arbitral award would be
contrary to the public policy in British Columbia.
(2) If an application for setting aside or suspension of an arbitral
award has been made to a court referred to in subsection (1) (a) (vi),
the court where recognition or enforcement is sought may, if it
considers it proper, adjourn its decision and may also, on the
[Vol. 14:2
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application of the party claiming recognition or enforcement of the
arbitral award, order the other party to provide appropriate security.'9
Section 36 of the BC ICAA is essentially the same as Article 34 of the
Model Law (application for setting aside as exclusive recourse against arbitral
award).20
The respondent in Food Services did not argue that a waiver was not
permitted. Rather, it submitted that the waiver applied only where the
arbitration was conducted strictly in accordance with the International
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, the rules under
which the arbitration agreement required the arbitration to be conducted. The
Supreme Court of British Columbia held that if that were the case, there would
be no need to make use of Section 36, rendering the waiver useless.
The court did not discuss whether a waiver was possible. Implicitly it
accepted that it was possible and discussed the respondent's submission, stating
that "[i]t would not be appropriate for a court to go beyond the clear meaning
of the words in an arbitration agreement and interpret them in such a way as to
render the clause meaningless."'"
B. Noble China Inc. v. Lei (Ontario)
The 1998 decision of the Ontario Court (General Division) (now the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice) in Noble China Inc. v. Lei22 upheld a
settlement agreement arbitration clause in which the parties contractually
limited the grounds of judicial review of the arbitral award. The agreement
provided: "No matter which is to be arbitrated is to be the subject matter of any
court proceeding other than a proceeding to enforce the arbitration award."23
The arbitration was governed by the Ontario International Commercial
Arbitration Act (Ontario ICAA), a Model Law statute.24 The respondent Lei
moved unsuccessfully to set aside the award under Article 34 of the Model Law
(grounds for setting aside an arbitral award).25 In summary, the court concluded
that:
(a) Article 19 of the Model Law (determination of rules of
procedure), as incorporated into the Ontario ICAA, permits parties to
19. International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 233, § 36 (1996).
20. See International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C., ch.233, § 34 (1996).
21. Food Services, 32 B.C.L.R. (3d) 15.
22. Noble China Inc. v. Lei, (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 69, 87 (Ont. Gen. Div. Nov. 4, 1998).
23. Id. at 73.
24. Ontario International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 1.9 (1990).
25. Noble China, 42 O.R. (3d) at 96.
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agree on the rules of procedure for their arbitration, except in the case
of mandatory provisions of the Model Law (for example, Article 18,
equal treatment of parties required) or where the procedure would be
contrary to public policy;
(b) Contrary to the respondent's submission, Article 34 is not a
mandatory provision of the Model Law out of which parties cannot
contract; and
(c) The agreement not to resort to the courts was part of the permitted
procedural agreement of the parties.26
As a result, "[t]he rules to which they agreed exclude recourse to the
courts except to enforce an award."27 The court noted that the Ontario domestic
arbitration statute expressly prohibits parties from contracting out of the
comparable "setting aside an award" provision, which the Ontario ICAA does
not do.28
The court's judgment analyzes how to determine which articles of the
Model Law are mandatory and which are not. The court held that all articles
that are not discussed in the Commentary29 with mandatory language (i.e.,
words such as "may" as opposed to "shall") are not mandatory and can be
derogated from.3" The court noted that the Commentary to Article 34 states that
"[p]aragraph (2) lists the various grounds on which an award may be set
aside., 31 The court held that Article 34 is not a mandatory provision.32
C. The Parties Cannot Confer Appellate Jurisdiction
In Hall Street, one argument against permitting parties to expand the scope
of court review of arbitral awards is grounded in the reasoning that parties
should not have the ability to contractually agree that the courts will have
greater jurisdiction than the FAA provides.3
An indication of the way Canadian courts might react can be found in the
2004 decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Brent v. Brent.34 The
arbitration agreement did not purport to vary the scope ofjudicial review of the
26. Id. at 87, 90, 92, 93-94.
27. Id. at 88.
28. Id. at 88-89.
29. See The Secretary-General, Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on
International CommercialArbitration, deliveredto the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264 (Mar. 25,
1985) [hereinafter Commentary].
30. Noble China, 42 O.R. (3d) at 90.
31. Noble China, 42 O.R. (3d) at 90-91 (quoting Commentary, supra note 25, at 72) (emphasis
added).
32. Noble China, 42 O.R. (3d) at 94.
33. Hall Street, 113 F.App'x at 273 (citing Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 994).
34. See Brent v. Brent, (2004), 69 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A. Feb. 17, 2004).
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award. However, it did purport to allow an appeal (on questions of law)
directly to the Court of Appeal, contrary to the scheme in the domestic
arbitration statute for appeals from awards to go to the Superior Court (and only
on specified grounds), with a limited further appeal right, with leave, to the
Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal held that it is a statutory court, with its
jurisdiction defined by statute.35 It has no original jurisdiction to hear an appeal
from an arbitration award and the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on it.36
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion in Hall Street that parties cannot
expand the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards was based squarely on
the language in the relevant provisions of the FAA. The Court held that the
grounds for vacatur and modification set out in sections 10 and 11 of the FAA
are the exclusive grounds for review by virtue of section 9, which states that
"the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title".
The Ontario court's reasoning in Noble China was that the judicial review
provision in Article 34 of the Model Law is not a mandatory provision out of
which parties cannot contract. That reasoning is closer in spirit to Justice
Stevens' reasoning in his minority opinion in Hall Street that the core purpose
of the FAA is to favor the enforceability of fairly negotiated arbitration
agreements.
It remains to be seen whether Canadian appellate courts will endorse the
approach of the trial level courts in Ontario and British Columbia that permitted
parties to contractually limit courts' rights of review of arbitral awards.
However, at least on the basis of on Canadian court decisions to date, it can be
said that the FAA and the Model Law took opposite approaches to the ability
of parties to expand the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards: the FAA
precludes the parties from doing so while the Model Law appears to permit
them to do so.
35. Id. at 740.
36. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Extraterritorial jurisdiction can be defined as a government's ability to
adjudicate disputes involving individuals who are located and/or events that
have taken place in anotherjurisdiction, including acts and omissions of foreign
officials. Due to their sometimes extensive transnational ramifications, human
rights' and mass tort cases2 are particularly apt to give rise to extraterritorial
jurisdiction issues. In fact, several modem legal theories and discussions on
extraterritorial jurisdiction appear to be premised on the idea that those two are
the most frequent, if not the only, relevant types of disputes with a bearing on
the subject.'
However, as this paper intends to show, complex extraterritorial
jurisdiction issues arise with increasing frequency in civil, commercial, and
* Anibal Sabater (asabater@fulbright.com) is an attorney with the international law firm of
Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P. He is currently serving as a co-chair of the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Committee of the American Branch of the International Law Association (ABILA). The opinions expressed
in this article are exclusively those of the author and do not represent the opinions of other members of his
firm. This article is based on the presentation given by the author at the 2007 International Law Weekend
held by the ABILA in New York City in November 2007.
1. See, e.g., Emma Daly, Spanish Judge Sends Argentine to Prison on Genocide Charge, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2003, at A3 (reporting several decisions by a Spanish criminal court to try former Chilean
and Argentinean officials, including Chile's Augusto Pinochet, for alleged human right violations that had
taken place in those nations).
2. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 634 F. Supp. 842, 844
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
3. See, e.g., Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 285 (1982).
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foreign investment matters that do not involve (or, at least, do not substantially
involve) alleged human rights violations or mass torts.
To prove that point, this paper shall briefly discuss three recent cases. The
paper does not intend to draw conclusions or show a pattern other than the
irreducible complexity ofextraterritorial jurisdiction matters, in which it is hard
to offer general or "one-size-fits-all" solutions. Two of the cases discussed in
this paper were brought before common lawjurisdictions and one before a civil
law jurisdiction, something that does not appear to have had any discernable
impact on the ultimate outcome of each of those cases.
In the first case discussed in this paper no decision on the merits of the
dispute was ever issued. In the second case, Occidental Exploration & Prod
Co. v. Ecuador, the seized courts decided that they had jurisdiction to fully
resolve the dispute, even if the dispute included extraterritorial elements. In the
third case, Aguas Lenders Recovery Group, LLC v. Suez, the issue of whether
or not the court has jurisdiction has not been finally adjudicated.
The reasons why these three cases were brought in a jurisdiction with
which they had a relatively vague connection vary. In the first example
discussed in this paper, the case was brought before the courts of the
jurisdiction where the plaintiff had been ultimately harmed, although the chain
of harmful events had commenced and essentially took place somewhere else.
In the second case, the law gave no option to the plaintiff but to bring its actions
in the seized jurisdiction, even at the cost of giving rise to complex extra-
territorial issues. In the third case, it is not entirely clear why the plaintiff chose
one jurisdiction to the detriment of the other jurisdictions that might have been
available to it. Plaintiffs sometimes appear to resort to the courts of the juris-
dictions where they can maximize their recovery or the relief they can obtain
(e.g., by seeking punitive damages), even if those courts have a less evident
connection with the dispute than the courts of other jurisdictions. In the
absence of a consistent set of international legal rules, it depends on each legal
system to determine whether or not that is a permissible strategy.
II. FIRST EXAMPLE: EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN A CIVIL MATTER4
In May 2000, a Spanish criminal judge, Ms. J., issued an international
arrest warrant against a foreign citizen, Mr. F., who was charged with abduction
of minors.' Pursuant to that international warrant, the foreign citizen was
arrested in Switzerland, where he spent several months in prison.6
4. Although not reported, the cases addressed in this section are extensively discussed in Christian
Dominici, Acte de 1 'Organ, Acte de 1'Vttat, et le Dilemme Immunitg de Juridiction ou Incompetence, in EL
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL: NORMAS, HECHOS Y VALORES. LIBER AMICORUM JOSe ANTONIO PASTOR
RIDRUEO 325, 326-34 (Comit6 Organizador, et. al. eds. 2006).




Based on Spanish law and some other decisions issued in the abduction
matter, Mr. F. reached the conclusion that the international arrest warrant
against him was unlawful and groundless.7 He then decided to bring civil
actions in Switzerland against Ms. J. seeking damages for the time spent in the
Swiss prison.8
On November 7, 2002, a Geneva First Instance Court asserted its
jurisdiction to entertain Mr. F.'s complaint. 9 On May 16, 2003, however, a
Swiss Court of Appeals reversed that decision and asserted that Swiss courts
lacked extraterritorial jurisdiction over actions that entailed the review of
rulings and opinions issued by foreign courts.'0 According to the Swiss Court
of Appeals, foreign judges' rules and opinions are generally immune and cannot
be reviewed by Swiss national courts for purposes of determining the liability
of the judge who issued them.11
Interestingly, the Swiss Court of Appeals does not appear to have been
troubled by the fact that the case presented so many extraterritorial elements
(e.g., an arrest warrant issued abroad; a criminal case pending abroad, etc.).
Instead, its chief concern (and the reason that ultimately led to the dismissal of
the case) appears to have been that the plaintiff was requesting the declaration
that a foreign sovereign act was unlawful; something that the Swiss Court of
Appeals found went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.
III. SECOND EXAMPLE: ExTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN A
FOREIGN INVESTMENT MATTER
On July 1, 2004, Occidental Exploration and Production Company
(Occidental), a company incorporated in and under the laws of California,
obtained a favorable award against the Republic of Ecuador in arbitration under
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law's (UNCITRAL)
Arbitration Rules and the United States-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty
(BIT). 12
Under the 1996 English Arbitration Act, Ecuador brought an action to set
aside the award before the courts of London, the seat of arbitration. 3 Among
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Dominic6, supra note 5, at 327.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, 72-75, available at http://www.
investmentclaims.com/decisions/Occidental-Ecuador-FinalAward- 1Jul2004.pdf (last visited Mar. 9,2008).
13. Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. [2005] EWHC (Comm) 774, 2005 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 240 (Eng.) [hereinafter Ecuador]. As recognized by Article V(1)(e) of 1958 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, it is generally understood that arbitral awards can
be challenged before the courts of the jurisdiction where they have been rendered. Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V(l)(e), opened for signature June 10, 1958,
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other things, Ecuador argued that the arbitral tribunal had failed to interpret
correctly the substantive provisions contained in the BIT. " Occidental opposed
that challenge of the award, arguing, among other things, that the English courts
lacked jurisdiction to decide how the BIT, a sovereign act by two foreign
nations, should be interpreted. 5 Additionally, Occidental noted that the
dispute, which involved Ecuador's alleged failure to reimburse to Occidental
certain taxes in connection with Occidental's gas exploration and production
activities in Ecuador, lacked any substantive ties with England but for the fact
that it had been resolved there.'6 Accordingly, Occidental asserted that English
courts were not in the best position to review the merits of the award and deter-
mine whether or not the arbitrators had resolved the dispute appropriately.17
The English courts found that they had jurisdiction to resolve the set-aside
action brought by Ecuador and, in particular, to interpret and apply the BIT. 8
However, the English courts dismissed Ecuador's set-aside action after finding
that the arbitral tribunal had properly applied the BIT.' 9
It may seem that, in contrast with the Swiss Court of Appeals mentioned
in the first example, English courts in the Occidental case had no objection to
examining foreign sovereign acts, such as the BIT. However, the decision of
the Swiss Court of Appeals in the first case and the decision of the English
courts in the second case are not at odds in this respect. English courts were not
called on to review the validity of a foreign sovereign act, which was taken for
granted, but rather to interpret and apply that act. Swiss courts, however, were
called on to determine whether a certain foreign act, the international arrest
warrant, was valid. For the Swiss Court of Appeals, this last type of analysis
was what the court was precluded from conducting.
IV. THIRD EXAMPLE: EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN A
COMMERCIAL MATTER
The dispute between the parties in this third case broadly arose out of
loans in excess of $100 million made by the members of Aguas Lenders
Recovery Group (ALRG), a limited liability company, to Aguas Argentinas
330 U.N.T.S. 38.
14. Ecuador, [2005] EWHC at [26]. Under Sections 67 and following of the 1996 English
Arbitration Act, it is sometimes permissible to challenge an award and have its merits reviewed on certain
grounds. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 67 (Eng.).
15. Ecuador, (2005] EWHC at [2].
16. Id. at [35].
17. Id. at [33].
18. Id. at [71].
19. See Ecuadorv. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. [2005] EWCA (Civ Div) 1116,2006 Q.B.




(AA), an Argentinean water supply company.2" AA's shareholders included
Suez S.A. (Suez), a French public utility company, and its Spanish affiliate,
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. (Agbar).2
Following last decade's Argentinean crisis, AA became insolvent and
failed to repay the loans made by ALRGs members. 2 AA's bankruptcy
proceedings were then initiated in Argentina.23
Sometime later, ALRG was established as a pool of financial entities. 4
Only a few of ALRGs members were U.S. companies.25 Shortly after its
incorporation, ALRG was assigned the credits that its members held against AA
and brought action in New York federal court against Suez, Agbar, and AA's
successor in interest, Aguas y Saneamientos Argentinos S.A., seeking repay-
ment of the loans made by ALRG's members to AA, along with punitive
damages and attorneys' fees under an alter ego theory.26
The three co-respondents submitted motions to dismiss arguing that,
among other things, the New York federal court case was aimed at circum-
venting the bankruptcy proceedings still pending in Argentina.27 Specifically,
the three co-respondents argued that ALRG's actions constituted an imper-
missible attempt to have U.S. courts exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, review
the decisions issued by the Argentinean bankruptcy courts, and resolve a
dispute with no relevant connection with the United States. 8
Prior to any court decision on the motions to dismiss, in October 2007, a
stipulation was entered into providing for the dismissal with prejudice of
ALRG's claims against Suez and Agbar.29
20. Complaint: Demand for Jury Trial at l, Aguas Lenders Recovery Group, LLC v. Suez, S.A.,




24. Id. I 13 & 45.
25. Aguas Complaint, 13 & 50.
26. Id. 112.
27. Notice of Motion (Aguas), Aguas Lenders Recovery Group, LLC v. Suez, S.A., No. 06-cv-
07873 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2007); Notice of Motion (Suez), Aguas Lenders Recovery Group, LLC v. Suez,
S.A., No. 06-cv-07873 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2007); Notice of Motion (Sociedad), Aguas Lenders Recovery
Group, LLC v. Suez, S.A., No. 06-cv-07873 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2007).
28. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion of Defendant Suez S.A. to Dismiss the Complaint
at 19-22, Aguas Lenders Recovery Group, LLC v. Suez, S.A., No. 06-cv-07873 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006).
29. Stipulation of Dismissal, Aguas Lenders Recovery Group, LLC v. Suez S.A., No. 06-cv-07873
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2007).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The previous speaker, Jonathan Fried, masterfully outlined the
International Monetary Fund (Fund or IMF)'s recent policy reform efforts, in
particular its shift towards crisis prevention, as only an IMF Executive Director
could.' My goal in commenting is to offer a normative framework through
which to evaluate this shift, specifically, to help answer the questions of
whether or not the Fund should be moving in this direction, and how. I am
going to approach this as a question of fairness, which means I am going to look
at the international financial system from the perspective ofjustice.' Insofar as
the Fund makes decisions involving the allocation of social resources
(specifically, hard currencies), its activities are the direct subject of justice
theory. The key question is "what normative principles should guide the Fund
in its allocation of social goods?"
* I'd like to thank the American Branch and Professor Cynthia Lichtenstein for the invitation to
speak on this panel with such distinguished co-panelists whose comments and suggestions have been greatly
appreciated. I would also like to thank Dan Blanchard and Matthew Hoisington for their able research
assistance.
1. Jonathan T. Fried & James A. Haley, Crisis Prevention: The International Agenda (2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
2. On the general subject of fairness analysis in international economic law, see AMERICO
BEVIGLIA ZAMPETTI, FAIRNESS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: U.S. PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
RELATIONS (2006); FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF
JUST TRADE (2003) [hereinafter JUST TRADE]; Robert Hockett, From "Mission-Creep " to Gestalt-Switch:
Justice, Finance, the IFIs, and Globalization's Intended Beneficiaries, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 167,
179-81 (2005); on the broader question of fairness in international law generally, see THOMAS M. FRANCK,
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).
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In developing the framework for this analysis, I am going to rely on Rawls'
theory of Justice as Fairness in which the fairness of a given distribution of
social goods (such as wealth, opportunities, or rights) is evaluated in terms of
its benefit to the least advantaged members of the group.3 Applying Justice as
Fairness to the question at hand, we would ask whether the proposed shift in
Fund priorities, insofar as it affects the way the Fund allocates its resources,
works to the benefit of the least advantaged states.4
Though I am only at the preliminary stage of this project,5 my analysis
suggests that, although the Fund's operations are consistent with global justice
in several key respects, the proposed shift in priorities does raise some issues.
My concern is that while the Fund as an institution plays an important role in
promoting fairness, any move to shift resources away from existing Fund
programs focused on the least developed countries, and towards macro-
economic stability funds for intermediate countries, is only partly justifiable as
a matter of fairness. In the Doha Round and elsewhere, we can see the impact
which questions about the basic fairness of the international system can have
on contemporary global social relations. We therefore cannot afford to ignore
questions ofjustice and injustice, for our own security and prosperity if for no
other reason.6
II. FAIRNESS AND THE WORK OF THE FUND
Justice as Fairness offers a powerful way to articulate the liberal view of
justice as it applies to institutions which allocate social goods, such as wealth,
rights, opportunities, and in this case, hard currencies.7 In Rawls' theory, the
3. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
4. Although I believe a true theory ofglobaljustice requires either cosmopolitan or communitarian
grounding, or both, I offer neither here, relying instead on a more traditional international law/"society of
states" model ofjustice. See Frank J. Garcia, Globalization and the Theory of International Law, 11 INT'L
LEG. THEORY 9 (2005) (surveying arguments regarding normative basis ofglobal justice in globalizing social
relations). Thus what I am actually engaging in here is more properly an international justice argument, or
justice between states and with their citizens, although I believe the substantive conclusions would be quite
similar either way.
5. This analysis is part of a larger project I am currently engaged in through which I attempt to
employ a normative framework drawn from domestic political theory and first adapted to international trade,
to analyze the work of the Fund and the World Bank with respect to global distributive justice. A preliminary
statement of some of these themes can be found in Frank J. Garcia, Global Justice and the Bretton Woods
Institutions, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 461 (2007).
6. See Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Justice andSecurity, in TRADE AS GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY
& SECURITY?-CRITICAL, EMPIRICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 78 (Padideh Ala'i et al. eds., 2006).
7. l am not going to try to argue for the applicability of global justice per se at this juncture, but
rather to assume the more limited position that liberal states have an obligation to pursue liberal foreign




touchstone for whether a particular pattern of distribution is just is not whether
it is equal-he assumes and accepts that there will be many inequalities in the
world-but whether or not a particular inequality in the distribution of social
goods is justified. Rawls defines this justification as whether or not the
distribution pattern benefits the least advantaged players in the system--the so-
called Difference Principle.8
With respect to the work of the Fund, there are two kinds of inequalities
we are concerned with: inequalities in the global distribution of hard
currencies, which the Fund does or does not make work to the benefit of the
least advantaged; and inequalities in the way the Fund itself re-distributes such
currencies, which must themselves be justified by reference to their benefit to
the least advantaged.
A. Fairness and International Monetary Policy
It is important at the outset to recall that the Fund is a social institution,
whose core activity is to allocate primary social goods: access to currency
reserves, and the cost of such access. Trade currencies are an exhaustible social
resource.9 The fact that certain currencies are considered hard, and others are
not necessarily creates inequality in the distribution of trade currencies. This
inequality in part reflects the fact that currencies are national in nature, since
those countries whose economic policies and performance support the hardness
of their currency have a built-in advantage in the supply of that currency. It is
also in part a function of the larger operation of the global economic system, its
inequalities and colonial legacy, which contribute to the hard-currency
attributes of some economies, and undercuts such attributes of others.
Those states whose currencies are hard have an abundance of, and a
capacity to self generate, such currencies, whereas those states whose
currencies are soft are always at risk of scarcity and cannot create this resource
indigenously."0 Given that private economic actors want to be paid in hard
currencies, this creates incentives even for states with hard currencies to
address these inequalities or else their exporters will not get paid, or will have
to accept soft currencies instead.
8. See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 11-16 (introducing the Difference Principle); JUST TRADE, supra
note 2, at 128-43 (discussing international application of Difference Principle).
9. See Rosa Maria Lastra, The International Monetary Fund in Historical Perspective, 3 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 507, 516 (2000) (Fund resources are finite hence their use is subject to oversight). While it is true
that countries whose currencies are hard could in theory print more money, it is in the very nature of hard
currency countries that they not pursue such policies or risk the tradability of their currency. Therefore, hard
currency is in essence exhaustible even for hard currency countries.
10. 1 am setting aside for the moment the issue of whether by making better policy choices they
could harden their currency. This would not in any case deal with natural inequalities or historical
contingencies. See JUST TRADE, supra note 2, at 61 (discussing problem of "ambition" in justice theory).
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Given these facts, it is rational for states to create a market for currencies.
Through such a market, trade currencies can be made available at rates set by
the market. Such a market serves the self-interests of borrowers and lenders
alike. Lending states put their hard currencies to work in the satisfaction of
trade debt owed to their own producers. This generates export volumes and
future economic opportunities for themselves, as well as contributing to
stability in foreign relations through support for other states' commercial
activities. Borrowing states have access to needed goods and services through
hard currency supplies they could not generate domestically.
However, due to the same kinds of natural and social inequalities which
affect a state's capacity to create or generate a supply of hard currency, not all
states can afford to borrow needed hard currencies on commercial terms in the
private market. For this sort of reason, it is also rational for states to create an
institution such as the Fund, which is institutionally oriented to meet the
specific currency lending needs of less wealthy states, and can lend on other
than commercial terms.
How does justice come in? The key normative implication of Justice as
Fairness for hard currency lending is that states do not in a simple, linear sense
deserve their relative supply of hard currency, insofar as it is a product, in part,
of natural inequalities which are morally arbitrary and compounded by social
inequalities." This means that states cannot be presumed to be entitled to their
particular supply of hard currency, and that resulting inequalities in the
distribution of hard currency must bejustified. States and the social institutions
they create, such as the Fund, must therefore attend to the justice implications
of their operations and policies with respect to hard currencies.
What might these justice implications be? That will depend on the
particular theory of justice employed. Here, using Justice as Fairness and
applying the Difference Principle to the Fund's role as manager of international
currency reserves, we can derive the following basic principle of global
distributive justice as it affects the work of the Fund:
(I). In order to justify inequalities in the distribution of trade
currencies, states must ensure that access to trade currencies is
structured so as to benefit the least advantaged.12
In other words, in order for the distributions of a social institution, such as the
Fund, to play any role injustifying inequalities, these distributions must benefit
11. Here we again face and defer the problem of ambition-sensitivity, namely how to account for
the fact that good social policies contribute to the hardness of a particular currency. See JUST TRADE, supra




the least advantaged states. It does not mean the distribution must necessarily
go to the least advantaged states, but it must benefit them. Thus, the Fund can
play an important role in states' efforts to justify inequalities in the global
financial system, depending on its policies. How does the Fund look from this
perspective?
I1. THE FUND AND OPERATIONALIZING JUSTICE
A. The Fund's Basic Mission
The Fund's very existence and basic mission play a significant normative
role in justifying wealthy states' abundance of trade currencies. By putting
hard currency to work on near-commercial terms in the economies of states
without adequate indigenous supplies of such currencies, the Fund is conferring
a benefit on less advantaged states. 3 Therefore, in its basic mission and role,
the Fund is fulfilling an important element of global justice.
However, the demand for hard currency exceeds currency-poor states'
ability to pay commercial rates, so if the only access to hard currency was
through private banks at commercial rates, economic opportunities would go
unrealized. 4 Moreover, whenever there is a general economic crisis or a
country-specific crisis, it is much harder for certain states to generate or borrow
needed hard currencies. This brings us to the issue of the terms on which the
Fund makes hard currency available.
B. Terms ofAccess to Fund Facilities
The Fund offers two basic types of facilities: "regular" or non-
concessional facilities, such as Stand-by Arrangements, which are not in fact
loans but purchase and repurchase agreements offered on near-market terms;' 5
and concessional facilities, which are truly trade currency loans to developing
countries.16 The Fund's current concessional facilities consist of the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGFs), which replaced the earlier Structural
13. JOHN W. HEAD, THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS: AN EVALUATION
OF CRITICISMS LEVELED AT THE IMF, THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS, AND THE WTO 95-96
(2005) (documenting the considerable wealth transfers which Fund facilities have effected for the benefit of
the least developed members).
14. Exporting states would lose sales, importing states much-needed goods and services, and less
advantaged states would be tempted to employ currency controls, devaluations, etc., destabilizing the
international monetary system to the detriment of all.
15. See HEAD, supra note 12, at 24 (describing operation of SBA and EFF purchase/repurchase
obligations).
16. See Lastra, supra note 9, at 517-18.
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Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and Enhanced SAPs, and charge only 0.5%
interest per year.m7
In addition to hard currencies being a social resource, the terms of access
to such currencies through each facility are themselves a social resource. In
other words, the terms on which the Fund makes its currencies available
through regular facilities (preferential rates), and the terms on which the Fund
makes its currencies available through concessional facilities (concessional
rates) are themselves a further socially-produced, and socially allocated,
resource.
Just as a system of purely free trade is not enough to benefit the least
advantaged states due to the facts of inequality (hence the WTO's Special &
Differential Treatment (S&D) policies), 8 so, too, in hard currency lending a
system of pure private market currency transactions, or even a blended system
of private bank commercial currency transactions and Fund preferential
lending, would not be enough. Because developing countries have limited
domestically generated supplies of hard currency and limited resources to
borrow such currencies, they cannot get enough through these avenues,
meaning that the overall inequality in currency supplies will not work to their
advantage.
In terms of the International Difference Principle, this suggests the
following corollary to the principle derived above:
(II). In order that access to trade currencies benefit the least
advantaged, states must offer concessional access to development
capital."
The PRGFs, are in the balance-of-payments lending context, the structural
analog to S&D in the trade setting-concessional access to hard currencies as
a tool for justifying inequality. They represent that specific aspect of the Fund
which directly addresses the inequality in the distribution of hard currencies
from the perspective of the least advantaged.
In terms of resource commitments the Fund currently emphasizes its
regular facility lending, with PRGF lending a small and underutilized portion
17. See BAHRAM GHAZI, THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND THE QUESTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 13(2005). One commentator suggests that the category ofconcessional facilities also includes special
facilities such as the oil facility, accelerated procedures such as the emergency financing mechanism, and
exceptional facilities such as the supplemental reserve facility and contingent credit line for sudden and
disruptive events. See Lastra supra note 9, at 519-20. 1 will follow the narrower approach and restrict my
attention to the PRGFs since the rest charge higher, near-market rates.




of its portfolio.2 Justice as Fairness requires us to evaluate this scheme with
reference to our normative touchstone, namely, is this prioritization benefiting
the least advantaged? The PRGF program would seem to have the most
potential forjustifying inequalities in hard currencies by directly making them
work for the benefit of the least advantaged. However, despite the evident
inequality in the global distribution of hard currency and in the borrowing
power of states, most of the Fund's activities nevertheless involve preferential
and not concessional lending.21
As a function of states' responsibility for global justice, it is part of the
Fund's mandate to see that this most valuable social good-access to trade
currencies-in fact operates so as to benefit the least advantaged. How does
the Fund's shift to crisis prevention look from this perspective?
C. Crisis Prevention: Normative Implications
As I am in the early stages of this project, I must, in this section be
suggestive rather than definitive. Nevertheless, looking through the lens of
global justice theory, one can see that the proposed shift in Fund priorities does
raise several fundamental questions. Most basically, we must ask what effect
this shift will have on current Fund priorities with respect to allocation of Fund
resources, and in particular on the balance of concessional versus preferential
lending. Our normative criterion is whether this shift to crisis prevention
efforts is calculated to benefit the least advantaged states. This involves a
determination as to how this shift alters which states get Fund resources and
Fund attention.
It appears as if the shift to crisis prevention will involve a shift away from
an emphasis on existing programs, such as the PRGF, which benefit the least
advantaged, rather than an effort to ensure the least advantaged make full use
of programs such as the PRGF. To take one example, it has been proposed that
the Fund offer a new crisis prevention facility, the Reserve Augmentation Line
(RAL).22 The current form of the proposal to create a RAL suggests that the
target states are intermediate states, neither so strong in both resources and
policies as to be largely self-sufficient in terms of trade currencies, nor so weak
20. International Monetary Fund [IMF], Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial
Year EndedApril30, 2006, Appendix 11, (2006), http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/ar.2006/eng/index.htm
(last visited March 22, 2008).
21. See Charles Abugre, Still Sapping the Poor: A Critique of IMF Poverty Reduction Strategies,
WORLD DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT, June 2000, http://www.wdm.org.uk/resources/reports/debt/stillsapping
thepoorO 1062000.pdf(last visited Mar. 22, 2008) (discussing declining economic conditions and increasingly
inequitable distribution of wealth in numerous countries despite Fund activity).
22. See Fried & Haley, supra note 1, at 14-15.
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that they constitute the less developed Fund clients.23 This means that by
definition, the RAL will not itself be available to benefit the least advantaged
states. Therefore, by itself the creation of the RAL does nothing to address the
immediate needs of the least advantaged, or justify inequalities in the global
financial system. Moreover, if it is to be successful, the RAL will require
massive amounts of capital.24 Thus, if the Fund implements the RAL, it will
have created a new facility for preferential lending, one which will require
tremendous resources if it is to be successful. This will tilt the overall balance
of the Fund's lending away from concessional lending.
This does not mean by itself, however, that the RAL is unfair. Rather, it
means we must examine whether offering the RAL to intermediate states will
in some way benefit the least advantaged states in a secondary manner. The
fairness of the RAL depends upon any consequential benefits to least developed
countries; absent such benefits, it shifts the system as a whole further away
from basic fairness.
There are two important ways in which the RAL might benefit the least
advantaged states, and therefore to that extent be consistent with Justice as
Fairness. First, to the extent that such intermediate states constitute important
export markets for less developed states, preventing a crisis among such states
preserves vital export opportunities for less developed states, which is of course
a benefit. Second, and perhaps most importantly, by helping to avert a local,
regional or global financial crisis (assuming the Fund proposals can do so), the
shift helps the least developed countries that would be affected by such a crisis,
since they are generally the states least able to weather such crises on their
own.
25
Insofar as the shift to crisis prevention can offer such stability, benefits
indirectly go to least advantaged states. Then this shift may, to this extent be
normatively justifiable and consistent with global financial justice. Neverthe-
less, such a second order benefit must be balanced against any losses or
reductions in support which least advantaged states might experience from a
reorientation in Fund priorities, particularly if, as has been recommended, such
a reorientation include a reduction in PRGF style lending. 6
23. See generally IMF, Further Consideration of a New Liquidity Instrument for Market Access
Countries-Design Issues, (Feb. 13, 2007), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2007/021307.pdf (last
visited Mar. 22, 2008) (reviewing RAL proposal).
24. See Fried & Haley, supra note 1, at 14-15.
25. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
26. External Review Committee, Report of the External Review Committee on Band Fund-
Collaboration: Final Report, at 43-45 (Feb. 2007) (recommending reduction in IMF long-term financing




It seems clear from even a preliminary analysis that, in discharging its
basic function, the IMF is offering a service which helps inequalities in hard
currency distributions work to the benefit of the least advantaged. The Fund's
preferential lending facilities further reinforce this contribution towards global
financial justice. However, it is critical that, in shifting from crisis resolution
to crisis prevention, the basic normative orientation suggested by Justice as
Fairness not be lost.
The question of whether least advantages states benefit more from direct
PRGF-style lending than they would from the crisis prevention benefits of a
reoriented Fund is of course partly an empirical question. One benefit of a
normative analysis, such as the present study, is to suggest that such research
must be undertaken in order to formulate any decisions on Fund priorities, so
as not to move the international financial system further away from basic
fairness.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The scholarship on conventional disarmament, especially vis-A-vis the
trade in conventional weapons, is surprisingly scarce. Whether the vacuum in
the literature results from a focus on nuclear proliferation (or for that matter, on
weapons of mass destruction), or alternatively, whether scholars chose to
emphasize the problem of small arms and light weapons, the reality remains:
on the eve of the official negotiations on an arms trade treaty, it is disappointing
to see how little attention academic circles have paid to the topic. In this paper,
I rely on the international relations literature on legalization and regime design
to analyze the international trade on conventional weapons as an issue area, and
the regulatory environment within which the relevant actors interact.
As we approach the moment to launch the official negotiation of an arms
trade treaty, it is important to refine our understanding of the regime that has
been in place since 1992, in light of lessons learned from other negotiations.
* Lecturer, International Relations Program, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank
Michael Cassandra, Araceli Garcia, David Gold, Stephanie Neuman, and Jandyr Santos for comments on an
earlier draft of the paper.
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Without denying the role of prior arms control efforts, this paper focuses on the
process that initiated with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/36
[L] of 9 December 1991.1 This document establishes a non-legally binding
obligation whereby states agree to report on their international trade in
conventional weapons to the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms.
The paper is organized as follows: section two reviews assessments of the
current regime; section three discusses several academic literatures that can
shed light on treaty negotiation, in particular, international law and international
relations; section four studies the empirical legacy of the UN Register in light
of this literature; section five concentrates on the prospects of an arms trade
treaty; and section six offers concluding remarks.
II. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REGISTER
The UN Register began to operate in 1992, the first year for which official
information on arms transfers is available.3 As of 2006, 172 states have
submitted information at least once.4 The UN Register covers seven categories
of weapons: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery
systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles (as well as
missile-launchers).5 The launching of the UN Register met with a great deal of
expectation within various policy circles. As time went on, some of the initial
optimism had waned. In one of the first assessments of the institution, Siemon
T. Wezeman supports an overhaul of the UN Register.6 For him, the institution
so far has succeeded in establishing a global norm for transparency in arms
transfers, but failed in its more ambitious objectives:
1. G.A. Res. 46/36[L], U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/36 (Dec. 6, 1991). Richard Betts refers to the
Brussels Act of 1890 as the first multilateral effort to regulate the international trade in conventional arms.
Richard K. Betts, The Tragicomedy ofArms Trade Control, 5 INT'L SEC. 80, 83 (Summer 1980). In 1919,
twenty-three states negotiated the Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, which
never entered in effect. Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, 15 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 297, 297 (1921) (not entered into force) [hereinafter Convention]. More recently, states negotiated the
non-binding 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement. See generally Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, July 11, 1996, http://www.wassenaar.org/
docs/LE96.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
2. G.A. Res. 46/36[L), U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/36 (Dec. 6, 1991).
3. U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS [UNODA], UNITED NATIONS REGISTER OF
CONVENTIONAL ARMS: PATTERN OF REPORTING BY STATES 1992-2006 2, available at
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register-files/Registerdatabookletl992-2005.doc (last visited Mar. 22,2008).
4. Id.
5. Id. at5.
6. Siemon T. Wezeman, The Future ofthe United Nations Register of ConventionalArms, SIPRI,
at 24, August 2003, http://bokssipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP04.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
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[T]he UN Register has performed worse than the great majority of...
other initiatives both in terms of reaching its targets, and of capacity
for self-reform and adaptation. After its initial success in securing
near universal acceptance of the principle of transparency in arma-
ments, it failed to secure comprehensive participation and consistent
observance; to harvest genuinely useful data; to analyse it; or to
achieve practical follow-up in terms of identifying and correcting
potentially destabilizing build-ups of arms.'
Stephanie G. Neuman offers a more balanced view of the arms control
initiative Writing in the aftermath of the 1991 United Nations Conference on
the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the
coming into force of the UN Register in 1992, she analyses the historical
circumstances that favorably impact the notion of arms control.9 Among those,
the end of the Cold War features quite prominently, especially if we consider
government-to-government arms transfers.'° In her view, the economic context
and the move toward democratization in various countries constitute another set
of positive forces:
In sum, we are witnessing a structural form of conventional arms
control caused by economic factors that makes arms-control initia-
tives potentially more attractive to recipients and suppliers. In
response to the deflating arms trade, some supplier states have found
it possible to initiate more restrictive arms export policies without
paying a political price domestically. Many governments find them-
selves freer to respond to advocates for arms control in a situation in
which military industries, weakened by falling orders and their own
declining numbers, are able to fight less fiercely for permissive export
legislation."
Nevertheless, the picture is not entirely optimistic. Neuman points to
technological advances and to the increased mobility of former scientists and
arms experts as a cause for concern.'2 In addition, the rise in the illicit trade
7. Id. at3.
8. Stephanie G. Neuman, Controlling the Arms Trade: Idealistic Dream orRealpolitik?, 16(No.
3) WASH. Q. 53 (1993), reprinted in WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IN THE 1990S 327-42 (Brad Roberts ed.,
1989).
9. See id.
10. Stephanie G. Neuman, The Arms Trade, Military Assistance, and Recent Wars: Change and
Continuity, 541 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 47, 54 (1995).
11. Neuman, supra note 8, at 335.
12. Neuman, supra note 8, at 339.
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and the challenges that effective monitoring presents 3 contribute to a skeptical
view of the prospects for the commitments embedded in the UN Register. In
retrospect, Neuman's preoccupation was not unfounded. The 2003 assessment
sponsored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
rebuts the favorable economic context thesis and offers a rather pessimistic
view of the future for market constraints on the arms trade.' 4
In contrast to Wezeman's view, most recently, the Group of Governmental
Experts (GGE) expresses a rather positive attitude in relation to the UN
Register and the prospects for further developments. 5
The overall optimistic tone of the 2003 Report is balanced by concerns
with inconsistency on reporting by states, which the Report suggests may be
attributed to international security problems. 6 There is an emphasis on the goal
of universal membership, which reinforces the role of "nil" reports.' 7
Confidence building and transparency depend on universality and the practice
of submitting "nil" reports contribute to both. 8 The report acknowledges the
GGE discussion of the small arms and light weapons issue." To that end,
revising category 11120 of weapons currently covered by Resolution 46/36 [L]
could be an effective mechanism to extend the reach of the UN Register over
some light weapons. The 2003 GGE appears to struggle with divergent
positions on the expansion proposal, and ultimately recommends lowering the
range threshold from 100mm to 75mm.2' This is an important development
because it contemplates the inclusion of small arms and light weapons under the
UN Register. Concurrently, the GGE welcomes member-states' voluntary sub-
mission of data on small arms and light weapons and encourages the initiative.22
Three years later, the GGE reevaluated the performance of the UN
Register. The 2006 Report offers a positive assessment but acknowledges that
13. Neuman, supra note 8, at 341-42.
14. Wezeman, supra note 6, at 24.
15. The Secretary-General, Report on the Continuing Operation of the U.N. Register of
Conventional Arms and its Further Development, 2, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/58/274
(Aug. 13, 2003) [Hereinafter 2003 Report]; The Secretary-General, Report on the Continuing Operation of
the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms and its Further Development, 2, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/61/261 (Aug. 15, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Report].
16. 2003 Report, supra note 15, at 17.
17. See id. at 19-20.
18. Id. at 19.
19. Id. at 30.
20. Category I1 nowadays comprises 75mm and above large-caliber artillery systems. Id. at 28.
21. 2003 Report, supra note 15, at 28.
22. 2003 Report, supra note 15, at 33-34. This pronouncement was key in institutionalizing formal
reporting mechanisms on small arms and light weapons under the UN Register. Nowadays, member-states
dispose of forms designed exclusively for this category, which was never a part of Resolution 46/36[L].
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the institution has not addressed states' concerns in certain parts of the world
effectively.23 Specifically, the scope of the UN Register continues to exclude
small arms and light weapons, except for voluntary and erratic submissions
from state members. 24 An important development in the 2006 Report dealt with
the institutionalization of an eighth category of covered weapons to encompass
small arms and light weapons, even if the obligation to report would have a
differentiated character when compared to reporting on the existing seven
categories. 25 The absence of consensus on the matter prevented uniformity in
reporting instruments for such weapons.
Given the views in the literature and the contrastingly optimistic outlook
prevalent among the Group of Governmental Experts, 26 it is important to
analyze the issue within the rigor of recent international relations scholarship.
Research on international agreements and the phenomenon of legalization in
world politics has enhanced our understanding of states behavior within an
increasingly institutionalized society of nations. International relations theory
has finally moved beyond the question of whether international institutions
matter to the pressing inquiry as to how they matter.
III. DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE OF AN ARMS CONTROL REGIME
In 2000 and 2001, two groups of scholars made a significant contribution
to our understanding of international agreements along the lines of legalization
and design, respectively. 27 In both instances, researchers analyze subjects that
have been historically within the realm of international legal scholarship
through political science lenses. Common to their initiatives is a set of
theoretical understandings and assumptions. First, institutions matter. These
two groups of scholars believe that institutions reflect states' capabilities,
thereby they are created as a means to pursue state interest. Second, in the
pursuit of their self-interest, states act as rational decision-makers. They
process information related to preferences and attempt to maximize benefits in
a strategic context. While the first group of scholars focuses on the movement
toward the legalization in international politics, the second concentrates on
certain features that are prominent within international agreements. The two
23. 2006 Report, supra note 15, at 35.
24. Id. at 15-16.
25. Id. at 26-27.
26. See generally 2003 Report, supra note 15; 2006 Report, supra note 15.
27. See generally Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 (No.
3) LNT'L ORG. 385 (2000); Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design ofInternational Institutions, 55
(No. 4) INT'L ORG. 761 (2001); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 (No. 2) INT'L ORG. 217 (2000).
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literatures have an important contribution for a prospective arms trade treaty
that I articulate in the next paragraphs.
Goldstein et al., introduce a journal issue dedicated to the study of
legalization as an important phenomenon in international politics.28 They
provide a definition of legalization and caution against any valuejudgment with
respect to the superiority of one form of legalization over another (for example,
is hard law better than soft law?). 29 Their goal is to better understand different
forms of legalization and, in the process, to offer guidance to individuals
negotiating or revising international regulatory arrangements. For the authors,
legalization encompasses three aspects: obligation, or the degree to which
commitments are legally binding; precision, or the degree to which the content
of commitments clearly identifies the conduct that is required, authorized, or
proscribed; and delegation, or the degree to which the interpretation, the
monitoring, and/or the implementation of commitments is transferred to a third
party.3° Hard law corresponds to high levels of obligation, precision, and
delegation.3 In contrast, soft law stands for institutional arrangements where
low levels of obligation, precision, and delegation dominate.32  The
phenomenon of legalization has been a trademark of the twentieth-century, but
the expansion itself remains uneven. For example, the authors acknowledge
that "major arms control treaties are stalled by domestic political opposition."33
One goal of this research agenda is to identify the characteristics of a particular
issue area in order to devise the form of legalization that best suits the problem.
It is with this goal in mind that I proceed from here.
Abbott and Snidal propose a set of variables that are expected to influence
states' choice for soft law or hard law.34 Five among those are directly relevant
to the arms trade issue: credibility problems with respect to commitments,
transaction costs, sovereignty costs, uncertainty, and discount rates.35 By
reviewing the hypothesized relationships between each one of these variables
and the occurrence of hard law, this paper unveils some of the obstacles that the
pursuit of further legalization-through the negotiation of an arms trade
treaty-will encounter.
28. Goldstein et al., supra note 27, at 387.
29. Id. at 387-88.
30. Id. at 387.
31. Id. at 396.
32. Id. at 394. The authors treat hard law and soft law as ideal types. It is common to encounter
norms that vary within a spectrum of legalization, for example an agreement that incorporates high levels of
obligation and precision, but provides for no delegation. Goldstein et al., supra note 27, at 394.
33. Id. at 386.
34. Kenneth W. Abbott& Duncan Snidal, HardandSoft Law in International Governance, 54 (No.
3) INT'L ORG. 421, 423 (2000).
35. Id. at 429.
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Credibility problems with respect to commitments arise in situations where
states negotiate agreements which have fewer chances of generating
compliance. This is often the case "when the benefits of cooperation are great
but the potential for opportunism and its costs are high. 36 Here, recourse to
hard law rewards compliance by increasing the costs associated with reneging
on commitments. An arms trade treaty is likely to embed incentives to defect
from a cooperative arrangement. States often like to have access to information
on other states' arms trade transactions better than they like to share data on
their own dealings in weapons. This preference results from the Prisoner's
Dilemma structure of incentives associated with the arms trade. The problem
is aggravated by the understanding that states will think alike and defect from
the cooperative arrangement in large numbers, ultimately compromising the
overall goal of transparency. The choice for hard law will counter the trend
toward defection, thereby enhancing the credibility of commitments. Also
adding to the advantages of hard law, in face of commitment problems, is the
fact that noncompliance may be difficult to detect. Here, the delegation aspect
of hard agreements can empower institutions to monitor behavior. An arms
trade treaty will possibly lead to more reporting (formal aspect) and less
underreporting (substantive aspect), especially if the treaty designates a
dedicated bureaucracy to oversee implementation.
Transaction costs refer to the efforts associated with the management and
implementation of international agreements. More specifically, the managerial
process encompasses the application and elaboration of the rules, while
implementation deals with monitoring, enforcement, and dispute settlement.
Abbott and Snidal suggest that agreements that take the form of hard law entail
lower transaction costs because they operate within a predictable institutional
context.3 7 For example, disputes born out of hard legal agreements are
governed by specialized procedures and are usually resolved through legal
discourse. It follows that non-legal or illegal means to settle differences, such
as reprisal and unilateral retaliation, are not tolerated. Once more, the
delegation aspect of hard legalization takes a prominent role, because short of
dispute settlement mechanisms, an arms trade treaty could very well transfer
powers to manage and to implement the agreement. Indeed, managerial
authority can even work to update the terms of the treaty in order to adapt the
language to new challenges and developments.38
36. Id.
37. Id. at 436.
38. A useful analogy is the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, which has interpreted
the covered agreements in a somewhat extensive manner, arguably creating new law.
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Sovereignty costs, together with uncertainty and variations in states'
discount rates make up what Abbott and Snidal refer to as contracting costs. 39
While hard legalization is expected to reduce post-agreement costs (or
transaction costs), soft law does arguably better at reducing contracting costs-
or the costs associated with the negotiation of an agreement in the first place.40
Of concern here is the characterization of the arms trade as an issue area where
high contracting costs prevail. Sovereignty costs are high because conventional
arms holdings remain an important aspect for the national security of states.
Thereby, transparency on arms trade may be perceived as jeopardizing states'
national security interests. Uncertainty is also high in this realm, mainly
because power imbalances among states are constantly shifting. For this
reason, transparency today may be acceptable, given a specific context of
relative power, but it may become cumbersome once this balance of power is
upset. Finally, states care about the future in quite distinct ways (they have
different discount rates). In particular, democracies tend to value the future
more than non-democracies; nevertheless, an effective instrument should be as
inclusive as possible. If states negotiate an arms trade treaty through hard law,
pursuant to the General Assembly Resolution 61/8941 mandate, how can we
mitigate the influence of contracting costs?
Research by the second group of scholars mentioned above can shed light
on the contracting costs problem. Koremenos et al., propose that five aspects
of treaty design are prominent among the 34,000 plus international agreements
registered with the United Nations between 1946 and 1986: membership,
scope, centralization, control, and flexibility.42 Membership indicates the total
number of states that the agreement seeks to include as participants; scope
refers to the number and breadth of issues contemplated by the agreement;
centralization stands for whether the agreement establishes an institution
charged with monitoring, interpreting, and possibly adjudicating related
matters; control refers to the decision-making rules that will govern imple-
mentation of the agreement; and flexibility deals with whether the agreement
leaves room for exceptional clauses, such as reservations, declarations, and
understandings. 43 Flexibility can also involve the use of escape clauses, with-
drawal clauses and limits on agreement duration.' These five characteristics
vary from treaty to treaty, contingent upon the nature of the issue area. In this
paper I chose to focus on flexibility, leaving the analysis of the other four
39. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 34, at 436.
40. 1d. at 434.
41. G.A. Res. 61/89, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/89 (Dec. 18, 2006).
42. Koremenos et al., supra note 27, at 763.
43. Id. at 770-73.
44. Id. at 773.
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design elements (i.e., membership, scope, centralization, and control) for a later
moment in time.
With respect to flexibility, there are four aspects of international politics
that this literature suggests will influence how flexible agreements are.45
Uncertainty and distribution problems are of special interest in the context of
an arms trade treaty,46 given the discussion above on the challenges to negotiate
hard law agreements in the presence of high contracting costs. Distribution
problems associated with an arms trade treaty may involve specification of
weapons, the level of detail required of reported weapons, and the like. The
distribution problem arises because there are multiple institutional arrange-
ments and states have different preferences in regards to each combination.
Flexibility can enable distinct combinations to co-exist, thereby maximizing the
depth of the commitments made by states.4 7 On that note, flexibility can be said
to avoid establishing a commitment that reflects the lowest possible common
denominator.48
Flexibility can also mitigate contracting costs associated with uncertainty.
Here, tools such as the imposition of limits on agreement duration, escape
clauses, and withdrawal clauses may facilitate agreement where otherwise
states see little room for compromise. 49 Limits on agreement duration allow
states to revisit the terms of the agreement periodically in order to adjust for
new circumstances. The successive rounds of negotiation under the GATT/
WTO5" agreements constitute an example of flexibility through limits on
duration."' Koremenos finds significant statistical evidence for the effects of
uncertainty on the duration of international agreements: "[a]ll else equal,
45. Id. at 771-73.
46. Id. at 773. The other two aspects, discussed in the literature as independent variables, are
enforcement problems and number of actors (number of actors refers to all entities that have an interest in
the issue, whether or not they are taking part in the negotiations or are a party to the agreement). Koremenos
et al., supra note 27, at 773.
47. Gilligan challenges the common belief that there is a "broader v. deeper" tradeoff inherent to
the negotiation of international multilateral agreements. Michael J. Gilligan, Is There a Broader-Deeper
Trade-offin International Multilateral Agreements?, 58 (No. 3) INT'L ORG. 459,460 (2004). He proposes
a formal model where states can set policy at different levels, thereby relaxing the single policy assumption.
In these cases, broad membership can be found to promote even deeper cooperation. Id. at 462.
48. This literature proposes three conjectures bearing on the flexibility aspect of international
agreements: 1) flexibility increases with uncertainty (uncertainty about the state of the world); 2) flexibility
increases with the severity of the distribution problem; 3) flexibility decreases with number. Koremenos et
al., supra note 27, at 793-94.
49. Id. at 773.
50. World Trade Organization/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
51. Koremenos et al., supra note 27, at 773.
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agreements with high levels of uncertainty are about 44.0% more likely to be
finite than are agreements with low levels of uncertainty.
5 2
With respect to an arms trade treaty, the flexibility story is not all good
news. In fact, another hypothesis that is confirmed by Koremenos research
deals with the number of participants. As the number of participants increases,
renegotiation costs also increase and, as a consequence, the probability of a
finite agreement decreases. 3 Thus, in a hypothetical arms trade treaty the
incidence of uncertainty and of a large number of participants is pulling the
flexibility solution in two different directions.
Unfortunately, research on flexibility tools that take the form of escape
clauses is not abundant. Rosendorff and Milner provide a detailed analysis of
the role of escape clauses in multilateral trade agreements, such as the
GATT/WTO 4 Because trade liberalization benefits are usually excludable, not
all the rationale behind their formal model applies to the arms trade issue,
where the benefits associated with disarmament are generally non-excludable.
With that caveat in mind, a key feature of escape clauses is that they are
costly.5 The benefits from suspending the terms of an agreement during a time
period must be accompanied by a penalty which the "escaping" state agrees to
ex ante, so that in theory, "policymakers should attempt to design efficient
escape clauses; they should act so that the incentive to exercise relief is
balanced with the gains from cooperation."56 The authors suggest that escape
clauses may be especially beneficial to democracies, " given the distinct role
that domestic constituencies play in politics, while discounting the need for
flexibility arrangements of this kind in arms control agreements. With respect
to the latter, disarmament through the reduction of stockpiles (nuclear and non-
nuclear) is said to be of limited interest to constituents outside of the
security/military circles. 8
In conclusion, our limited understanding of escape clauses suggests that
they may be useful as an incentive for democracies, who will encounter
obstacles in the idea of a legally binding treaty. Otherwise, it is unclear
whether escape clauses or limits on duration can effectively counter the
uncertainties specific to the arms trade issue. In the next section, I explain why
52. Barbara Koremenos, Contracting AroundInternational Uncertainty, 99 (No. 4) AM. POL. SC.
REv. 549, 558 (2005).
53. Id. at 557 n.22.
54. See generally B. Peter Rosendorff& Helen Milner, The OptimalDesign ofInternational Trade
Institutions: Uncertainty andEscape, 55 (No. 4) INT'L ORG. 829 (2001).
55. Id. at 847.
56. Id. at 835.
57. Id. at 843.
58. Id. at 845.
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democracies are expected to resist a legally binding treaty in light of the
literature on legalization of world politics.
IV. THE UN REGISTER: FEATURES AND EXPECTATIONS
According to the discussion of legalization offered in the literature, the UN
Register resulted from a soft legal document, wherein the levels of obligation,
precision, and delegation are relatively low.59 With respect to the level of
obligation, states are encouraged to report on arms transfers but nevertheless
have the legal prerogative not to do so, given the common understanding that
General Assembly Resolutions are not legally binding." The analysis of the
levels of precision and delegation presents a more mixed picture. In fact, the
language of Resolution 46/36 [L] clearly lists the seven categories of equipment
that states are requested to report to the UN Register despite critics' demands
for more precise definitions of terms and more detailed descriptions of reported
weapons." Moreover, a definition of arms "exports and imports" is offered as
well as the start date and other arrangements pertaining to the logistics of the
UN Register.62 Pursuant to the reports submitted to the General Assembly by
the Group of Governmental Experts, further refinements on the categories of
weapons covered were offered. 63 Finally, regarding the level of delegation, the
very institutionalization of an arms register entails a measure of monitoring and
interpretation (implementation). Surely, the other two aspects of delegation,
namely enforcement and adjudication, are absent. As states move toward the
negotiation of an arms trade treaty, advances in the level of legalization will be
contingent upon the existence of adequate solutions for some of the problems
that prevented states from going beyond the UN Register regime in the first
place. It is important to decompose the document's legal structure in order to
enhance our understanding of states strategic positions toward the issue. To
that end, I next review some of the predictions of the literature in light of the
empirical record of the UN Register from 1992 to 2006.
A. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law
Goldsmith and Posner analyze states' choices with respect to the legal
form that international commitments assume.' In their view, the characteristics
59. Goldstein et al., supra note 27, at 394.
60. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEPHEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS,
ACTORS, PROCESS 187 (2d ed. 2006).
61. Wezeman, supra note 6, at 7-8.
62. G.A. Res. 46/36[L], U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/36 (Dec. 6, 1991), at 75-76.
63. 2003 Report, supra note 15, at 33; 2006 Report, supra note 15, at 26.
64. See generally JACK L GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005).
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of a particular issue, given states' interests and capabilities, determines whether
regulation will be governed by soft law or hard law, and whether states will
choose to negotiate treaties or to sponsor the development of a norm of
customary international law.65 In a nutshell, because negotiation is costly,
unless states have specific reasons to enter into treaties (in the form of hard or
soft law), they will choose to regulate behavior through customary international
law. What then is the rationale behind the negotiation of international commit-
ments like the one called for under Resolution 46/36 [L]? For Goldsmith and
Posner, the logic involves two steps: first, states feel the need to coordinate
behavior, and second, they see value in creating compliance-enhancing
mechanisms.66
This two-step logic derives from Goldsmith and Posner's understanding
of state behavior as strategic and self-interested.67 For them, interactions among
states follow four identifiable patterns: coincidence of interest, coercion,
coordination, and cooperation.68 Of relevance to the UN Register are the last
two, wherein coordination can be equated to instances where states have a
common interest but still need to agree on the path toward that outcome.
Situations that involve cooperation are more complex, because they present
states with high benefits associated with cooperation but even higher profits
associated with defection, when other states remain cooperative. This is the
classic Prisoner's Dilemma game. Goldsmith and Posner go further to suggest
that situations involving repeated bilateral instances of cooperation can lead to
compliance,69 which is clearly not the case of the UN Register.
If on one hand the establishment of the UN Register resolves the coordina-
tion problem (step 1)-on the other hand, a legally binding document would not
counter the incentives to defect that are inherent to the arms trade issue (step
2)--because this is by definition a multilateral rather than a bilateral case. By
negotiating a hard law document, states would have increased the costs asso-
ciated with defection for no reason.7" It appears that Goldsmith and Posner's
model would predict the establishment of the UN Register as we know it today.
Nevertheless, there are countless multilateral treaties that incorporate legally
binding commitments. It is the rationale behind these documents that will eventu-
ally shed some light on the prospects of a legally binding arms trade treaty.
65. Id. at 3. The authors prefer the term "nonlegal agreements" when referring to soft law. Id. at
81.
66. Id. at 87.
67. Id. at 225.
68. Id.
69. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 64, at 88.
70. 1 assume that non-compliance with a legally binding document brings more damage to state
reputation than defection from soft law.
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There are three aspects to (hard) multilateral treaties that deserve attention.
Firstly, once states agree on a set of treaty provisions, renegotiation is costly.
Especially when dealing with treaties that aim at universal membership, states
hesitate to re-open the document for fear that a Pandora Box may ensue.
Secondly, states may choose the hard law option in order to engage domestic
audience concerns more directly, through the ratification process. Finally,
states may choose the hard law venue as a mechanism to delay commitment,
because soft legal documents are a lot easier to negotiate. Regarding the latter,
as time passes, the status quo may become more receptive of a given state's
preferred propositions. As the negotiation toward a legally binding treaty is
launched, it is important to maximize the role of incentives that work to
promote harder legal commitments.
B. Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic
Delegation in Postwar Europe
One example relating to the origins of (hard) multilateral regimes is
discussed in Moravcsik, who analyzes the birth of the European human rights
framework to reveal the puzzling disinterest that long-standing European
democracies in the 1950s had in the creation of a strong legal instrument.7
Rather, it was the several newly established democracies who rallied behind the
idea of a treaty which would contemplate the right to individual petition and
empower ajudicial body to enact binding rulings." The solution to this puzzle
carries applications to the negotiation under analysis here, as I articulate next.
Moravcsik sets out to analyze states' support for the creation of a human
rights regime in Europe after World War U." His research seeks to identify
patterns of support/opposition among different regime types, given the
encroachments that international human rights law present for sovereign
nations.74 To that end, European countries are classified into three categories:
democracies, newly established democracies, and non-democracies (or unstable
democracies).7 5 Subsequently, their attitude toward a hard legal option-a
convention on human rights that included the right to individual petition and
compulsory jurisdiction-is analyzed.76 The results confirm Moravcsik's
hypothesis that newly established democracies were the main force to support
a harder document, whereas all European democracies at that time, with the
71. Moravcsik, supra note 27, at 232.
72. Id.
73. See generally Moravcsik, supra note 27.
74. Id. at 219-220.
75. Id. at 23 1-33.
76. Id. at 230-31.
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exception of Belgium, opposed inclusion of the right to individual petition as
well as compulsory jurisdiction.77
From a theoretical standpoint, Moravcsik proposes that newly established
democracies have an incentive to "lock in" any gains from their recent
experience with democratization.78 For fully established democracies, this
concern is not prominent, whereas for non-democracies it runs counter to their
goals of political survival.7 9 Moravcsik suggests that this theoretical framework
and empirical findings may shed light on the dynamics of other international
regimes." Based on the discussion offered in the article, I extend the
framework to analyze the patterns of support associated with the UN Register
in an effort to derive lessons for an arms trade treaty.
This exercise requires some adaptation of Moravcsik's framework: if on
one hand, the European Convention on Human Rights turned out to be a hard
legal document, on the other hand the UN Register remains a soft law instru-
ment. Therefore, the expectations with respect to the UN Register should be
reversed: democracies should lend greater support to the Register, while newly
established democracies will display relatively lower levels of engagement.
Consistent with Moravcsik's predictions, non-democracies (or unstable
democracies) will be the least involved.81 These expectations reflect states'
motivations regarding one of the main goals of the UN Register: to promote a
culture of transparency over the arms trade issue.
For democracies, fostering transparency does not entail an unnecessary
encroachment on their sovereignty, precisely because of the soft nature of the
obligation. There are strategic reasons that lead democracies to support the UN
Register: transparency may potentially reveal valuable information regarding
arms transfers to and from non-democracies. On the other hand, transparency
is a practice usually well known to democracies, given that domestic
constituents demand accountability as part of the democratic game. For newly
established democracies the story is slightly different, because there are no
"lock in" mechanisms to guarantee commitments to transparency in the long
77. Id. at 233 tbl.2.
78. Moravcsik, supra note 27, at 243-44.
79. Id. at 220.
80. Id.
81. Here the following disclaimer is in order: Moravcsik's research design focuses on the origins
of a particular regime-the European human rights regime. The UN Register can be interpreted as a regime
in itself, and to that end, the negotiation that led to Resolution 46/36[L] would be the subject of analysis. In
my view, the UN Register can also be understood as a step toward the formation of an arms trade regime,
whereby attitudes of states in relation to the UN Register (report or not report) work as a proxy to the
negotiation of this other-more encompassing -regime that seeks to regulate the international trade on
conventional arms. I proceed with the analysis under the assumption that Resolution 46/36[L] marks an
important step toward the goal of an arms trade treaty.
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haul; after all, this is a soft law agreement. In the absence of the benefits
associated with hard law commitments, newly established democracies only see
the costs that transparency involves-for example, the timely production and
dissemination of data on arms trade-in a context of growing domestic
demands for accountability. For non-democracies, the demand for transparency
in the arms trade is a losing proposition, because it may compromise their
strategies for political survival. These nations often attempt to maintain their
military might by keeping their actual arms capabilities secret.
The data present a number of non-democracies that have submitted reports
several times. I consider those false positives, that is, countries that actually
report for reasons other than transparency. For example, Russia, the Ukraine,
and China are among the top twenty arms exporters.8 2 The first two have
reported every year since 1992, whereas China has reported six times between
1992 and 2006.83 I argue that pressure from the marketplace and the under-
standing that the choice to report may actually be a good business strategy,
motivate these countries to comply with Resolution 46/36 [L]. A similar
explanation may account for the behavior of some non-democracies that fall
within the top twenty arms importers category. Cases such as Pakistan and
Turkey, both having reported every year since 1992, s4 can be explained by the
fact that the two countries have increasingly been under the influence of the
U.S. and the EU, respectively.
A closer look at states' reporting behavior to the UN Register between
1992 and 2006 confirms the expectations laid out above. Table 1 presents the
average score for the three categories of regime type. I calculate the scores by
counting the number of reports that states submitted during the period analyzed,
so that a score of fifteen means that a particular state reported every year,
whereas a score of zero means that no report was submitted during the same
time period. In order to categorize countries according to regime type I rely on
Freedom House's Freedom in the World classification, which proposes three
aggregate measures: "free," "partly free," and "not free." 5 Countries that are
consistently coded as "free" by Freedom House between 1972 and 2006 make
up the group of established democracies. 6 Countries that are consistently
82. STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., THE ToP-20: ARMS IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS
1977-2006, http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/output-examples.html#twenty (last visited Mar. 15,
2008).
83. See U.N. REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS, DATABASE 1996-2006, http://disarmament.
un.org/UN_REGISTER.NSF [hereinafter Register Database] (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
84. Id.
85. Arch Puddington, Freedom in Retreat: Is the Tide Turning? Findings of Freedom in the World
2008, FREEDOM HOUSE, at 3,2008, http://www.fieedomhouse.org/uploads/fiwO8launch/FIW08Overview.pdf
(last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
86. Id. at 4.
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coded as "partly free" by Freedom House represent the newly established
democracies.8 7 Countries that are "not free" correspond to the non-democracies
(or unstable democracies).88
Table 1-Average Number of Reports to the UN Register (1992-2006)89
Number of countries Average number of reports;
Reporting scores
Democracies 36 12.8
Newly established 47 9.9
democracies
Non-democracies 106 5.7
Top twenty arms 18 13.7
exporters*
Top twenty arms 20 8.7
importers**
* The majority ofthe top twenty (18) exporters consist ofdemocracies. There are two newly
established democracies (Brazil and Poland) and four non-democracies (Russia, Ukraine,
China, and North Korea).
** The majority of the top twenty importers consist of non-democracies. There are two
newly established democracies (India and South Korea) and six democracies (Israel, Spain,
the U.K., Australia, Greece, and Japan).
The results are consistent with the predictions in the literature. Newly
established democracies report less often than democracies. In fact, their
reporting score is twenty-three percent lower than that of democracies. Also
consistent with the literature, non-democracies report significantly less often
than both democracies and newly established democracies. The overall score
of non-democracies is probably inflated by false positives, such as the cases
discussed in the previous paragraphs. It is important to note that countries that
qualify as major arms exporters and importers, on average, report more often
than their counterparts in the same regime type category. This is of special
relevance for the top twenty arms importers, which consist primarily of non-
democracies. Their propensity to report is substantially higher when compared
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id.
89. STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., supra note 82; Register Database, supra note 83;
Puddington, supra note 85.
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to that of non-democracies that are not major arms importers (a score of 8.7 as
opposed to 5.7).
The balance of the UN Register is not as grim as many suggest. It has
managed to gather support among democracies as well as newly established
democracies. It has also attracted several non-democracies, even if for
unanticipated motivations. The world is slightly more transparent with respect
to transfers of conventional arms today than it was in 1991. More importantly,
states are more welcoming of a norm of transparency and accountability in that
area than they have ever been before. As we move towards an arms trade
treaty, what recommendations can we make based on this analysis?
1. Leverage support among democracies
Negotiators should be attentive to democracies and their preferences in
regards to an arms trade treaty. The literature predicts that the move toward a
harder legal regime will ignite skepticism among democracies, given their
resistance to the idea of encroachments on their sovereignty. So far, the United
States position with respect to an arms trade treaty confirms that preoccupa-
tion.90 Here, the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities,"
which has guided several environmental protection negotiations since the 1994
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9' may offer a template for creative
solutions that would address these countries' resistance to what they perceive
as an unnecessary trespassing of the boundaries of state sovereignty. To that
end, while the U.S. was a strong force behind Resolution 46/36 [L], it remains
skeptical of the notion of an arms trade treaty, as reflected in the voting record
of General Assembly Resolution 61/89 of 6 December 2006.92
2. Create selective incentives for non-democracies
Because non-democracies feature prominently in most instances of armed
conflict and human rights violations in the world, they are a natural concern for
the debate on arms trade. Aside from that, non-democracies clearly outnumber
democracies and newly established democracies in the world today. This
aggravates the collective action problem that permeates any attempt to control
the international trade in conventional weapons. Indeed, it is common wisdom
90. UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FIRST COMMrrEE: MEETING #21, RECORDED VOTE:
TOWARDS AN ARMS TRADE TREATY, U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/61/L.55 (Oct. 26,2006), [hereinafter Recorded Vote],
available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/politicall1com/1com06/votes/L.55vote.pdf(last visited Mar.
22, 2008).
91. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 10, Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
92. G.A. Res. 61/89, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/89 (Dec. 18, 2006); Recorded Vote, supra note 90. Of
the 192 countries that took part in the vote, 153 voted yes, I voted no, 24 abstained, and 14 did not vote. Id.
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in the academic literature that the opportunities for collective action dwindle as
the number of actors increases.93 One of the proposed solutions to address the
provision of public goods by large groups lies with the institutionalization of
selective incentives. In other words, if the large contingent of non-democracies
can be offered perks in exchange for their participation in the arms regulation
effort, there is now an excludable benefit associated with cooperation.94 Aid,
technology transfer, and preferential trade status feature as good candidates.95
3. Alleviate cooperation costs for newly established democracies
as well as for non-democracies
The literature predicts that newly established democracies will favor hard
legal commitments because these agreements enable states to "lock in" any
gains from the democratization process.96 Nevertheless, compliance still entails
costs, and in the context of an arms trade regime, reporting costs are prominent.
In fact, transparency measures affect newly established democracies and non-
democracies alike, because these states are newcomers to accountability and
participatory practices that are deeply rooted among democracies. One way to
counter these disincentives associated with an arms trade treaty is to make
institutional assistance available to member states.
Beyond these recommendations, some general guidance can be extracted
from the theoretical analysis offered in the previous sections. In particular,
delegation and flexibility appear to have a prominent contribution to the treaty.
In the next section I expand the discussion on delegation and flexibility in order
to arrive at more specific propositions.
V. THE PROSPECTS OF AN ARMS TRADE TREATY
Establishment of a dedicated bureaucracy to which powers to monitor,
interpret, and implement an arms trade treaty would be delegated will be key
to an effective agreement. This group of individuals can improve on the
accomplishments of the UN Register without the requirements of periodical
consensus reviews by a Group of Governmental Experts. Moreover, a
dedicated bureaucracy can devise selective incentives and mobilize domestic
constituencies as a means to promote compliance. With respect to selective
93. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 9 (reprint 1982) (1965).
94. Emilie M. Harier-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements
Influence Government Repression, 59 INT'L ORG. 593, 624 (2005).
95. Hafner-Burton finds significant evidence that preferential trade agreements containing hard
commitments with respect to human rights policies have actually improved a country's record with respect
to repression. Id.
96. Moravcsik, supra note 27, at 243-44.
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incentives, this bureaucracy could explore excludable benefits to an arms trade
treaty. For example, preferential trade status could be subordinated to member-
ship and fulfillment of treaty obligations by the recipient state. Whereas this
strategy relies primarily on coercion, there is also a role for persuasion through
the mobilization of political elites and domestic constituents.97
There are several other reasons for emphasizing delegation. In particular,
newly established democracies will be more attracted to the treaty if it
contemplates "locking in" mechanisms. After all, this is the main motivation
for joining among this category of states. Alongside, a dedicated bureaucracy
might be better equipped to tackle connected problems, such as the diversion
of licit transfers.98
The gains from delegation are not perceived equally by states. In fact,
democracies (as opposed to newly established democracies) are more resistant
to encroachments upon their sovereignty. Here, flexibility of commitments may
help to reconcile states interests, thereby facilitating universal membership. I
foresee a role for two forms of flexibility: time limits and escape clauses. As
explained before, scholars have found a negative correlation between the
number of participants and the imposition of limits on agreement duration. 99 As
the number of participants approaches universality, we tend to observe less, if
any, limits on agreement duration, due to the presence of renegotiation costs.
A possible compromise would establish relatively long limits on duration, much
like the institutional features of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.10
Finally, escape clauses will appeal to democracies as well as non-demo-
cracies. The latter may temporarily withdraw from treaty obligations when
facing a national security crisis. Interestingly, because escape clauses are
costly, "escaping" from the treaty may expedite the resolution of crises that
would otherwise linger in time. Democracies may see escape clauses as a
suitable counterweight to agreement rigidity, especially when there is resistance
by organized interest groups domestically. For example, the armament industry
is likely to be more accepting of an arms trade treaty that allows for temporary
withdrawal. It is important to keep in mind that organized interest groups
perceive costs and benefits associated with regulation in a concentrated manner,
as opposed to less organized groups within society, such as voters and
97. The distinction between coercion and persuasion is made by Hafher-Burton in the context of
enforcement of human rights obligations. She reminds us that coercion and persuasion are not mutually
exclusive. Hafner-Burton, supra note 94, at 599-600.
98. During an informal conversation with a government intelligence analyst, it was explained to
me that a major limitation of the current regime is the underlying assumption that the contents of licit transfer
do actually reach its intended destination. In certain parts of the world this is seldom the case. Corruption
fuels a black market, channeling some of these weapons to embargoed countries.
99. Korememos, supra note 52, at 557 n.22.
100. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 91.
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policymakers. Therefore, resistance from organized interests is much more
effective at influencing governments.' °'
It will be challenging to create escape clauses that balance costs and
benefits adequately. Escape clauses must impose a burden so as to deter
unwarranted withdrawal; but if these clauses are excessively costly, their
function as guarantors of agreement survival will be at stake. With respect to
an arms trade treaty, engineering escape clauses is no easy task. I leave further
thinking on this issue for future research.
Overall, recourse to delegation and flexibility mechanisms will contribute
to a strong and universal treaty. It will be helpful to assess what role these
mechanisms have played in similar treaties. For now, the scholarship on
legalization and regime design call attention to these two features of
international agreements as prominent aspects for successful negotiation and
enforcement.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper I discussed the prospects of an arms trade treaty in light of
predictions from the literature on legalization and regime design. The role of
delegation and flexibility emerged prominently in the analysis, which offers
specific justifications for various forms of flexibility as well as the functions of
a dedicated bureaucracy. The paper took a closer look at the reporting record
of states between 1992 and 2006 in order to assess theoretical expectations with
respect to regime type. Confirming the predictions of the literature, states
reveal reporting patterns associated with the degree to which they have
developed into fully established democracies. This exercise promotes a better
understanding of the distinct challenges each identified category will present
during the negotiation of an arms trade treaty.
Several analyses of the arms trade issue were discussed, including the two
most recent reports by the Group of Governmental Experts. 112 From that
overview, a mixed picture emerges: observers, from academia and think tanks,
do not match the optimism displayed by the GGE. The two extreme positions
seem to agree, however, on the need to address the issue of small arms and light
weapons. So far, the GGE has made progress in the debate but no strong
reform proposal was able to reach consensus among participants. As the
negotiation of an arms trade treaty progresses, these unresolved issues are likely
to resurface. To that end, the Small Arms Survey 200703 continues to raise
101. James Q. Wilson, The Politics ofRegulation, in THEPOLITICSOFREGULATION 357,358 (James
Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
102. See generally 2003 Report, supra note 15; 2006 Report, supra note 15.
103. See GRADUATE INST. OF INT'L STUDIES, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2007: GUNS AND THE CITY
(2007).
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awareness to the implications of the trade in these weapons for human rights
and humanitarian law obligations.
Finally, areas that are ripe for further research were identified. More work
on the notion of flexibility is needed. Given the universe of multilateral treaties
that exists today, it is important to draw lessons in an attempt to engineer
optimum design mechanisms. Especially for treaties that aim at universal
membership, escape clauses, limits on agreement duration, and/or the admissi-
bility of different policy levels may offer the key to self-enforcing institutional
arrangements.
In 1919, twenty three states signed the Convention for the Control of the
Trade in Arms and Ammunition, which never entered into force because states
failed to ratify the document."0 4 This treaty incorporated several design
elements: limits on duration (seven year renegotiation rounds), majority rule
for decisions on renegotiation, the creation of a dedicated bureaucracy (the
Central International Office), and provisions for arbitration of differences.0 5
The challenges we face in the new millennium are greater in many aspects. It
is imperative to find the right institutional recipe this time.
104. Convention, supra note 1.
105. Idat310.
2008] Carneiro
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AS OBJECTS
AND SOURCES OF TRANSNATIONAL
REGULATION
Larry Cat6 Backer*
I. THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC LAW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ..... 500
A. Domestic Corporate Law ............................. 501
B. Domestic Substantive Law ............................ 502
C. International Substantive Law ......................... 502
D. International Process ................................ 503
E. Limitations of this Regulatory Framework ............... 503
II. THE NEW(ER) SOFT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN CONTEXT:
AN EXAMPLE ............................................ 508
III. THEORIZING THE FRAMEWORK: Is THERE A SYSTEM
TO THIS STORY .? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
IV . CONCLUSION .......................................... 523
It was my great pleasure to participate in the 2007 International Law
Weekend organized in New York City by the American Branch of the
International Law Association and held at the House of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York on October 25-27, 2007. My presentation,
entitled "Multinational Corporations as Sources of Soft Transnational
Regulation" was part of the panel "International Law Making and Non-State
Actors: Toward New Paradigms?"
As described in the program notes for the conference, the panel addressed
the impact of non-state actors on international lawmaking as well as the
regulation of non-state actors under international institutional frameworks. It
explored questions regarding the capacity of the supranational legal or regula-
tory framework to account for the activities of non-state actors, particularly
where alternate avenues for imposing responsibility and accountability on non-
state actors may exist at the national and sub-national level. This essay was my
contribution to that effort. I focused on the impact of multinational corpora-
tions in the context of corporate social responsibility as a regulatory policy
* Visiting Professor of Law Tulane Law School, Director, Coalition for Peace and Ethics,
Washington, D.C., Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University. The author may be contacted at
lcb91 l@gmail.com. l am grateful to my co-panelists, Lillian Aponte Miranda (FlU), Janet Levit (Interim
Dean, University of Tulsa College of Law) and Heather Hughes (American), for their reactions and the
insights their own work has provided to mine.
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framework.' It seeks to develop earlier work on the dynamics of regulatory
frameworks for multinational corporations as an expression of both public and
private power.2
One of the most interesting dynamics of modem global law involves
control of the governance mechanics of multinational corporations.3 From the
perspective of public law, the objective has been to develop a network of
regulatory systems through which state actors can control such entities. From
the perspective of the multinational corporation, the objective has been to
develop governance systems of its own to regulate the factors of production of
wealth wherever located. My objective today is threefold: first, I want to
describe the traditional public law regulatory framework and suggest its limita-
tions and failures of perspective. Second, I want to illustrate the new soft
regulatory framework in which the state is substantially absent and the center
of regulatory activity shifts to the corporation. And third, I want to flush out
some of the more important characteristics of this new regulatory framework
and suggest its contours and implications within modem economic globaliza-
tion.
I. THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC LAW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The traditional regulatory framework for managing multinational corpora-
tions is grounded in public positive law. The sources of that positive law could
I. I agree, for example, with Jennifer Zerk, that the classic state centered model of corporate
regulation is, in the modem global context, ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst, and that
national governments have recognized this and are currently experimenting with alternative forms of
regulation, including "self-regulation, use of incentives, awards and accreditation systems, market-based
initiatives, disclosure obligations.., and education campaigns." JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (2006).
1 am less sure that the solution might be found in international substantive regulation or in the exraterritorial
application of home state law. See id., at 145. See Larry CatA Backer, From Moral Obligation to
International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets andthe Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO.
J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2008).
2. See, e.g., Larry CatM Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of
Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39(4) CONN. L. REV. 1739 (2007). See also
Larry Cati Backer, Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign Debt: Cuba and the IMF, 24(3) PENN ST.
INT'L L. REv. 497 (2006); Larry CatA Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United
Nation's Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social
Responsibility in International Law, 37(2) COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 287 (2006) [hereinafter Backer-
COLUMBIA]; Larry Cati Backer, The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of Organizational Law
Beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality, Larry Cati Backer, Economic Globalization Ascendant
and the Crisis of the State: Four Perspectives on the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global
Order, 17(1) BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 141 (2006).
3. See Michael K. Addo, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations-an Introduction, in
HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 3 (Michael K.
Addo ed., 1999).
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be divided into four components (or fields)--sometimes related and sometimes
oblivious to the effects of one set of regulatory frameworks over another.
These are domestic corporate law, domestic substantive law, international
substantive law and international process or enforcement authority.
A. Domestic Corporate Law
Domestic corporate law, or more generally the law of business organiza-
tions, was the traditional method for managing economic enterprises. Natural
persons are born; collectives are created. Many collectives do not need the
imprimatur of a government to exist. Religion, social organizations and affinity
groups exist because people come together and stay together because (and for
so long as) they desire. To obtain certain benefits under law, and principally
the benefit of being treated as an autonomous individual under law, an entity
must be created in accordance with law. Most jurisdictions now provide rules
for the creation of a number of economic and other collectives. By consenting
to creation under law, these entities enjoy special status. In return, the state
retains the right to regulate certain critical aspects of their organization. That
regulation serves as the foundation of corporate or entity law. The state that
creates an entity is generally given authority to regulate its internal affairs.
That regulation touches on the relationships between the primary stakeholders
in these entities-for corporations, that includes shareholders, officers and
directors. More importantly, the regulatory state also retains the power to
determine which stakeholders are to be included within the regulatory
framework. That varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. As a consequence,
state-created entities like corporations are accorded status as independent and
autonomous entities, like natural persons. Within the United States (US), there
has been a century-long debate about the obligations of these entities. At one
end, economic entities are viewed as essentially private and geared to the
maximization of the welfare of its primary stakeholders- shareholders.4 At the
other end, extreme economic entities are viewed as mixed public/private
entities with social responsibilities beyond the periodic charitable donation.5
Of course, the creation of economic entities can reach only those entities
that a state is empowered to create. In some jurisdictions that may include any
collective that meets the statutory requirements and submits to the authority of
4. Franklin A. Gervurtz, Getting Real About Corporate Social Responsibility: A Reply to
Professor Greenfield, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645,648-49 (2002) (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W.
668, 684 (1919)). See also Backer-COLUMBIA, supra note 2, at 296; Susan J. Stabile, Using Religion to
Promote Corporate Responsibility, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 839, 841 (2004).
S. See Backer-COLUMBIA, supra note 2, at 298; Stabile, supra note 4, at 846. See generally MARK
J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT
(2003).
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the state, irrespective of the place of their operation. In other jurisdictions,
states seek the power over any entity operating in substantial respect within its
territory. In mostjurisdictions, entities created (and recognized as such) by one
government can be recognized by others. Sometimes governments give entities
created in one jurisdiction the power to operate in another as if they had been
created there--except that the regulation of the internal organization of the
entity is still subject to the regulatory authority of the creating state.
B. Domestic Substantive Law
However organized, economic entities are also regulated to the extent of
their activities. Like individuals engaged in similar activities, economic
collectives are subject to the legal regimes of the places in which they operate.
These include virtually all aspects of law-making in early twenty-first century
administrative states. The extent of this regulation, of course, is bounded by the
territory of the regulating state. States, however, have been seeking to extend
their authority beyond their borders under some circumstances. Usually that
involves the extension of substantive regulation by entities operating or created
within the home jurisdiction with respect to their activities in other states.
Examples include the application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act against
US companies for activities abroad,6 and the regulation of the activities of
foreign corporations seeking access to American financial markets under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.'
C. International Substantive Law
This field of regulatory effort can itself be divided into two unequally
important branches, hard law and soft law. Hard international substantive law
has focused for some time on aspects of human rights and development that
may touch on the activities of multinational corporations But that focus is
indirect. Many powerful states continue to oppose the idea of a direct
relationship between international law and economic collectives, and draw a
sharp distinction between political collectives and everything else. As a result,
most of the lawmaking in this area has been directed to states. Provisions are
aimed at developing some system of basic harmonization of behavior norms to
6. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C.A § 78dd-1 (West 2008).
7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 15 U.S.C.A §
7201) (West 2008).
8. See Julie Canpagna, United Nations Norms On The Responsibilities Of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises With Regard To Human Rights: The International Community
Asserts Binding Law On The Global Rule Makers, 37(4) J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1205 (2004); David
Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises With Regard to Human Rights, 97(4) Am. J. INT'L L. 901, 901 (2003).
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be implemented by states within their legal orders. Soft international law is
both powerful in its own way and hortatory. It is represented in the growing
business of providing multinational corporations with guidelines and standards
for the conduct of its businesses across borders. Production of these guidelines
has not been the monopoly of public bodies though both international
institutions and national governments have sought to play a part. Among the
leading efforts of such groups are the United Nations' Global Compact9 and the
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development's Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises."° But the private sector, and especially the global
civil society sector, has been busy producing guidelines of their own.
D. International Process
This regulatory framework has grown to prominence since the end of the
Second World War. It seeks to make dispute resolution easier or more effective
in a cross-border context. Great strides have been made in forging global
systems of alternative dispute resolution, and some progress has been made in
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. But there is still much
debate about the shape and focus of any efforts in this area. Many states are
unwilling to give up cherished procedural devices and most states are reluctant
to turn over control of the judicial process to extra-territorial bodies. In
addition, many states still nurture weak or underdeveloped systems of dispute
resolution.
E. Limitations of this Regulatory Framework
This regulatory framework has proven both durable and effective in the
regulation of domestic undertakings, even those that engage in significant
amounts of transnational business. However, it has proven to be less useful in
the management of multinational corporations and similar entities. The
principal problem has been a matter of territorial disjunction. The regulatory
power of states tends to extend no further than their political borders. I have
indicated that all states attempt to push those borders out a bit-to project
domestic regulatory power abroad-but this is the exception rather than the
conventional way of regulation. At the same time, multinational corporations
and transnational actors, tend to operate across political borders-to move
9. See United Nations Global Compact,. What is the Global Compact?, http://www.
unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited, Jan. 23, 2008).
10. See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development [hereinafter OECD], The
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/
1922428.pdf (recommendations addressed by governments to multinational enterprises in a number of
governance areas including employment and industrial relations, human rights, environment, information
disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, science and technology, competition, and taxation).
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assets, operations and activities in ways in which political borders become inci-
dental to their activities." Multinational corporations may take advantage of
differences in territorial regulation in deciding the nature and character of local
investment, especially in a legal context in which the free movement of capital
is encouraged. 2 Since more than one state can regulate various aspects of the
operations of a multinational corporation, the latter might be able to evade
regulation by a strategic elaboration of its operations. When a multinational
entity does not like a particular regulatory scheme, it can leave and a regulating
state cannot reach the activities of entities subject to the substantive regulation
of other states. Many states have been reluctant to concede authority over
economic enterprises to supranational or international organs. 3
The territorial limits of regulatory power-so simple and conventional a
doctrine that it might be easily overlooked-tend to have the greatest effect on
the management of the activities of multinational enterprises. 14 But territorial
limits are compounded by several other regulatory effects, each of which tends
to have a peculiar effect when undertaken by multinational enterprises. The
first includes a cluster of domestic and supranational regulatory reforms that
have substantially eased restrictions on the movement of capital and invest-
ments across borders. Multilateral and bilateral trade and investment agree-
ments, agreements between large enterprises and governments, privatization of
governmental functions in favor of private enterprises and changes in domestic
law (as states compete to attract global capital) have all contributed to an
environment in which large multinational enterprises can more easily disperse
assets and operations across borders. In this context, law becomes a factor in
the production of profit-like labor and capital-to be assessed (and on account
of which) business decisions will be made.
The second focuses on the effects of legal personality. There are two
characteristics of legal personality that work to the advantage of multinational
corporations. The first is the autonomy of every corporate actor. Each corpora-
tion stands as an autonomous individual. The second is that one legal person
may own another. This latter characteristic makes it possible to construct large
and complex networks of legally autonomous persons, owned ultimately by
shareholders of a parent or controlling entity. Together, these two char-
acteristics make it possible to disperse operations globally but in a way that
significantly limits the liability of the entire enterprise for the actions of any of
11. See, e.g., LESLIE SKLAIR, THE TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALIST CLASS 38-48 (2001).
12. See, e.g., Christian Bellack, How Performance Gaps Between Domestic Firms and Foreign
Affiliates Matter For Economic Policy, 13(2) TRANSNAT'L CORPS. 29 (2004), available at
www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20045a3_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
13. See PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 3-15 (1995).
14. See Tania Voon, Multinational Enterprises and State Sovereignty Under International Law,
21 ADEL. L. REv. 219, 244 (1999).
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its parts. While some states have sought to extend their authority over inte-
grated networks of corporations-for example, by extending notions of enter-
prise or related-entity liability-those efforts are still in their initial stages. And
in any case, many of these efforts flounder on the shoals of governmental resis-
tance to projections of power by one state outside its borders-and enterprise
liability has the effect of permitting the regulating state to control activity in
another state by regulating the enterprise.
The third is a function of legal commodification. If economic entities may
now effectively choose among legal regimes, that is, decide which among law
producing political states it will establish operations and invest resources, then
the legal maturity of a political state will have a significant regulatory effect.
Where states have a less developed legal system, and an inexperienced or
corrupt legal system, multinational corporations may be able to assert more
effective control over their operations in that state. Conversely, where stability
is desirable or where there is much money to be made, a multinational enter-
prise might be willing to put up with a more intrusive and sophisticated
regulatory environment. In any case, in a global environment in which states
compete for investment funds for development of local economies or otherwise
compete for capital, law will serve as a commodity through which each
competing state will seek to lure economic activity. This is a sort of "Delaware
Effect" now understood in essentially economic terms. Some lawyers and
political scientists though, may find it harder than most to see law as just
another commodity offered for sale, or perhaps as a factor of production.
In addition to these systemic limits, the rise of the current system of
economic globalization has produced something of a shift in the sense of the
function and character of multinational corporations. Contemporary globaliza-
tion has produced a conflation of sorts among public and private spheres,
emphasizing markets and the diminished role of states in economic regulation. 5
No longer strictly private actors servicing their principal stakeholders for their
mutual benefit, corporations and other economic enterprises are increasingly
seen as shouldering a set of public or socially focused obligations. States have
increasingly sought to privatize governmental activity, including everything
from garbage collection, to the operation of border and customs operations at
points of entry, to the maintenance of prisons and the conduct of military
operations. The distinctions between economic and political collectives
become fuzzy in a world in which states become participants in the market and
economic enterprises assume traditional governmental functions.
Some also see economic enterprises as political actors. Starting with the
complicity of certain corporations in the overthrow of the Allende regime in
Chile in the 1970s, multinational corporations have been implicated in the
15. See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LExus AND THE OLIvE TREE 14 (2nd ed. 2000).
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elaboration of political action. This has been thought unseemly, since direct
political action has traditionally been limited to natural persons, political
factions and domestic enterprises. Moreover, the ability of the largest econo-
mic enterprises to negotiate agreements with states gives them a position similar
to nation states able to negotiate treaties. Where such activities are conducted
by multinational enterprises, it appeared that sovereign authority slipped from
the state and its citizens to foreign organizations. Enterprises appeared to
acquire the status and power of states without any of the public obligations,
responsibilities or accountability usually demanded of political governments. 6
As a consequence, the last half-century has seen a vigorous debate about
the status, character, obligations and sources of regulation of multinational
enterprises (and principally those organizations operating in corporate form)
that continues unabated.'7 In its current form, the debates center on four macro
issues that grow out of traditional methods of legal regulation of domestic
economic enterprises:
1) The extent or porousness of extraterritoriality of law;
2) Sovereign immunity either from suit or from liability;
3) The responsibilities and legal character of multinational
economic enterprises; and
4) The commodification of law. 8
Each of these areas is marked by a great dynamism. What will emerge a
quarter century from now will bear little resemblance to the state of enterprise
regulation that forms the basis of the management of multinational enterprises
today.
Reform along these lines is taking a number of forms. For example, tradi-
tional doctrines of piercing the corporate veil might be broadened to make it
easier to impose liability among corporations that share a common ownership.
16. See Maria McFarland Sbnchez-Moreno & Tracy Higgins, No Recourse: Transnational
Corporations and the Protection of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1663, 1668-72 (2004) (quoting U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSCO], Comm. on Econ., Soc., and
Cultural Rights, Report on the Seventh Session, annex II, 5, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/1992/2 (Nov. 23-Dec. 11,
1992); J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: International
Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples 'Rights in Africa, 18(4) AM. U. INT'L. L. REV.
851,895-99 (2003).
17. See Backer-COLUMBIA, supra note 2, at 313-19; Richard Meeran, The Unveiling of
Transnational Corporations: A Direct Approach, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 161 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999).
18. See Fleur Johns, The Invisibility ofthe Transnational Corporation: An Analysis oflnternational
Law andLegal Theory, 19 MELB. U. L. REv. 893(1994). See generally R.J. BARRY JONES, GLOBALISATION
AND INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: RHETORIC AND REALITY (1995);
MUCHLINSKI, supra note 13.
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The purpose of these efforts would be to make it less valuable for organizations
to split their assets and operations among autonomous and legally distinct cor-
porate entities. Others suggest the development of principles of universal
jurisdiction applicable against economic enterprises. Still, others have
proposed the elaboration of strict theories of enterprise liability through which
the traditional notions of corporate autonomy and independence will be sub-
stantially undone. Lastly, a variety of efforts have been suggested or under-
taken to harmonize legal regulation of multinational enterprises at a
supranational or international level. These include liability under harmonized
substantive standards for labor relations, corruption, deployment of security
forces, taxation and the like. The other is to provide universal systems of
jurisdiction over such enterprises either under the authority of state courts or
under international dispute resolution mechanisms. But these are controversial,
and a number of more powerful commercial states have sought to capture the
markets in regulation of multinational enterprises by aggressively seeking to
extend their regulatory schemes beyond their borders. In some cases-for
example, among the US and the European Union-extraterritoriality is
leveraged by strategic bargaining under which standards as between these
entities are harmonized. Thus harmonized, they are extended beyond their
collective borders.
Thus, from a public law perspective, the framework for the regulation of
multinational enterprises can be viewed most charitably as in flux.'9 At one end
are attempts to bring multinational enterprises within the regulatory ambit of
states, while preserving the territorial autonomy and preeminence of states as
the highest form of political power. At the other extreme are regulatory efforts
grounded in the idea that states ought not to be the locus of regulatory activity,
but that instead, regulation of multinational enterprises must be affected at an
international or at least a supranational level. The current compromise between
these views (and one very popular now) is the effort to harmonize national
regulation through international instruments or otherwise by multilateral
efforts.2" The hope is that when substantive law is substantially harmonized,
differences in state systems will be effectively neutralized. The model is the
market harmonization framework of the European Union.2 The problem is that
19. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility,
111(3) YALE L.J. 443, 452 (2001); Eric W. Orts, The Legitimacy of Multinational Corporations, in
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAw 247 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Jean-Philippe Robi, Multinational
Enterprises: The Constitution of a Pluralistic Legal Order, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 45, 45-47
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
20. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the
Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38(2) COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1999).
21. See Martin Rhodes & Bastiaan van Apeldoom, Capitalism Unbound? The Transformation of
European Corporate Governance, 5 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 406, 423-25 (1998).
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many states which seek to employ this method refuse to permit any form of
supranational enforcement or interpretive mechanism-like a European Court
of Justice. To the extent that such systems have been tentatively put in place
(consider the framework for multilateral trade regulation under the World Trade
Organization) they have been cabined to the arena of state-to-state relations.
Substantive harmonization without centralized mechanisms for interpretation
is unlikely to produce more than a growing number of very generally worded
and essentially hortatory conventions.
II. THE NEW(ER) SOFT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN CONTEXT:
AN EXAMPLE
While public law systems struggle to reshape their character and focus as
law and as an instrumental tool of management by political collectives over
economic collectives, new systems of governance are arising. These new
systems of governance, of behavior management, are originating within
increasingly complex networks of governance to bind a growing number of
functionally distinct communities of actors within the scope of their
communities. These networks are made up of collectives that are not princi-
pally political. Essentially in a context in which the legal regulatory framework
is fractured-that is, where states are smaller than the territory subject to the
activities of economic actors-then it is likely that these economic actors might
themselves begin to self-regulate over the entire territory in which they operate.
The same, of course, applies to noneconomic actors-for example, religious
groups, social organizations, and other communities of people who band
together to submit to particular regulatory regimes.
These regulatory regimes are not the same as political regulation through
law. Because these regulatory regimes are not direct legislation, they are what
is commonly termed "soft" law. At one end of the soft regulatory framework
are behavior frameworks originating either from public bodies or from
partnerships of private and private entities. These usually include the hortatory
codes of conduct or ethical rules for the conduct of multinational enterprises.22
While they have no direct legal effect, they may have an effect on the conduct
of business.23 At the other extreme are behavior frameworks created by com-
munities of actors to regulate their internal affairs-that is, to regulate the
22. Cf United Nations Global Compact, supra note 9; OECD, supra note 10. Most of these target
not only internal corporate governance (in terms of transparency and governance), but also focus on the
relationship between the enterprise and a large segment of the stakeholder community-labor, host localities,
and the like.
23. See Hans. W. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, in




relationships among them. The coercive power of the state is essentially absent
in these communities. The extent of regulatory power is not great, but the
power of participation may sometimes be as strong. Moreover, narrow regula-
tory power-that is, the power to set rules only with respect to those things in
relation to which the community was formed--does not detract from the
effectiveness of that regulation. These communities can exist within and
around states. They seek to engage in regulation at the interstices of law-
making, where law either does not or cannot provide a basis for effective
regulation.
I want to examine one of those communities-that which is made up of
large globally-engaged multinational enterprises. These are entities whose
operations and institutional elaboration, direct or indirect, exist in more than
one national territory. By that examination, I will tease out some of the
characteristics of these self-referencing regulatory communities. The easiest
way to illustrate these systems is by a short case study of Gap Inc. and the
regulation of its suppliers in India.
Gap Inc. was founded in 1969 in San Francisco, California as a retail
outlet geared toward a younger and hip-style demographic.24 "Today, Gap Inc.
is one of the world's largest specialty retailers, with more than 3100 stores and
fiscal 2006 revenues of $15.9 billion. We operate four of the most recognized
apparel brands in the world--Gap, Banana Republic, Old Navy and
Piperlime., '25 That much retail trade requires a great amount of product. And
Gap Inc. feeds its stores with merchandise procured throughout the world. Gap
Inc. does not manufacture a large amount of the products it sells.26 Instead, it
contracts with a number of independent suppliers across the globe for apparel
and other items sold under the Gap Inc. and related labels.27
In a traditional business environment, Gap Inc. would endeavor to enter
into fairly straightforward agreements with its suppliers. In return for the
production of a certain amount of products (to be described in the contract), the
supplier would be expected to be paid a certain amount. The rest of the terms
of such a contract would also be fairly straightforward: quality, place of
delivery, inspection of goods and quality control, payment holdbacks and the
like. But Gap Inc. has entered into a different form of contractual arrangement
with its suppliers. These contracts have a substantial social and regulatory
dimension. Gap Inc. proudly emphasizes, "[a]t Gap Inc., social responsibility
24. Gap Inc., About Gap Inc., http://www.gapinc.com/public/About/about.shtml (last visited Jan.
16, 2008).
25. Id.
26. Gap Inc., How Our Clothes Are Made, http://gapinc.com/public/About/abthowourclothesare
made.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
27. Gap Inc., Factory Approval Process, http://gapinc.com/public/SocialResponsibility/sr-fa_
wwf fap.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
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is fundamental to who we are and how we operate as a company. ,28 Gap Inc.
has undertaken a responsibility for the way in which the enterprises with which
it does business behave. It demands a certain uniform level of conduct from its
suppliers, so that each of them conforms to what Gap Inc. determines to be an
appropriate framework of conduct between its suppliers and their employees,
the state and other stakeholders in the suppliers' business.29 "At Gap Inc., we
believe we should go beyond the basics of ethical business practices and
embrace our responsibility to people and to the planet. We believe this brings
sustained, collective value to our shareholders, our employees, our customers
and society."3
That "sustained, collective value" is potentially significant to Gap Inc.'s
going concern value. First, it reduces the costs and increases the quality of
goods. "When factories treat workers well, they also tend to produce higher
quality product and deliver it on time. The more we respect and empower our
own employees, the more creative and innovative our products and marketing
tend to be."'" Second, corporate social responsibility serves as a profitable
response to consumer demand for goods procured in a particular manner.
"We're increasingly seeing that consumers care about the way companies
behave in the global economy. By acting responsibly as a business, we can
offer covetable products that respond to this growing consumer demand. 3 2
Third, corporate social responsibility is tied to corporate good governance.
"We strive for best practices in corporate governance because we believe that
a better-run company yields better results, and ultimately, greater shareholder
value."33 Thus, to a great extent, Gap Inc.'s social responsibility is founded on
its relationship with its two key stakeholders-consumers and investors.
The basis for this change in Gap Inc.'s relationship with its overseas
suppliers dates back to 1992 when "Gap Inc. developed Sourcing Guidelines
outlining general labor standards for vendors to follow."34 By 2004, Gap Inc.
had produced its first annual Social Responsibility Report, widely circulated to
the investor and human rights organization communities.35 The next year, Gap
28. Gap Inc., Social Responsibility, http://www.gapinc.com/public/SocialResponsibility/socialres
.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
29. Gap Inc., Improving Factory Conditions, http://www.gapinc.com/public/SocialResponsibility/
sr factories.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
30. Gap Inc., supra note 27.
31. GAP INC., 2005-2006 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 12 (2005-2006),
http://www.gapinc.com/public/SocialResponsibility/srfac-wwf standards.shtml (follow "2005-2006 Social
Responsibility Report" hyperlink under "Downloads") (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Gap Inc., Our Social Responsibility History, http://www.gapinc.com/public/Social




Inc. called its first summit meeting in San Francisco "to build closer
relationships and set expectations among top garment manufacturers."36 It
participated in efforts to create uniform standards within the garment industry
globally.37 By 2006, Gap Inc. was sponsoring training sessions for the
managers of its suppliers and consulting with various elements of civil society
to assess its compliance with emerging labor standards.38
To ensure uniform behavior among its global network of suppliers, Gap
Inc. promulgated a Code of Vendor Conduct.39
This Code of Vendor Conduct applies to all factories that produce
goods for Gap Inc. or any of its subsidiaries, divisions, affiliates or
agents ("Gap Inc."). While Gap Inc. recognizes that there are
different legal and cultural environments in which factories operate
throughout the world, this Code sets forth the basic requirements that
all factories must meet in order to do business with Gap Inc. The
Code also provides the foundation for Gap Inc.'s ongoing evaluation
ofa factory's employment practices and environmental compliance.4"
The "Code is based on internationally accepted labor standards-in
particular, the International Labour Organization's core conventions.... It also
spells out our expectations regarding" local labor laws, environmental practices,
discrimination, forced and child labor, requirements for wages and hours of
employment, health and safety of workers and protection of workers' freedom
of association.41 Gap Inc. has, to some extent, legislated a labor code particular
to its suppliers. In addition to suppliers; the Code extends to the entire chain
of supply, so that suppliers that subcontract work must ensure that all such work
be produced in accordance with the Code, whatever the other contractual
requirements might exist between a Gap Inc. supplier and its subcontractors.
Gap Inc. is not acting alone. "That's why we're actively involved in the Joint
Initiative on Corporate Accountability and Workers' Rights, an effort to develop




39. GAP INc., CODE OF VENDOR CONDUCT, available at http://www.gapinc.com/public/documentst
code_vendor-conduct.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
40. Id.
41. Gap Inc., Our Standards, http://www.gapinc.com/public/SocialResponsibility/sr-fac-wwf
standards.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
42. Id. See also Joint Initiative on Corporate Accountability and Workers Rights, http://www.jo-
in.org/english/about.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
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In order to be considered as a potential party to a contract for the delivery
of goods for Gap Inc., a potential supplier must undergo a Gap Inc. supervised
approval process.
In 2005 and 2006, we again required manufacturers and subcon-
tractors that produce internally-designed and branded apparel for
Gap, Banana Republic, and Old Navy to pass through our approval
process before we placed any orders. This process ... can take
anywhere from a week to more than a year to complete.43
Enforcement of the Code is undertaken through monitoring by Gap Inc.
officials or their designees, mandatory training, inspections, and the right to
impose a variety of sanctions for non-compliance."
If Gap Inc. determines that any factory has violated this Code, Gap
Inc. may either terminate its business relationship or require the
factory to implement a corrective action plan. If corrective action is
advised but not taken, Gap Inc. will suspend placement of future
orders and may terminate current production.45
This overarching set of regulatory norms is imposed uniformly as the
foundation on which traditional individual contracts are entered into for the
delivery of goods. The policy has deep social aspects of a sort customary to
legislation and unusual in output contracts, at least as traditionally conceived.
Compliance efforts, for example, are spoken of in policy terms. Thus,
[Flactory monitoring remains a key element of our efforts to improve
working conditions. We believe that 'what gets measured gets
managed,' and monitoring data-despite its imperfections-gives us
a way to assess factory conditions objectively, as well as our own
monitoring performance, so that we can improve our efforts over
time.'
Gap Inc. understands that its efforts are undertaken "to create more com-
prehensive, long-term change in the garment industry.'47 Gap Inc.'s Code of
43. GAP INC., supra note 31, at 25.
44. Gap Inc., Ongoing Monitoring, http://www.gapinc.com/public/SocialResponsibility/sr
facwwfom.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
45. GAP INc., supra note 39, VIII.
46. Gap Inc., The Art and Science of Factory Monitoring,
http://www.gapinc.com/public/SocialResponsibility/srfac-wwf aftn.shtml (last visited Jan. 16,2008).
47. Gap Inc., supra note 34.
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Vendor Conduct strictly prohibits child labor.4" Violation of Code standards
is subject to certain enforcement procedures.49 Enforcement can result in a
variety of reactions, from notice, to supervised correction, to termination of the
contract between Gap Inc. and the supplier." Enforcement policy under that
rule has undergone some revision in recent years. Violations of the prohibition
against child labor resulted in a termination of the contract between Gap Inc.
and the supplier. 1 "We believed that this approach sent a strong message to
suppliers that underage labor was wholly unacceptable. However, we have
learned from our experience over the years and extensive consultations with
stakeholders that such a policy of immediate termination is not necessarily in
the best interest of children."52 As a consequence, since 2006, Gap Inc.
imposed a new policy, "and now require[s] that any underage workers found in
a factory be immediately removed from the workplace, given access to
schooling, paid an ongoing wage and guaranteed a job at the factory as soon as
they reach the appropriate age."53 The purpose of the policy change was to
provide greater incentives to change cultures that promote child labor. "We
believe that this new approach is not only in the best interest of underage
workers, but also provides an effective deterrent to suppliers not to use
underage labor in the first place."54
On October 28, 2007, the Observer ran a story that reported that "[c]hild
workers, some as young as 10, have been found working in a textile factory in
conditions close to slavery to produce clothes that appear destined for Gap
Kids, one of the most successful arms of the high street giant."55 In addition,
the children were subjected to long hours, threats and beatings.56 On the same
day, Gap Inc. issued a statement. It explained that it had received notice of
the report just prior to its publication and immediately launched an investiga-
tion. "The company noted that a very small portion of a particular order placed
with one of its vendors was apparently subcontracted to an unauthorized
48. GAP INC., supra note 39, V.
49. Gap Inc., Violations of Our Standards, http://www.gapinc.com/public/SocialResponsibility/
sr fac wwf vos.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
50. Id.




55. Dan McDougall, Indian 'Slave' Children Found Making Low-Cost Clothes Destinedfor Gap
THE OBSERVER, Oct. 28, 2007, available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,331090351-
I 19093,00.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
56. Id.
57. Press Release, Gap Inc., Gap Inc. Issues Statement on Media Reports on Child Labor (Oct. 28,
2007), available at http://www.gapinc.com/public/Media/PressReleases/med_prvendorlaborl 02807.shtml
(last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
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subcontractor without the company's knowledge or approval.""8 Gap Inc. then
quoted from a statement issued by Marka Hansen, president of Gap North
America, which stated in part:
"We strictly prohibit the use of child labor. This is a non-negotiable
for us-and we are deeply concerned and upset by this allegation. As
we've demonstrated in the past, Gap has a history of addressing
challenges like this head-on, and our approach to this situation will be
no exception .... As soon as we were alerted to this situation, we
stopped the work order and prevented the product from being sold in
stores. While violations of our strict prohibition on child labor in
factories that produce product for the company are extremely rare, we
have called an urgent meeting with our suppliers in the region to
reinforce our policies."59
She also reminded her audience that "'Gap Inc. has one of the industry's
most comprehensive programs in place to fight for workers' rights overseas.
We will continue to work with the government, NGOs, trade unions, and other
stakeholder organizations in an effort to end the use of child labor.'
60
This statement, along with the original press report, were posted to the web
sites of important civil society actors-for example, the Business and Human
Rights Resource Centre. 6' The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre
also posted a U.S. State Department information release that appeared to
confirm that by October 31, 2007, Gap Inc. had terminated its relationship with
the supplier accused of prohibited child labor practices and had pulled the
apparel made by these children from its inventory.62 The report quoted Gap
Inc.'s Hansen as stating "'[a]s soon as we were alerted to this situation, we
stopped the work order and prevented the product from being sold in stores,'
Hansen said, citing Gap's 'strict prohibition on child labor.' 63 Terhune also
noted that "Gap called an emergency meeting with regional suppliers to
reinforce the policy."'
By November 4, 2007, Gap Inc. had appeared to turn the situation around




61. See Posting of Gap Inc. Press Release to http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/
Individualcompanies/G/Gap?&batch_start=l (Oct. 28, 2007) (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
62. See Lea Terhune, US. Clothing Company Drops New Delhi Contractor, U.S. STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Oct. 31, 2007, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/October/




slave labor by the Indian supplier's subcontractor now reported that "[i]n what
would be the biggest commitment to ending child labour ever undertaken by a
major retailer, Gap Inc is drawing up plans to label its products 'Sweatshop
Free'. ''65 McDougall reported that Gap Inc. would essentially attempt to
operate a product certification program similar to one that had been success-
fully used in the Indian rug making sector, the "RugMark" Programme.66
"According to Bhuwan Ribhu, a lawyer from the charity, the US conglomerate
set out a series of ambitious proposals including a move that would see it
relabeling its garments to allow the consumer to directly track online exactly
where they are made. ' 67 Gap Inc. confirmed that it "was laying down the
groundwork for a major commitment to fight the problem. 6 1 More importantly
perhaps, Gap Inc.'s management went out of its way to thank the efforts of the
people whose undercover investigation produced the report circulated by the
Observer in its October 28, 2007 article. Hansen was again quoted: "'[w]e
genuinely appreciate that The Observer identified this unauthorised
subcontractor [using child labour], and we acted swiftly in this situation. "'69
All of this was widely reported in media that would reach Gap Inc.'s primary
stakeholders-its customers and investors.7"
The day after publication of this announcement saw the production of
commentary in the English language Indian media, not all of it positive.71
Natteri Adigal suggested that the efforts of the media, multinational
corporations and elements of civil society seeking to end child labor did more
harm than good. The harm occurred because once the tales of the rescue and
reform efforts are published, the children are left on their own again.72 In that
condition, they might have little choice but to seek the same kind of work.
Indeed, it was suggested that the efforts of these stakeholders might do no more
that increase the transaction costs of hiring illegal child labor.
7 3
Two weeks later, an AssociatedPress report by Michael Liedtke described
the results of Gap Inc.'s investigation. "To punish the vendor, Gap imposed a
six-month probation that includes a fifty percent reduction in orders placed with
65. See Dan McDougall, Gap Plans 'Sweatshop Free' Labels, THE OBSERVER, Nov. 4, 2007,





70. See McDougall, supra note 65.
71. See Natteri Adigal, Do Delhi's Child Workers and Dubai's Labourers Need These Crocodile
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the supplier. Gap Inc. declined to identify the penalized supplier, one of the
company's roughly 200 vendors in India. 74 The report also described the
framework through which Gap Inc. would institute its work culture reform
programs. Gap Inc. would partner with elements of civil society, principally the
Global March Against Child Labour, to institute systems of monitoring of home
work. These systems focus on hand embroidery and beadwork and provide
grants to establish "community centers in India where such work could be
performed under better-monitored conditions., 75 Gap Inc. would also "make
a $200,000 grant aimed at improving the working conditions in India and would
try to recruit retailers from around the world to participate in a forum next year
to address child labor issues."76
Thus, within less than two months a significant set of events had taken
place. Elements of Indian civil society had undertaken an undercover
investigation of the conditions of India's child labor. Those conditions might
violate Indian labor law. Those conditions also violated the social behavior
norms written into the business arrangements between a multinational
enterprise and its suppliers. The undercover report was leaked to the
multinational enterprise a few days before a member of the global media elite
published the report. The enterprise reacted immediately. It conducted its own
investigation, which resulted in the enterprise pulling the goods produced
through prohibited child labor from its inventory, exacting sanctions from the
supplier and terminating any relationship with the subcontractor. The
multinational enterprise also began working with elements of civil society to
participate in programs designed to change the way in which the labor market
worked in India, including grants for the regulation of garment house work and
the elaboration of an extensive product certification program overseen with
elements of civil society. All of this was reported in the global media and by
significant elements of the human rights establishment.
But the political state was not entirely absent from the regulatory activity.
Both the governments of the US and India also became involved. "A US
government notification on proposed procedural guidelines issued in October
on imported goods made using child or forced labour has finally acted as a
wake-up call for India."77 The Indian government's reaction was interesting-
74. See Michael Liedtke, Gap Takes Steps to End Child Labor, FOXNEwS.COM, Nov. 15,2007,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendly wires/2007Novl 5/0,4675,GapChildLabor,00.html
(last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
75. Id.
76. Id
77. Dec. 4, 2007, at 7, available at http://epaper.timesofindia.com/archive/skins/pastissues2/
navigator.asp?login=default (under "Publication" select "Economic Times Delhi"; then under "Year and




its appropriate ministries met to declare their intention to implement Indian law,
including the "conduct [of] annual external social audit[s] on child labour" as
per the national labour laws and rules.7 8 "Export promotion councils (EPC) will
also prepare a perspective plan for child labour abolition in specific areas of
geographical concentration."79  The tensions between extraterritoriality,
strivings for harmonized behavior norms, regulatory power and global
economic dynamics were clearly evident in the statement of the Indian minister
of state for commerce Jairam Ramesh who said the US notification on proposed
action against goods made using child labour had to be taken seriously. "'The
issue of child labour, raised in the US Congress 12 years ago but later dumped,
is being revisited by the US government. This has to be taken seriously,' he
said."8 Indian export promotion councils will now also play a role in the
monitoring of the Indian labor market, prodded by the interests of the US as
expressed in threatened regulatory moves by the American Congress. Both
political entities have thus moved closer to implementing the labor standards
they have elaborated principally in their law codes.
Thus, a story about the abuse of child laborers in India-so common in
that country that it might not have otherwise merited much attention-was
powerful enough to engage a multinational corporation, a set of non-govern-
mental organizations, international media players and the governments of two
large and powerful states. All asserted a role in regulation that might have been
unusual only forty years before. It is to elaborate a theory of regulatory action
from the story that the next section turns.
III. THEORIZING THE FRAMEWORK: Is THERE A SYSTEM TO THIS STORY?
Is it possible to generalize a regulatory system from out of this story? This
section attempts to sketch out the basic framework of a regulatory system
suggested through the story of the Gap Inc. and its suppliers in India. This
system, existing side by side with the regulatory systems of territorially limited
states, can be characterized as a freestanding, autonomous, self-communicating
system. It generates enforceable conduct rules binding on its constituency, and
is accountable to a well-defined constituency. Contract serves as the means by
which the "law" of this system is memorialized and made binding. While states
memorialize their norms through law, contract serves a similar purpose for




81. See, e.g., The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Report of the Special
Representative ofthe Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations
and other business enterprises, 12, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/41035 (February 9 2007), available at
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purely voluntary, and any stakeholder is free to leave at any time, all of its
members have strong incentives to participate, and within the very limited
scope of its regulatory authority, each act to strengthen the integrity of the
system. The primary actors include the multinational enterprise and their
suppliers, non-governmental organizations, the media and investors and con-
sumers. Government plays a limited and secondary role in the elaboration of
this system. And the people actually affected-suppliers, local labor and others
directly affected-are passive participants, the objects rather than subjects of
this system.
How does each of the primary actors contribute to the construction of an
autonomous and self-contained regulatory system? The multinational
enterprise stands at the center of the system.. Through its elaboration of a
tightly controlled supplier system, for example, the multinational corporation
can serve as the system legislator.82 It does not enter merely into contracts but
imposes a complex set of norms with social, cultural and political effect. It
enforces its standards against its controlled groups-those persons and entities
that seek to do business with it. Thus, the Codes of Conduct-and other instru-
ments to which suppliers assented in their relations with Gap Inc.-provide Gap
Inc. with both the authority to set appropriate standards of conduct and to
impose sanctions. Enforcement is through extensive monitoring programs,
which are as intrusive as any created by governments. These sanctions are not
the stuff of contract breach. They resemble more the form of legislative or
administrative management under public law codes. Gap Inc. can effectively
assess civil penalties, impose training or other rehabilitation programs, compel
changes in internal organization or terminate the contractual relationship with
the enterprises subject to its standards. These standards themselves are targeted
to the enterprise's investors and customers. While the standards are developed
and implemented by the enterprise, they are usually constructed with input from
elements of civil society-non-governmental organizations that have a policy
or other interest in the subject of the standards. At the same time, the
multinational enterprise expends much energy shaping consumer and investor
opinion. A substantial portion of Gap Inc.'s website-for example, is devoted
to issues of good governance83 and social responsibility.84 Both are self-
http://www.business-humanrights.orgfDocuments/SRSG-report-Human-Rights-Council- 19-Feb-2007.pdf
(last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
82. See, e.g., Li-Wen Lin, Corporate SocialAccountability Standards ln The Global Supply Chain:
Resistance, Reconsideration, And Resolution In China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 321, 329-30,
340-41 (2007).
83. See Gap, Inc., Governance, http://www.gapinc.com/public/Investors/invgovern.shtml (last
visited Apr. 6, 2008).
84. See Gap, Inc., Social Responsibility, http://www.gapinc.com/public/SocialResponsibility/
socialres.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
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consciously targeted to investors and consumers. In these materials, Gap Inc.
describes its complex network of interrelationships with non-governmental
actors in setting standards.
Non-governmental organizations help shape the standards that multi-
national enterprises implement. They participate in the creation of standards
actually developed by enterprises, and perhaps most importantly, they serve as
independent monitors of compliance with these standards. 85 Gap Inc. did not
invent or create a demand for a prohibition of infant labor. The work of many
organizations, mobilized in large and small-scale campaigns against this
practice, contributed to the formation of a public opinion strongly opposed to
the use of child labor for the manufacture of consumer products in developing
states.86 That developed and strongly intuited public opinion made it desirable
for an enterprise like Gap Inc. to adopt policies against the practice even if it
meant imposing standards stricter than those required under the applied law of
the host state. India may well have had many laws against infant labor, but it
was Gap Inc. that actually enforced the prohibition in those independent
economic enterprises with which it cultivated contractual relationships.
Moreover, Gap Inc. embraced a complex network of non-governmental
organizations for the purpose of helping develop its standards and compliance
programs. Gap Inc. advertises that it is "working closely with these groups and
other worker rights and civil society groups to address these issues both in our
code as well as how we enforce it through our compliance program.,, 87 But
most importantly, non-governmental organizations are instrumental in
85. Terry Macdonald & Kate Macdonald, Non-Electoral Accountability In Global Politics:
Strengthening Democratic Control Within The Global Garment Industry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 89, 106 (2006).
By means of campaigns that were promoted at times via high-profile media attention,
and at other times by the direct actions of widespread grassroots networks targeting
retail outlets of familiar brands-strategies commonly referred to as "naming and
shaming"--activists significantly increased public awareness of the direct power of
such companies over the lives of workers in far away countries.
Id.
86. The lesson hit home in the United States with the successful mobilization of public opinion
against the television talk show host Kathie Lee Gifford and her Wal-Mart marketed clothing line in 1996.
Kathy Lee Gifford, a popular daytime talk-show host and advocate of children's rights,
found herself embroiled in a sweatshop scandal when Charles Kemaghan of the
National Labor Committee Education Fund in Support of Worker and Human Rights
in Central America told the United States by way of Congress that Ms. Gifford's
clothing line, made for and controlled by Wal-Mart, was manufactured by girls barely
in their teens in a Honduras sweatshop. This served as a lesson for celebrities with
clothing lines that they had to monitor the manufacture of their products or face the
court of public opinion.
Nancy L. Mensch, Codes, Lawsuits or International Law: How Should the Multinational Corporation Be
Regulated With Respect to Human Rights?, 14 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 243, 244 (2006).
87. Gap, Inc., supra note 41.
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monitoring compliance with the norms adopted by multinational enterprises to
govern the behavior of its suppliers and their subcontractors. Gap Inc. did not
discover the use of child labor in its Indian supplier operations on its own or
through its own programs of monitoring. An undercover investigation by non-
governmental organizations-human rights and child labor advocacy groups-
produced the necessary information that caused Gap Inc. to act. There is an
economic aspect to the participation of non-governmental organizations as well.
Involvement in the efforts of multinational enterprises to harmonize the
regulation of its supplier chain through the imposition of labor, environmental
and other norms, is a critical source of raising funds, motivating members and
increasing the membership in such organizations. Multinational enterprise
regulatory work is good for the business of non-governmental organizations.
Critical to the work of both the multinational enterprise and the non-
governmental organization is the media.88 Newspapers, television, internet-
based news and other information dissemination enterprises play an essential
role in the development and enforcement of multinational enterprise-developed
standards of conduct. The media serves principally to legitimate and to
transmit the work of multinational actors legislating conduct over their
networks of stakeholders or the monitoring work of non-governmental
organizations, especially as multinational corporations seek to more tightly
control the information they distribute about themselves and their operations. 9
The audience for those functions includes the consumer and investor sector,
whose actions are essential to the wellbeing of corporate actors. But they also
serve as a means of communication among the multinational corporation and
non-governmental organization stakeholders.9" The report of the groups that
uncovered child labor in Gap Inc.'s Indian supplier operations did not acquire
88. This idea is well understood in the context of the American culture wars of the last century. See,
e.g., Symposium, Tune In, Turn On, Cop Out?: The Media and Social Responsibility, A Panel Discussion:
Potential Liability Arising From the Dissemination of Violent Music, 22 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 237 (2002).
89. See, e.g., Vicki McIntyre, Note: Nike V Kasky: Leaving Corporate America Speechless, 30
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1531, 1562-65 (2004).
90. Advertising can play a critical role in the system. Referring to a successful ad campaign waged
by Mobil Oil, one commentator noted:
The power of such ads, according to one scholar and the company's own CEO, was to
make Mobil Oil's self-interested messages appear more objective, particularly because
the ads appeared in credible media outlets, often on op-ed pages. Control over the
content and presentation of these ads allowed Mobil Oil to soften its image, distract
attention from its profits and counterbalance negative news stories.
Susan Dente Ross, The Ad That Changed Libel Law: Judicial Realism And Social Activism In New
York Times Co. V. Sullivan, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 489, 493 (2004) (citing, S. Prakash Sethi, Advocacy
Advertising-The American Experience, 21 CAL. MGMT. REv. 55 (1978); S. Prakash Sethi, Business andthe
News Media, The Paradox ofInformedMisunderstanding, 19 CAL. MGMT. REv. 52 (1977); S. Prakash Sethi,
Issue-Oriented Corporate Advertising, Tax Treatment of Expenditures, 19 CAL. MGMT. REv. 5 (1976)).
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much impact before it was reported in the Observer-a news organ with global
connections, and published in English. The validity of Gap Inc.'s responses
acquired substantially more impact for having been reported in the same media
organ. In this later role, the media serves as the critical vehicle for communica-
tion across stakeholder organizations. The media also serves as a critical means
of communication with consumers and investors. Ironically, the media also
serves as significant sources of information for governments. The media
mediated much of the conversations between Gap Inc. and the civil society
community-its investors and consumers. And all of this is critical for the
media. All of this, of course, inures to the benefit of the media as an industry
in its own right. The media is the largest consumer of information on the globe.
Information is a critical factor in the production of news-the product that
makes money for the media. Corporate social responsibility targeted at
consumers and investors, overseen by multinational enterprises and monitored
by non-governmental organizations, are very good for the business of the
production of news.
Like the citizens and residents of political states, consumers and investors
play a critical yet passive role in the governance systems of multinational enter-
prises. By their actions, they (collectively) determine the efficacy of the actions
of each of the stakeholders-consumption of the products and investment
vehicles peddled by multinational enterprises, support for the efforts of non-
governmental organizations and readership of media.9' Consumers and
investors are the object of the efforts of the other stakeholders in this system to
get them to act on certain sets of beliefs. Control of the beliefs and desires of
these groups-or the ability to express those beliefs and desires as policies,
rules and conduct (and to impose them on those in networks of control)
-affects the shape and character of the "desires" of multinational enterprises
(and their taste for things like social responsibility, good governance,
environmental protection, long or short term strategic thinking and the like) and
the extent of their willingness to legislate for their network of stakeholders. To
a great extent, then, corporate regulation has moved from a foundation in
efficiency to a focus on values and their elaboration in the action of economic
actors.92
Like consumers and investors, government-both domestic and inter-
national public entities-play a significant but passive role in the control of the
91. This, of course, was the moral of the Kathie Gifford story. For many of the documents, see
National Labor Committee, The Kathie Lee Campaign, http://www.nlcnet.org/article.php?id=403 (last visited
Apr. 7, 2008).
92. See Larry Cati Backer, Values Economics and Theology: The Contribution of Catholic Social
Thought and Its Implications for Legal Regulatory Systems, Law at the End of the Day, http://lcbackerblog.
blogspot.com/2008/0 I/values-economics-and-theology.html (Jan. 12, 2008, 10:06 EST) (last visited Apr. 7,
2008).
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social and economic relationships of multinational enterprises and their
suppliers. Government serves as a source of authentic memorializations of
conduct norms. It is not necessarily their legal effect so much as the values
they express that count. Gap Inc.'s social responsibility norms are based on the
International Labour Organization's core norms.93 Those norms have no legal
effect, except, ironically as enacted into the contractual relations between Gap
Inc. and every natural or legal person which forms part of its supplier network.
Gap Inc., thus, has used governmental standards as the basis of binding
regulations in a context in which supranational harmonizing legislation is
impossible in a political context. It is true enough that Gap Inc.'s regulations
affect only a slice of economic actors, and that they are founded in contract and
not law, but within the scope of their authority they serve a purpose similar to
law. As importantly, governmental pronouncements and actions-international
and domestic declarations of policy or aspirational goals-tend to set the
parameters of the debate that produce beliefs in consumers and investors on
which both governmental and non-governmental actors base their own
responses. And lastly, government sometimes tends to follow the actions of its
stakeholders. The American and Indian governments appeared to act to shore
up their fidelity to their laws or notions of right in time to appear to react to the
"scandals" of child labor and its suppression by Gap Inc.
But what of the objects of all of this activity-the business people
operating supplier factories, or their subcontractors, the children and their
families, and the local communities in which all of these activities occur?
Those are the groups that seem to be cut out of the process.94 Things are done
on their behalf. Working conditions are improved to better their environment.
Business relationships are changed on the basis of values that might or might
not be shared by local business. Yet there is little expectation that the objects
of all these activities will actually participate actively in the formation and
elaboration of standards and enforcement norms. All of those are imposed from
outside the communities affected. The position of some is to treat host nations
as sometimes suspect locations for social responsibility action because their
leaders might be tempted to collude with the multinationals operating in their
territory or because such states are too weak to apply their own laws, much less
international standards in the face of the economic power of the multinational
entity.95 Global power, in effect, is exercised on their behalf, but based on the
93. Gap, Inc., supra note 41.
94. See, e.g., Li-Wen Lin, supra note 82; Larry Cath Backer, Extraterritoriality and Corporate
Social Responsibility: Governing Corporations, Governing Developing States, Law at the End of the Day,
http://Icbackerblog.blogspot.com/2008/03/extraterritoriality-and-corporate.html, (Mar. 27,2008, 11:07 EST).
95. See, e.g., Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and
International Law: Wherefrom Here?, 19 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2003) (suggesting that the international
regime's inadequacies "becomes more conspicuous when a state is weaker than an MNC, is in connivance
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sensibilities of consumers and investors in developed states. From the
perspective of the global order, it seems that the people of the developed world
continue to impose their beliefs on others. This time, it is for their own good
and the moral betterment of those who impose their values, through their
decisions to purchase goods or invest in financial instruments. While it may not
be a bad thing, it certainly does marginalize an important segment of
stakeholders. Yet, in an ironic way, control might be every bit as strong under
the harmonizing regimes of economic private regulation described here, as in
the old days of direct political colonialism. But there may be a difference.
Under the new regime it is possible for multinational enterprises to grow almost
anywhere in the world. East Asia has evidenced the way in which shifts of
economic power might affect the markets for beliefs and harmonizing
regulation in the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
The circle is thus complete. Together a close-knit and well-defined group
of stakeholders in a community of interest have generated a closed and self-
referencing system of regulation that binds all of its elements together in webs
of mutual interest and constraint. In this network government has a place, but
not a primary or controlling role. In many cases it is noticeable by its absence.
Contract replaces law; networks of relationships replace a political community;
interest replaces territory; the regulated becomes the regulator. Yet, the
freedom from political regulation suggested here is illusory to some extent.
Like its political counterpart, the regulating multinational enterprise is as much
a prisoner of its own stakeholders (and principally its consumers and investors)
as any state is to its citizens and residents.
The system is not dependant on a particular set of actors for its operation.
Any network of non-state actors can use the framework described in Section II
and theorized in Section III. Indeed, it is possible that rising networks of other
communities-indigenous and religious communities-might be crafting
similarly frame-worked systems of non-state regulation among their respective
communities. What Gap Inc. (and its supplier network regulation) suggests is
that there are potentially significant gaps in the reach of law--especially in
those contexts in which regulated communities stretch between political
communities-in which other forms of regulatory systems might arise. While
these systems may in some respects mimic political organization, their scope,
framework, extent and operation will also be significantly different. In a world
in which states will exist side by side with these non-state regulatory
communities, law may lose some of its privilege.
with an MNC, or is more interested in foreign investment than enforcement of human rights."); Mensch,
supra note 86, at 245-46.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent events have focused the attention of international jurists on
international responsibility for complicit conduct. Beginning with the question
of state responsibility for the 9/11 attacks, the issue of complicity sufficient for
attribution has continued to evolve and become more nuanced. More recently,
the issue of complicity liability of Council of Europe member states for their
alleged assistance in the abduction, detention, and rendition of terror suspects
has prompted a re-examination of the secondary rules of the law of state
responsibility. At the same time, the jurisprudence of the regional human rights
institutions has generated an ever-lowering standard for state responsibility
under their respective treaties, eroding to a considerable degree the distinction
between negative and positive obligations.
This article examines the interaction of these developments in human
rights law, international criminal law, and the law of state responsibility, and
will discuss implications for the concept and analytical coherence of
international responsibility.
II. THE MEANING OF COMPLICITY
Although the term complicity is commonly used in these contexts, its
meaning can vary greatly. Use of the term frequently introduces ambiguity
* John Cerone is Associate Professor of Law & Director of the Center for International Law &
Policy at the New England School of Law.
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because it can refer to different types of conduct with correspondingly different
legal implications.
For lawyers, the notion of complicity is first and foremost a domestic
criminal law concept-a way of imputing at least partial responsibility for a
criminal act to one who assists the principal in carrying it out. More generally,
the term may be used to refer to a situation in which a person participates with
another in the commission of a wrongful act in a way that entails some degree
of responsibility.
The notion of complicity arises in various forms in international law. The
use of the term that most directly corresponds to its domestic criminal law
analog would be the forms of complicity recognized in international criminal
law in the strict sense.1 As the standards for complicity liability vary among the
world's diverse domestic criminal justice systems, the international criminal
courts have developed international rules by synthesizing those diverse
standards. The international standards for complicity liability in this context
govern individual criminal responsibility for violations of international law.
However, the traditional and primary form of responsibility in the international
legal system is state responsibility. Can we speak of complicity on the part of
states? We frequently do-indeed, the term is used in a variety of contexts. In
order to understand its legal meaning, it is essential to parse out the distinctions
among the various ways in which the concept is employed.
For example, the concept was invoked in the wake of the September 11,
2001 attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Shortly after the
attacks, U.S. President George W. Bush said that those who harbor terrorists
would be treated as the terrorists themselves.2 Some saw this as an attempt to
invoke the Taliban's complicity in the attacks as grounds for attributing the
conduct of Al-Qaeda to the state of Afghanistan.
Thus, one way in which complicity is sometimes discussed is in the
context of attribution. The issue of attribution arises in the context of the so-
called secondary or "framework" rules of international law, as reflected in the
International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility. 3 The concept
of attribution4 is an important component in the determination of an
internationally wrongful act. Since states can only act through individuals,
1. International criminal law in the strict sense refers to that body of rules of international law the
breach of which gives rise to individual criminal responsibility.
2. President George W. Bush, President's Address to the Nation, White House (September 11,
2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/2006091 l-3.html (last visited Apr.
17, 2008). See also Press Release, White House, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat (Oct. 7, 2002).
3. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the GeneralAssembly, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
10), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 30, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/200 1/Add. 1 (Part 2) [hereinafter ILC Report].
4. Id. at 40.
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there needs to be a way to connect the conduct5 of actors to states. This is
achieved by examining the relationship between a state and the individual
perpetrators of a given act6 to see if there is a strong enough link to attribute the
perpetrators' conduct to that state.
Another way in which the term complicity might be used is in determining
derivative state responsibility; that is, when one state is derivatively responsible
for assisting another state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act.
This type of complicity, in the sense of derivative responsibility, is somewhat
analogous to attribution, but analytically distinct. Rules of attribution are
concerned with the attribution of conduct to a subject of international law (i.e.
in this context, a state); they are distinct from the question of responsibility.
Rules of derivative responsibility focus on the relationship between a principal
and an accomplice (or assistant). Thus, derivative responsibility is generally
predicated on the internationally wrongful act (and thus responsibility) of a
principal state. As such, it is distinct from the question of attributing the
conduct of the agents of one state to another state, which, in itself, says nothing
about whether an internationally wrongful act has been committed or whether
any state's international responsibility arises.
Yet another way in which the concept of complicity is employed is in the
context of a failure to fulfill a positive obligation; e.g. where a state has a duty
to prevent certain conduct. Complicity, even mere acquiescence, by state
officials in the carrying out of such conduct would constitute a violation of that
state's positive obligation.
By parsing out the different legal issues to which this term may be applied,
it becomes possible to see what standards have developed for each. It is then
possible to examine the extent to which these standards are mutually
reinforcing, and also the extent to which they have begun to introduce a degree
of incoherence into the law of state responsibility.
III. A COMPLICITY SPECTRUM
This section analyzes the various legal issues arising in this context by
elaborating a spectrum from the highest level of complicit conduct to the
lowest, taking as a case study human rights violations committed by agents of
5. Although the term "conduct" can refer to both acts and omissions, in the case of omissions the
issue of attribution does not directly arise. "As omission is a lack of action, an actor is not required. Hence,
the state is essentially in a constant default state of omission. However, in order for an omission to constitute
a basis of responsibility, there must be a duty to act. The question of establishing a duty to act will turn on
the content of the relevant primary rule. Thus, in these circumstances, the issue of attribution collapses into
the content of the primary rule." See John Cerone, Human Dignity in the Line of Fire: The Application of
International Human Rights Law During Armed Conflict, Occupation, and Peace Operations, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1447, 1464 (2006).
6. Id. at 1455-56.
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one state on the territory of another state.7 The spectrum envisions at one end,
maximal participation by the territorial state, and at the other end, minimal
participation with respect to the same principal violations.
A. State Responsibility for violation of negative obligation
Where the link between perpetrators and the assisting state is strong
enough to attribute the conduct of the perpetrators to the assisting state, the
assisting state becomes a perpetrating state, giving rise to its international
responsibility as such. Thus, this participating state bears independent orjoint
responsibility for breaching the negative obligation to refrain from violating
human rights.
The standards for attribution are set forth in Part I, Chapter 2 of the
Articles.8 The first few rules contemplate situations where the actor is, or can
be assimilated to, an organ of the state.9 Thus, the conduct of dejure organs,
lent organs, or de facto organs" is attributable to the state. In the present
context, these would apply only if the perpetrators were under the exclusive
control," or in a situation of complete dependence 2 upon, the "assisting state,"
which clearly would be more than an assisting state if this were the case.
The next set of attribution rules apply in situations where the actor is not
an organ of the state, but is in fact acting on behalf of the state in particular
circumstances. These rules focus not on the general status of the actor, but on
the particular conduct of the actor in the particular circumstances to determine
whether the actor was, in fact, acting on behalf of the state during the relevant
period.
The conduct of this type of actor (commonly referred to as a "non-state
actor") may be attributed to a state when the actor "is in fact acting on the
7. The perpetration of human rights violations by agents of one state operating on the territory of
another also raises the issue of whether a state's human rights obligations apply to conduct perpetrated
outside of its territory. See Cerone, supra note 5. While this issue would not arise in relation to the territorial
state's human rights obligations, it could be relevant to the determination of any derivative responsibility on
the part of the territorial state, to the extent the principal's obligations are affected. See Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, [hereinafter
European Convention].
8. ILC Report, supra note 3, at 38-54.
9. Id.
10. While this rule is not expressly stated in the Articles on State Responsibility, its existence was
alluded to by the International Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986
1.C.J. 14,63 (June 27), and then affirmed in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
11. See ILC Report, supra note 3, at 43-44.
12, See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) 393 (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007).
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instructions of, or under the direction or control of, [a] [s]tate in carrying out
the conduct"; 3 when the actor is "exercising elements of the governmental
authority in the absence or default of the official authorities"; 4 when the
conduct is subsequently adopted by a state; 15 or when the conduct is that "of an
insurrectional movement [that] becomes the new government of a [s]tate."' 6
These standards establish a fairly high threshold of state involvement or,
alternatively, de facto state action by non-state actors accompanied by state
authorization or disengagement. Instances of lesser participation by state
organs in the conduct of non-state actors17 are not sufficient to render such
conduct attributable to the state under the traditional rules of attribution. 8
While the term complicity could be used to describe situations encompassed by
the above rules, the term usually connotes a lesser degree of involvement. This
would seem to make sense because the common sense understanding of
complicity is that the complicit party is merely assisting and is not the directly
responsible party, as it would be pursuant to a finding of attribution.
However, the jurisprudence of international criminal courts and regional
human rights bodies indicates a trend toward a lowering threshold for
attribution. For example, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has held that the overall control by a state
of a hierarchically-organized non-state entity may be sufficient to assimilate
that entity to an organ of the controlling state, rendering all of its conduct
attributable to that state.' 9
The regional human rights institutions have gone even further, stating that
lesser degrees of involvement, even mere acquiescence, would be sufficient to
find the perpetrator's conduct attributable to the complicit state.2"
13. ILC Report, supra note 3, at 47. In the absence of specific instructions, a fairly high degree of
control has been required to attribute the conduct to the state. According to the Commentary on the Articles,
"[s]uch conduct will be attributable to the State only if it directed or controlled the specific operation and the
conduct complained of was an integral part ofthat operation. The principle does not extend to conduct which
was only incidentally or peripherally associated with an operation and which escaped from the State's
direction or control." Id.
14. ILC Report, supra note 3, at 49.
15. Id. at 52. See also United States Diplomatic and Consular Staffin Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3, 65, 73, 96 (May 24).
16. ILC Report, supra note 3, at 50.
17. The term "non-state actor" is used here in the relative sense. Thus, agents of a third state who
could not be assimilated to organs of the territorial (in this context, the assisting) state would be regarded as
"non-state actors" vis-a-vis the territorial state.
18. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 66 (June 27)
(holding that provision of training, resources, and logistical support was insufficient for the conduct of the
contras to be attributable to the United States).
19. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgment, IN 120, 122-23, 131 (July 15, 1999).
20. It should be noted, however, that in each of the cases in which these lower standards were
articulated, the facts showed a degree of state involvement far greater than acquiescence.
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It could be argued that these institutions are simply not distinguishing
between positive and negative obligations. Hence, their establishment of a
lower threshold of responsibility does not in itself indicate a divergence from
the traditional rules of attribution. For example, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights requires state parties to "respect" and to "ensure" the
rights contained therein, reflecting both negative and positive obligations.2'
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in
contrast, employs only the phrase to "secure" rights, perhaps encouraging a
conflation of positive and negative obligations.22 However, the European Court
of Human Rights has expressly delineated the positive and negative dimensions
of the obligation to "secure" rights. Indeed, there are cases in all three regional
systems in which the respective human rights bodies make clear that they are
analyzing complicity under the rubric of attribution and not the failure to fulfill
a positive obligation.23
Alternatively, it might be noted that the Articles admit the possibility of
alex specialis, where "special rules of international law" may govern,24 and that
the human rights institutions are developing such a lex specialis. The problem
with this rationale is that the human rights bodies have made clear when
formulating their standards for attribution that they are drawing upon the
general law of state responsibility.
25
The International Court of Justice has resisted this trend toward a lower
threshold for attribution.26
B. Derivative State Responsibility for violation of negative obligation
Derivative state responsibility arising from complicit conduct is governed
by the rule set forth in article 16 of the Articles.27 That article, titled "Aid or
assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act," provides:
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, Mar. 23, 1976,999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
22. European Convention, supra note 7.
23. See Riofrio Massacre, Case 11.654, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/01, OEA/Ser.LV/II. I11,
doc.20 rev. IM 47-48 (2001); Ilascu v. Mold. & Russ., 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46,113-14, (2004); Soc. & Econ.
Rights Action Ctr. v. Nig., 2001 Afr. H.R. L. Rep. 60, 71 (Oct. 2001). Nonetheless, these distinctions are
often blurred in the jurisprudence of these institutions. See J. Cerone, Out of Bounds? Considering the
Reach of International Human Rights Law, sec. IV (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at NYU
School of Law, Working Paper, April 2006).
24. ILC Report, supra note 3, at 140.
25. Ilascu, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 117.
26. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime ofGenocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007), where the International Court of Justice
rejects the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's lower
standard for attribution.
27. ILC Report, supra note 3, at 65.
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A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible
for doing so if:
(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the
internationally wrongful act; and
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that
State.28
According to the International Legal Commission Commentary
accompanying the Articles, the assisting state must contribute "with a view to
facilitating" the internationally wrongful act.29
This form of responsibility is derivative of the principal state's responsi-
bility. As such, where the principal is not violating a particular obligation, the
assisting state cannot bear derivative responsibility for the violation of that
obligation. For example, if the assisting state is a party to the European
Convention on Human Rights, but the principal state is not, then the assisting
state cannot be said to bear derivative responsibility for violating the European
Convention on Human Rights.
30
Can the legal threshold for derivative responsibility be the same as that for
state responsibility? It would seem that it could not. Derivative responsibility
is a lesser form of responsibility. Common sense would seem to require that the
threshold for derivative responsibility be somewhat lower than that for principal
responsibility. Thus, it would be absurd to have the same level of involvement
that gives rise to derivative responsibility also make the conduct of the
perpetrators attributable to the assisting state.
Yet can there be a lower threshold than acquiescence? In light of the
Commentary to the Articles, as well as state practice, it is clear that derivative
responsibility requires more than acquiescence. Thus, the standard for
attribution must necessarily be higher.
In essence, the human rights institutions have gone too far (at least in their
formulations) in lowering the threshold for attribution. Ironically, however,
they did not have to go that far to achieve the same result (i.e. a finding that the
28. Id
29. See ILC Report, supra note 3, at 66.
30. See European Convention, supra note 7. As noted above, the issue of extraterritoriality may
also be relevant here. Ifthe principal state is not bound by certain of its human rights obligations while acting
outside of its territory, its responsibility cannot arise under those obligations in these circumstances. Thus,
ironically, the assisting, territorial state could not bear derivative responsibility, notwithstanding the fact that
the human rights violations are occurring on its territory. However, if the conduct of the perpetrators is
attributable to the assisting, territorial state, its responsibility would arise as a principal. Further, even if its
assistance is not sufficient to give rise to attribution, its responsibility would still arise if the relevant human
rights norms entailed positive obligations. See part C, infra.
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state party was in violation of its obligations under the respective human rights
treaties) because each of the human rights treaties they were interpreting
imposed positive obligations as well.3
C. State Responsibility for failure to fulfill positive obligation
It is well-established that an omission can constitute an internationally
wrongful act giving rise to state responsibility whenever a state is under a duty
to act.32 The scope of positive obligations-obligations imposing a duty to
act-is determined by primary rules. As noted above, the primary rules set forth
in each of the principal human rights treaties entail positive obligations.33
While the scope of positive obligation varies in accordance with the
primary rules,34 the primary rules of the principal "bill of rights" type treaties35
were formulated in similar terms, and in any event have been interpreted by
their respective judicial and quasi-judicial institutions to impose comparable
obligations. These institutions, drawing upon the Law of State Responsibility
for Injury to Aliens, have generally settled upon a standard of "due diligence,"
while recognizing that the level of conduct actually required by this standard
will vary depending upon the right in question, as well as the circumstances of
the particular case.36
One of those circumstances is knowledge that violations are being
perpetrated. Whatever the situation before information about violations perpe-
trated by third parties comes to their attention, the conduct required of states is
certainly increased after they are made aware of the relevant facts. Once the
state is on notice of human rights violations being committed on its territory,
the state must do more; the obligation remains formally the same, but what is
required to satisfy the obligation increases.
31. This is true in each case, with the possible exception of situations in which the obligations were
being applied vis-a-vis rights holders based outside ofthe state's territory. See, e.g., Ilascu v. Mold. & Russ.,
40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, 116 (2004).
32. See Cerone, supra note 5.
33. See Ilascu 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 114.
34. The scope of positive obligation is variable. For example, the scope of positive obligations
under the ICCPR is different from the scope of positive obligations under the Convention Against Torture.
See ICCPI, supra note 21, and Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113.
35. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 21; European Convention, supra note 7; 1970 American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L. M. 673; and African Charter on Human and People's
Rights, Jun. 27, 1981, 21 1.L.M. 59.
36. See, e.g., Velisquez-Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, at 153 (July 29,
1988). See also Bosn & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Judgment, 430 (Feb. 26, 2007).
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And, for the same reasons noted above, the standard for failure to fulfill
a positive obligation must be lower than that for attribution of the conduct of
the perpetrators to the state, and presumably also lower than that for derivative
responsibility for violation of a negative obligation.
IV. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
The international criminal tribunals are developing standards for indivi-
dual criminal responsibility that in some ways diverge from this framework. Of
course, individual criminal responsibility is a different form of responsibility,
and need not be governed by the same standards. 7 At the same time, the
introduction of lower thresholds of liability may create tension within both
systems. For example, where the standard for complicity in international
criminal law becomes significantly lower than that in the law of state
responsibility,38 the possibility exists for an individual official to be held
criminally responsible for conduct that the state is permitted to undertake.
This, of course, is less of a problem than the internal incoherence that is
developing within the law of state responsibility. Once the international
criminal tribunals abandoned the "double-decker bus" approach to
determinations of individual criminal responsibility, the link to the law of state
responsibility was severed. 9
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of state complicity involves a complex interplay between
primary (substantive) and secondary (framework) rules of international law-a
distinction which is easily blurred in this context. Part of the conceptual
difficulty in analyzing this problem flows from characterizing the issue as one
of complicity. The term complicity may be understood to encompass a broad
spectrum of conduct, with varying degrees of participation in the principal
violation. These different degrees of participation may engage different modes
of responsibility.
While one might normally welcome progressive developments in inter-
national law that are directed toward enhanced accountability for human rights
37. This is expressly recognized in the Articles on State Responsibility in the form of a "without
prejudice" clause. See ILC Report, supra note 3, at 142. ("These articles are without prejudice to any
question of the individual responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a State.").
38. For example, see recent submissions of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Office of the Prosecutor asserting the existence of complicity liability
where an official provides aid with awareness of a foreseeable risk that the aid will be used to commit crimes.
39. A traditional approach to determining the existence of individual criminal responsibility was
to first determine whether international law had been violated by a state, and then to determine whether that
breach gave rise to the criminal responsibility of the individual perpetrator. This approach has not been
followed by the international criminal tribunals.
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violations, we must be mindful of other possible legal consequences. For
example, lowering the threshold for attribution would be particularly
problematic if applied in a jus ad bellum context. If acquiescence were
sufficient for attribution, a state's acquiescence in an attack committed against
another state could render that attack attributable to the acquiescing state,
giving rise to a right of self-defense against that state. This is but one of many
examples that caution against an expansive interpretation of rules in one context
that can be problematic when applied to another.4"
International courts need to be more sensitive to these distinctions, and
they should pay closer attention to each other to avoid breaking down the
system of rules that the codification of the law of state responsibility was
intended to achieve. Coherence is not only essential to the legitimacy of this
system of rules, it is also an essential foundation for the relatively fragile inter-
national judiciary that is its steward.
40. Another example of this more general phenomenon may be seen in recent developments in the
jus in bello. The international criminal tribunals have increasingly found prohibitory rules of the law of
international armed conflict to be applicable in non-international armed conflict. This has led to claims by
states that the authorizations of the law of international armed conflict (e.g. to kill or detain indefinitely
enemy combatants) similarly apply to situations of non-international armed conflict, even where such conflict
occurs on the territory of another state. The broadened approach to ascertaining the existence of a nexus to
armed conflict (for the purpose of prosecuting war crimes) can similarly back-fire (e.g. in determining
combatant status).
[Vol. 14:2
THE INTERNATIONAL LEASE AS A LEGAL
INSTRUMENT OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE
SHAB'A FARMS AS A PROTOTYPE FOR THE
RESOLUTION OF TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS
Noemi Gal-Or* and Michael J. Strauss-
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Ill. THE POTENTIAL OF LEASING THE SHAB'A FARMS .............. 538
The Shab'a Farms have been considered the linchpin in the Hizb' Allah
rhetoric to destabilize the Israel-Lebanon-Syria relationship. We contemplate
here the possibility of defusing the conflict over the territory by using a lease
as a public international legal device.
I. THE SHAB'A FARMS
The Shab'a Farms area comprises six now-abandoned farmlands, on forty
square kilometres where Syria, Lebanon and Israel converge.' Until 1967, it
was considered Syrian. Israel seized it during the 1967 Six-Day War and still
occupies it as captured Syrian territory. In April 2007, Lebanon advised the
United Nations (UN) that it considered the Shab'a Farms to be Lebanese.2 The
so-called Second Lebanon War in 2006 resulted from the Hizb' Allah's
* Director, Institute for Transborder Studies, & Professor, Department of Political Science,
Kwantlen University College, Surrey, B.C., Canada, noemi.gal-or@kwantlen.ca.
** Lecturer in Geopolitics, Doctoral Program, Centre d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratdgiques,
Paris, France, m.strauss@wanadoo.fr.
1. HAIM SARBARO, THE CENTRE FOR ISRAEL'S CARTOGRAPHY, THE LEGITIMACY ISSUE OF THE
LEBANESE CLAIM TO THE 'SHEBAA FARMS,' IN RELATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER (2006),
www.mapi.gov.il/files/Shab'aa.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008) [author's translation from Hebrew]. The
geographic and historical description is largely based on the most detailed available source. See The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution
1701 (2006), 50, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/392 (June 28, 2007) [hereinafter LN
Shab 'a].
2. UN Shab'a, supra note 1, at 48-49; See Gideon Levy, Yatzpan Did Come. Life in a Syrian
Village of Which the Residents are Israeli and Half its Area is in Lebanon. Aja 'ar Without Border,
HAARETZ,Nov. 29,2005, http://www.haaretz.co.illhasitelpages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=651440 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2008) [author's translation from Hebrew]; See also Hagai Einav, Aja "ar Representatives to Livni:
'We Have Been Already Seven Years Under Internment, 'YNETNEws, Apr. 3, 2007, http://www.ynet.co.iV
articles/0,7340,L-3372246,00.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2008) [author's translation from Hebrew].
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incursion into Israeli territory under the claim that the Shab'a Farms was
Lebanese territory occupied by Israel, to be liberated by the Hizb' Allah. The
UN Secretary General noted after the war that
[T]he issue of the Shab'a Farms area continues to be put forward-in
contradiction to the repeated resolutions of the Security Council-to
justify the existence and activities of Hizbollah insofar as militant
activity across the Blue Line is concerned.... A permanent solution
of this issue [regarding status of the area], however, remains
contingent upon the delineation of the border between the Syrian
Arab Republic and Lebanon.3
The major pertinent legal issue consists of defining the border and
sovereign jurisdiction in the disputed area. UN efforts in addressing this have
intensified since the 2006 war. Meanwhile, the Secretary-General has referred
to repeated Syrian statements that the farmlands were Lebanese as "a new legal
reality,"4 although the UN still considers the territory Syrian. He has also
acknowledged an option suggested by Lebanon to temporarily place the
farmlands under UN jurisdiction.5
The dispute thus takes the following shape: Israel claims that Syria has
title, while Lebanon and Syria claim that Lebanon has title. The UN supports
the Israeli claim. And the only state claiming title for itself, Lebanon, has never
exercised effective control over the Shab'a Farms, and has suggested assigning
it to the party backing the competing claim-the UN.
The difficulty in settling this dispute by traditional diplomacy argues in
favor of applying other means. One that may hold promise is territorial leasing,
which allows a state to exercise control over an area where it does not have
sovereignty, by allocating sovereign rights to more than one state or party.
Leasing injects two elements into resolving sovereignty disputes that are
not traditionally present: first, a lease between states has the aura and connota-
tions of a private law contract, creating broader options for dealing with a
3. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security
Council Resolution 1701 (2006), 1 44, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/730 (Sept. 12,
2006).
4. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security
Council Resolution 1701 (2006), 46, delivered to the Security Council, S/2007/147 (Mar. 14, 2007)
(emphasis added). Note that this is a more definitive statement than the one made in 2000, when a similar
but significantly milder pronouncement was made by the UN regarding the then Lebanese claims to the
Shab'a Frams, qualifying them as "[Lebanon's] new position .... The Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), 15,
delivered to the Security Council, S/2000/460 (May 22, 2000).
5. UN Shab'a, supra note 1, at 49.
[Vol. 14:2
Gal-Or and Strauss
territorial issue.6 Second, "the competences gained by one state on another's
territory through a lease may satisfy objectives that otherwise could only be
achieved by obtaining sovereignty over the territory itself."7 This transforms
the conflict from one about sovereignty to one about specific components of
sovereignty--competences and rights-and opens alternative paths to settling
it.8 The cooperation required after creating a lease can then foster confidence-
building.
II. THE NATURE OF TERRITORIAL LEASES
Most territorial leases have economic, military, administrative or diplo-
matic objectives,9 and states have shown great flexibility with their terms
governing duration and compensation. Only rarely have leases been used to
resolve territorial conflicts-between France and Spain (1856), Bangladesh and
India (1974/1992), Israel and Jordan (1994), and Ecuador and Peru (1998)-
and these had never been examined as a phenomenon until recently."0
A comparative study of the first three leases" showed they all resolved the
specific territorial problem they were created to address. They produced stable
situations of sovereignty, precise and respected boundaries, and an end to
violence where it occurred. All three leases generated new problems, but these
were either resolved or less acute than the initial ones and stemmed from
factors external to the agreements' form as a lease.
If territorial leases can succeed in this application, why are they so
infrequent? It appears the precedents, known only poorly and individually,
have gone undetected, as evidenced by attestations of the originality of using
a lease each time one was employed to resolve a territorial conflict. Creativity
has been necessary to arrive at this option.
6. HELEN DWIGHT REID, INTERNATIONAL SERVITUDES IN LAW AND PRACTICE 9, 58 (1932).
7. Michael John Strauss, The Viability of Territorial Leases in Resolving Sovereignty Disputes:
A Comparative Study 359 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Academic De Paris) (on file with
Centre d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Strat~giques, Paris).
8. Id.
9. See generally F.A. VALI, SERVITUDES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY OF RIGHTS IN
FOREIGN TERRITORY (2nd ed. 1958).
10. The France-Spain lease involved the Pays Quint Septentrional/Quinto Real Norte; the
Bangladesh-India lease involved Tin Bigha; the Israel-Jordan lease involved Naharayim/Baqura and Zofar/Al
Ghamr; and the Ecuador-Peru lease involved Tiwintza. The last two were not called leases by the states
involved, but have the characteristics of leases and are tacitly regarded as such both within and outside of the
states.
11. Strauss, supra note 7, at 359.
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III. THE POTENTIAL OF LEASING THE SHAB'A FARMS
Besides Lebanon's suggestion to place the Shab'a Farms under UN
jurisdiction pending a permanent delineation of the boundary, Kaufman designs
two other scenarios-a "procedure of negotiation" to first settle the dispute,
after which, Israel (as occupier) would facilitate the demarcation of the border;
and an agreement on a "mechanism of resolution" among the three parties,
perhaps through international arbitration. 2 Yet agreement on the means would
still require the border's demarcation to be addressed. Without an agreement
between Syria and Lebanon to facilitate this, Lebanon would need to prove its
historic rights over the Shab'a Farms by demonstrating that it exercised
sovereignty there until 1967, against existing evidence. 3
Our proposal suggests embarking on a different route, tied to a recognized
need for all sides to maintain their dignity. 4
The conflicts that were resolved through territorial leases involve small
areas with few if any inhabitants, limited natural resources and limited
economic activity. These conditions are present in the Shab'a Farms, where the
reduced intensity of the dispute since the 2006 cease-fire may create an opening
for a lease to be discussed. Among the potential scenarios:
1) Confirmation of Syria's title to the Shab'a Farms, with Syria
leasing the territory to Lebanon;
2) Confirmation of Lebanon's title to the Shab'a Farms, with
Lebanon leasing the territory to Syria through an agreement that
formally recognizes Lebanese sovereignty over it;
3) Confirmation of Syria's title to the Shab'a Farms, with Syria
leasing the territory to Israel and transforming the occupation
into a more benign presence; and
4) Confirmation of either Syria's title or Lebanon's title to the
Shab'a Farms, with the sovereign state granting a lease to a non-
state actor-the UN, or even Hizb' Allah, which cannot be ruled
out in view of its relations with the other actors.
Instead of attempting an immediate settlement on final borderlines, we suggest
an international lease agreement as an interim solution with long-term
potential. 5
12. Asher Kaufman, Size Does Not Matter: The Shebaa Farms in History and Contemporary
Politics, 6 THE MIT ELECTRONIC J. OF MIDDLE E. STUD. 163, 171-72 (2006) http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/
mitejmes/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
13. Id. at 172.
14. Michael Molloy, Tiptoeing Through the Mideast Minefield of Myths, TE GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto, Can.), Aug. 31, 2007, at A15.
15. The Eretz Israel Electricity Company entertained ownership and usage rights east of
Naharayiim, and so did the Eretz Israel Dead Sea Company in Transjordan, without recognizing any Israeli
sovereignty in these Jordanian territories. Sarbaro, supra note 1.
[Vol. 14:2
PROSECUTING THE PRESIDENT AND HIS
ENTOURAGE
Jordan J. Paust*
During his so-called "war on terror," President Bush has authorized and
ordered manifest violations of customary and treaty-based international law
concerning the detention, transfer, and interrogation of numerous individuals.
For example, in a February 7, 2002 memorandum, President Bush expressly
authorized the denial of absolute rights and protections contained in the 1949
Geneva Conventions that apply in all circumstances to any person who is
detained during an armed conflict. The President's memo denied rights and
protections under Geneva law
[B]y ordering that humane treatment be provided merely "in a manner
consistent with the principles of Geneva" and then only "to the extent
appropriate and consistent with military necessity," despite the fact
that (1) far more than the "principles" of Geneva law apply, (2) it is
not "appropriate" to deny treatment required by Geneva law, and [it
is well-understood that] (3) alleged military necessity does not justify
the denial of treatment required by Geneva law.'
Necessarily, the President's 2002 memorandum authorized and ordered the
denial of treatment required by the Geneva Conventions and, therefore,
necessarily authorized and ordered violations of the Geneva Conventions-
which are war crimes.2
My new book at Cambridge University Press, BEYOND THE LAW,3
identifies a reported presidential finding (signed in 2002) by President Bush,
Condoleezza Rice, and then-Attorney General John Ashcroft approving
unlawful interrogation techniques-including water boarding, and an authoriza-
tion for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to secretly detain and interrogate
persons in a September 17, 2001 directive known as a memorandum of
notification and that harsh interrogation tactics were devised in late 2001 and
* Mike and Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston.
1. See JORDANJ. PAUST, BEYONDTHE LAw:THEBUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES
IN THE "WAR" ON TERROR 7-8 (2007) [hereinafter PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW].
2. Every violation of the law of war is a war crime. See, e.g., id. at 13. A uniform and
overwhelming number of federal cases demonstrates that the President and all persons within the executive
branch are bound by the customary and treaty-based laws of war. See, e.g., id. at 21-22, 169-72.
3. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1.
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early 2002.' Subsequently, the CIA disclosed the existence of a directive
signed by President Bush granting the CIA power to set up secret detention
facilities in foreign territory and outlining interrogation tactics that were
authorized, as well as another document that contains a Department of Justice
legal analysis specifying interrogation methods that the CIA was authorized to
use against top al-Qaeda members.' In fact, during a speech on September 6,
2006, President Bush publicly admitted that a CIA program has been
implemented "to move.. . [high-value] individuals to... where they can be
held in secret" and interrogated using "tough" forms of treatment, and stated
that the CIA program will continue.' In July 2006 and in furtherance of his
program, President Bush had signed a new executive order authorizing
"'enhanced' interrogation tactics to be used against persons held in secret
"'black sites"' overseas and elsewhere.'
As documented in BEYOND THE LAW, the unlawful "tough" interrogation
tactics that are an admitted part of the Bush program are war crimes.' They are
also violations of nonderogable customary and treaty-based human rights law9
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment."' The transfer of non-prisoners of war out of war-
related occupied territory in Afghanistan and Iraq during the Bush program was
also a patent and per se violation of the laws of war. Such transfers are
absolutely prohibited by express language in Article 49 of the Geneva Civilian
Convention' and clearly and unavoidably constitute "grave breaches" of the
Convention. 2 Moreover, the refusal to disclose the names or whereabouts of
persons subjected to secret transfer and secret detention is a manifest and
serious crime against humanity known as forced disappearance-a crime that
also involves patent violations of related human rights law, the Convention
Against Torture, and the laws of war.'3
4. Id. at 28.
5. Id. at 28-29.
6. Id. at29.
7. See, e.g., Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret US. Endorsement of Severe
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at AI (also disclosing the existence of memos penned by Seven
G. Bradbury in OLC, DOJ). See also Randall Mikkelsen, CIA Detention Program Remains Active: U.S.
Official, REUTERS NEWS, Oct. 4, 2007.
8. See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 1-4. 12-18. 27-31; Appendix, infra.
9. Id. at 4-5, 12-18,27-31.
10. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. See also PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 5.
11. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 49, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
12. Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 147; PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 18.
13. See PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 32.
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John Yoo, a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Office of
Legal Counsel of the United States Department of Justice, has disclosed that
detention, denial of Geneva protections, and coercive interrogation "policies
were part of a common, unifying approach to the war on terrorism."' 4 During
meetings chaired by White House Counsel Gonzales, the inner circle decided
that following Geneva law would interfere with their "'ability to . . .
interrogate,""'.. since everyone understood that "Geneva bars 'any form of
coercion.""' 6 "For the inner circle, '[t]his became a central issue," 7 and...
they calculated that 'treating the detainees as unlawful combatants would
increase flexibility in detention and interrogation';"8 and the question became
merely 'what interrogation methods fell short of the torture ban and could be
used"9 as 'coercive interrogation,' 20 which includes outlawed cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment."'"
In view of the fact that a "common, unifying approach" was devised to use
"coercive interrogation" tactics and President Bush has admitted that such
tactics and secret detention have been used as part of his approved program in
other countries, it is obvious that use of coercive interrogation migrated to
Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the common plan. It is also clear that
presidential and other authorizations, directives, and findings (including two
authorizations from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld22 and one from Lt. Gen.
Sanchez23) and memos (such as the Yoo-Delahunty,24 Gonzales,25 Aschcroft,26
Bybee,27 Goldsmith,2" and the newer Bradbury memos29), and the 2003
Department of Defense Working Group Report 0 substantially facilitated the
effectuation of the common, unifying plan to use coercive interrogation and that
14. JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS ix (2006).
15. PAUST, BEYONDTHE LAW, supra note 1, at 30. (citing YOO, supra note 15, at 39).
16. Id. at 30. (citing YOO, supra note 15, at 39).
17. Id. at 30. (citing YOO, supra note 15, at 39).
18. Id. at 30. (citing YOO, supra note 15, at 43).
19. Id. at 30. (citing YOO, supra note 15, at 171).
20. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 30. (citing YOO, supra note 15, at 191).
21. See, e.g., YOO supra note 14, at 200; PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 30.
22. See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 26.
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 7.
27. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 11.
28. Id. at 18.
29. See Shane, supra note 7, at Al.
30. See PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 14.
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use of unlawful coercive interrogation tactics was either known or a
substantially foreseeable consequence of the common plan. Clearly, several
memo writers and those who authorized coercive interrogation tactics were
aware that their memos and authorizations would assist perpetrators of coercive
interrogation.
What types of criminal responsibility can exist under international law
with respect to such conduct? First, it is obvious that direct perpetrators of
violations of the laws of war, the Convention Against Torture, and crimes
against humanity (such as forced disappearance of persons as part of the
President's "program" of secret detention) have direct liability. Leaders who
issue orders or authorizations to commit international crimes can also be
prosecuted as direct perpetrators.31
Second, any person who aids and abets an international crime has liability
as a complicitor or aider and abettor before the fact, during the fact, or after the
fact.32 Liability exists whether or not the person knows that his or her conduct
is criminal.33 Under customary international law, a complicitor or aider and
abettor need only be aware that his or her conduct would or does assist a direct
perpetrator.34 In any case, ignorance of the law is no excuse. Especially
relevant in this respect are the criminal memoranda and behavior of various
German lawyers in the German Ministry of Justice, high level executive
positions outside the Ministry, and the courts in the 1930s and 1940s that were
addressed in informing detail in United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice
Case).35 Clearly, several memo writers in the Bush Administration abetted the
"common, unifying" plan.
Third, individuals can also be prosecuted for participation in a "joint
criminal enterprise,"36 which the International Criminal Tribunal forthe Former
Yugoslavia has recognized can exist in at least two relevant forms: (1) where
all the accused "voluntarily participated in one of the aspects of the common
plan" and "intended the criminal result, [whether or not they knew it was a
31. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ETAL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 32,
35, 5 1-73 (3rd ed. 2007) [hereinafter PAUST, ICL].
32. Id. at 47 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. IT-95-14/I-T, Trial Chamber, 545 (Sept.
2, 1998); PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note I, at 18, 24, 30.
33. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 25(3)(c)-(d), 30, 32(2), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
34. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Trial Chamber, IM 236-38, 245, 249
(Dec. 10, 1998); But see Rome Statute, supra note 33, art. 25(3)(c) (adding a new "purpose" to facilitate the
test that will leave ICC jurisdiction incomplete).
35. See United States v. Altstoetter, 4 Law Reports ofTrials ofWar Criminals Case No. 35, 1 (U.N.
War Crimes Comm'n, 1948).
36. PAUST, ICL, supra note 31, at 32, 37-38.
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crime] even if not physically perpetrating the crime"37 ; and (2) where "(i) the
crime charged was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the execution of
that enterprise, and (ii) the accused was aware that such a crime was a possible
consequence of the execution of that enterprise, and, with that awareness
participated in that enterprise."3
Fourth, civilian and military leaders can also be liable for dereliction of
duty with respect to acts of subordinates when the leader:
1) Knew or should have known that subordinates were about to
commit, were committing, or had committed international
crimes;
2) The leader had an opportunity to act; and
3) The leader failed to take reasonable corrective action, such as
ordering a halt to criminal activity or initiating a process for
prosecution of all subordinates reasonably accused of criminal
conduct.39
What legislation allows prosecution of some of these crimes? In the
United States, there are several forms of legislation that can be used. However,
there is presently no federal statute permitting prosecution of "crimes against
humanity" as such, although one could be enacted and operate retroactively
without violating any ex post facto prohibitions as long as what is being
prosecuted under the new statute was a crime against humanity under
international law at the time of the alleged commission.4"
Prosecution in the federal district courts would most likely occur under
two forms of federal legislation that allow prosecution of relevant war crimes.
The first is the War Crimes Act.4 This statute allows prosecution, for example,
of those U.S. nationals who commit a relevant war crime outside the United
States. Listed war crimes include some violations of the 1907 Hague
Convention No. IV42 and all "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions43
(which include certain forms of mistreatment of detainees and the unlawful
transfer of persons).' Also clearly relevant is the statutory listing of violations
37. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Chamber, 264 (Sept. 1, 2004).
38. Id. 265; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T-A, Appeals Chamber, 50 (July 29,
2004)
39. See, PAUST, ICL, supra note 31, at 51-73; PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 52, 70.
40. See, e.g., PAUST, ICL, supra note 31, at 234, 236.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2003).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 244 1(c)(2) (2003).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1) (2003).
44. See, Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 147.
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of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,45 which expressly
requires humane treatment of detained persons "in all circumstances" and also
covers "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture" as well as "outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment" of "persons taking no active
part in the hostilities."46 Today, customary international law reflected in
common Article 3 provides a set of minimum rights and duties in any armed
conflict, although the article was originally designed to apply to cases of
insurgency.47 The Supreme Court's opinion in Hamdan48 and the concurring
opinion of Justice Kennedy, 49 generally affirm this point about Geneva law-a
point documented further in BEYOND THE LAW.5"
A second set of federal laws allows prosecution in federal district courts
of any violation of the laws of war as offenses against the laws of the United
States. As recognized by the Supreme Court in cases such as Exparte Quirin5
and In re Yamashita,52 the precursor to 10 U.S.C. § 818 incorporated the laws
of war by references as offenses against the laws of the United States. Under
18 U.S.C. § 3231, all offenses against the laws of the United States can be
prosecuted in the federal district courts, whether or not there is concurrent
jurisdiction in any military tribunal. These points have been well documented
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3) (2003).
46. Geneva Convention, supra note 1I, art. 3.
47. See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note I, at 2-3.
48. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 Sup.Ct. 2749, 2749 (2006) (the Court ruled that "there is at least
one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies here... Common Article 3").
49. See id. at 2799-804 (Kennedy, J. concurring)
[T]he requirement of the Geneva Conventions... [is] a requirement that controls here
... The Court is correct to concentrate on one provision of the law of war that is
applicable to our Nation's armed conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan ... That
provision is Common Article 3 ... The provision is part of a treaty the United States
has ratified and thus accepted as binding law.... By Act of Congress, moreover,
violations of Common Article 3 are considered 'war crimes,' punishable as federal
offenses.
Id.
50. See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 3.
51. 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30 (1942) ("Congress... exercised its authority to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations ... Congress has incorporated by reference... all offenses which are defined as
such by the law of war").
52. 327 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1946).
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in another article. 3 Additionally, prosecution of some forms of torture could
occur under the federal torture statute.54
It would also be possible to prosecute civilians in a properly constituted
military commission in a war related occupied territory using at least the
minimum due process requirements under customary international law
incorporated by reference in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions55
and reflected in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.56 Prosecution of civilians might also be possible in a general courts-
martial in a theater of war in time of war if such a prosecution can survive a
Fifth Amendment challenge such as that addressed in the Supreme Court's 1957
decision in Reid v. Covert 7 (which might be distinguished, since the case
addressed the impropriety of military tribunal jurisdiction over U.S. civilians
in time of peace). Prosecution of some persons is also possible under the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act,58 which applies extraterritorially to
"whoever engages in conduct outside the United States" that would be conduct
criminally proscribed had the conduct been engaged "within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States," but the conduct of a
person who is not a member of the armed forces of the United States would
have to have been engaged in while that person was (1) "employed by" US
armed forces,59 or (2) "accompanying" U.S. armed forces outside the United
States.60
A significant problem today, however, is the fact that the Bush
Administration is unwilling to prosecute "their own" under any relevant statute
and experts expect that the new Attorney General will not attempt to enforce
relevant criminal law.6" As documented in BEYOND THE LAW, "for more than
five years the Bush Administration has furthered a general policy of impunity
53. Jordan J. Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crime Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal
District Courts, 50 TEX. L. REv. 6, 10-23,27 (1971), reprinted in 4 THE VIETNAM WARAND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 447 (1976).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A (2000).
55. Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 3.
56. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 16,1966,999U.N.T.S. 171;
See also PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 105.
57. 354 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1957).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 326 1(a)(1) (2000).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g. Anthony D'Amato, Waterboarding: The Key Question for Mukasey, THE JURIST,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/waterboarding-key-question-for-mukasey.php (last visited Feb. 15,
2008); Benjamin Davis, Mukasey on Torture: Of Sins, Mistakes and Crimes, THE JURIST,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/fonny/2007/10/mukasey-on-torture-of-sins-mistakes-and.php (last visited Feb. 15,
2008).
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by refusing to prosecute any person of any nationality under the War Crimes
Act or alternative legislation, the torture statute, genocide legislation, and
legislation permitting prosecution of certain civilians employed by or
accompanying U.S. military forces abroad."62 For example, the Administration
refuses to prosecute memo-writers who have abetted what President Bush
admitted in September 2006 is his "program" of (1) secret detention or forced
disappearance and the per se war crime and "grave breach" of Geneva law
involving the transfer of persons out of occupied territory, and (2) "tough"
interrogation tactics (which are violative of several treaties of the United States
and customary international laws, as documented most recently in BEYOND THE
LAW),63 and those who authorized such criminal activity during what has been
described as a "common, unifying" plan devised by the "inner circle" to engage
in what are patently unlawful forms of "coercive interrogation." Only a few of
the direct perpetrators of the common plan have been prosecuted in military
fora and penalties have generally been surprisingly lenient.
Finally, in the long history of the United States, the Bush Administration
is unique. President Bush and others have clearly authorized and abetted
various types of serious and manifest international crime and the Administra-
tion refuses (1) to stop the violations, and (2) to initiate prosecution of all who
are reasonably accused. We who are still free to speak out must continue our
efforts to assure that no President, Vice President, or cabal of politically-
appointed lawyers ever initiate, authorize, engage in, and abet such a common
plan and program again. The very soul of America, the rule of law, and our
common humanity are at stake.
62. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 31-32.




Sixteen "Tough," "Coercive" Tactics Authorized for Interrogation
[and Categories of International Legal Proscription]' 4
1. Water-boarding [terror, torture, cruel, inhuman, physical coercion];
2. Use of dogs to intimidate [terror, torture, cruel, inhuman, threats of
violence, moral coercion];
3. Threatening to kill family members [terror, torture, cruel, inhuman, threats
of violence moral coercion];
4. Cold cell [torture, cruel, inhuman, physical coercion, degrading,
humiliating];
5. Stripping naked [inhuman, degrading, humiliating, moral coercion; (and
in a given culture) cruel, physical coercion];
6. "Fear up harsh" [cruel, inhuman, physical coercion, moral coercion];
7. Striking to cause pain and fear [cruel, inhuman, physical coercion, moral
coercion];
8. Severe stress matrix, including short shackling [cruel, inhuman, physical
coercion];
9. Withholding of pain medication [cruel, inhuman, physical coercion];
10. Prolonged deprivation of sleep [cruel, inhuman, physical coercion];
11. Secret detention [forced disappearance, cruel, inhuman];
12. Threat of transfer to country for torture [cruel, inhuman, threats of
violence, moral coercion; (and in a given case) terror, torture];
13. Transfer from occupied territory [unlawful transfer, grave breach];
14. Hooding to cause fear [inhuman, moral coercion -- exacerbated when used
with stripping naked and/or hooding to include other categories of
illegality];
15. Sexual humiliation [inhuman, degrading, humiliating, moral coercion],
and;
16. Withholding of food [inhuman, physical coercion].
64. See generally PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1.
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